CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE NO. 65
PROSPECTS FOR CRISIS PREDICTION

A South Pacific Case Study

Ken Ross

Published by
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra, Australia, 1990
ABSTRACT

The monograph considers the ability of intelligence assessments to predict important developments, particularly political crises. It surveys the published literature and draws on the author’s decade as an analyst specialising on the South Pacific. Intelligence analysis is explained and the considerable limitations on predicting crises are highlighted with the intent to establish more realistically what policy-makers and the public can expect of intelligence organisations. The importance of top-calibre analysts is emphasised as a most important element in obtaining the best possible assessments.

Most South Pacific countries change their Prime Ministers and governments within a peaceful constitutional succession convention. Fiji has been the only exception. Vanuatu, where the Lini government has been in power since 1979, is regarded by some observers as the next most probable exception. A general election is due in late 1991 and it is thought there could be political turmoil regardless of who wins because of discontent with the result.

This general election is developed as a case study to illustrate how an intelligence analyst might prepare assessments endeavouring to determine the likelihood of a crisis occurring then. The tentativeness of the assessment is stressed but the value of its being done hinges on the assertion that ministers and senior officials, as policy-makers, will be more alert and better briefed to face the eventual outcome, whether it lives up to the prediction or not.
Ken Ross is an analyst with the External Assessments Bureau in Wellington, New Zealand. His tertiary education was at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch where he obtained a master’s degree in political science and sociology, and also a post-graduate diploma in journalism.

From April 1970 to January 1973 he lived in Wellington and was employed as the Executive Secretary, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. For the next three years he worked as the Administrative Officer (Central Executive) at the University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby.

In May 1976 he returned to Wellington and joined the recently established External Intelligence Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Department. Since then he has been employed by the Bureau (renamed in 1988) as a specialist on South Pacific affairs. He lived in Honiara, Solomon Islands from February 1979 to January 1982 when he was the New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner there.

Since 1972 he has travelled extensively throughout the South Pacific. He has written several articles on developments in the region.

From June to October 1989 he was an Australian Defence Department Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra.
I am grateful to David Hegarty for having prompted me to visit the SDSC and for his continuing support. I appreciated particular assistance in Canberra from Des Ball, Cathy Downes, Helen Hookey, Denis McLean, Andy Mack, Robyn Sheen, Helen Wilson and staff at the New Zealand High Commission. I am indebted to another SDSC visitor, Tom McNaugher of The Brookings Institution, for leading me to the literature on intelligence and to Stephanie Lawson for introducing me to the detailed consideration of the failure of democratic politics in Fiji as the model for my own case study. In Wellington I have appreciated support from the External Assessments Bureau, particularly Mike Green, Clare Hill and Jane Simpkins, and for editorial advice from Nancy Mullins and Pauline Swain.

The contents of this monograph have been reviewed to ensure that there was no inclusion of classified information.
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications which arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University. Previous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as the relationship of the superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of those still available refer to the last pages of this volume.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.
FOREWORD

Who are the readers for a monograph on intelligence and the South Pacific, or, more baldly; are there any? I suspect there is a potential audience which might be interested in both major themes but larger discrete groups for each. Allison in his Preface to Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis said "rather than stumbling around thinking about a general unknown reader, or trying to write for everyman, he (a colleague) suggested instead that I choose four or five real people and let them stand for the circle of readers to whom I was writing".1 I have followed that advice with my "real people" being an academic, a journalist, a senior official in a South Pacific island state, and a business executive, all of whom have an interest in South Pacific developments. They also include a Washington based research fellow familiar with intelligence issues but a newcomer to the South Pacific. Then there's my family who over the years have politely puzzled about what I do; maybe now they will have a better appreciation, and also the colleague whose family presented him with a tee-shirt saying "my job is so secret even I don't know what I do".

The monograph was largely researched while I was an Australian Department of Defence Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from June to September 1989. During that time the initial outline underwent a major transformation as further literature on intelligence was explored. Though I had had a decade preparing assessments as one of a small team in Wellington I had not previously reflected a great deal about the assessment process. That changed after I was involved in two crisis situations during 1987 and 1988 and saw the difference assessments may make.2

2. A former Director of the CIA, William Colby, has written of the "psychic" incentive for better analysis, namely "the experience of briefing the National Security Council or seeing national policy turn on the result of an analysis can be a strong incentive to renewed dedication", from Roy Godson (ed.), Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, 1980), p.170.
The account of Vanuatu's last two decades is to a certain extent a personal memoir. I first went there in February 1974 having already met several ni-Vanuatu studying overseas. Since that visit I have returned to Vanuatu a dozen times as a tourist, diplomat and intelligence analyst. All my visits since joining the Bureau in May 1976 have been cleared with the Vanuatu government.

As I recount events in Vanuatu in the 1980s it will be apparent that there is no academic exposition by any ni-Vanuatu of these events. During the 1970s several leading ni-Vanuatu wrote of their experiences. The 1980s were barren of commentary by ni-Vanuatu except in media interviews. I am conscious that I write as an outsider and that I am writing primarily for foreigners rather than ni-Vanuatu, who will go about their politics irrespective of what I may or may not write about them!

The hope is that this monograph as well as being of interest in New Zealand and Australia will have some value for officials in the South Pacific island states who are becoming involved in assessments work. A separate audience is possible among business executives, academics and journalists as well as students. It is not a definitive piece but rather an introduction to intelligence, which also provides some insights on several South Pacific topics. I have deliberately resorted to quoting others extensively, rather than say some things myself, to drive home that the basic information exists in the public arena along with a variety of views to ponder for those interested in drawing their own conclusions about recent (and forthcoming) developments in the South Pacific.

I have approached my task of explaining intelligence by seeking to make some general points which are not specifically related to my own circumstances as a Wellington analyst. There is little of note that I could say had I written about the New Zealand scene because the Bureau and the group of customers in Wellington are, when compared to other such organisations, a minuscule group and one which has its own particular and peculiar dynamics.
An incidental intention of this monograph is to show that while, of course, intelligence work must be serious and responsible it is not necessarily as dull and earnest as many suppose it to be. (This concern became apparent from conversations while in Canberra.) There is excitement and one can be vibrant and survive so long as assessments produced are credible and sometimes match unfolding events. It is often a high stress environment. Washington’s Robert Gates, a top intelligence figure who has written on the CIA’s recent performance, is undoubtedly correct in stating the "CIA is not for the faint-hearted". Walter Laqueur in his major study of the American intelligence community World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (1985) contends that "...intelligence officials have to anticipate that their tasks will be like that of Sisyphus - not only thankless, but forever renewed and ultimately futile".

Yet some, such as myself, enjoy assessments work and relax with Le Carre fables. P. J. O’Rourke, the international desk chief for Rolling Stone Magazine, provides an insight which illuminates why. When filing a story from Beirut recently O’Rourke just said "I like to hang around places where human nature is at its most baffling". O’Rourke has shown an interest in the South Pacific claiming in his Foreword to Holidays in Hell to have mailed to his publisher a piece on terrorist activity on South Pacific nude beaches.

I owe a considerable debt to my friends throughout the South Pacific, who since the early 1970s have shared happy and serious times. In part this monograph is an acknowledgement that open encounters are still the practice in the region.

# CONTENTS

Abstract
Foreword

Introduction

## Intelligence

1. What is Intelligence?  
2. Butchers and Bakers  
3. Fortune Tellers?  
4. Intelligence Failures  
5. Analysts: Born, Bred and House-trained?  

## South Pacific

6. Democratic Constitutions  
7. Vanuatu: Scene-setting  
8. Vanuatu: The 1970s  
12. Vanuatu: Reflections  

Annex: Results of Vanuatu’s Parliamentary Elections 1979 to 1989

Bibliography
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Publications
INTRODUCTION

In recent months there have been dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe as Communist governments have collapsed from pressure for a more democratic form of state. The rapidity of developments has been near spell-binding for those in, for instance, Wellington watching such events on television as night after night they saw new twists and turns. Daily newspapers could barely keep pace as events cut across their deadlines. Just a few months before we had been riveted to the television as it carried the vivid images from Beijing of pro-democracy demonstrators facing troops.

In December 1989 the Australian journalist, Sam Lipski, writing in the The Bulletin referred to "the roller-coaster ride of history that the world has been on these past 12 months" and said that it is all happening too fast, the changes are so momentous, the possibilities so pregnant with hope and yet so fraught with danger. Lipski reckoned that anyone trying to make sense of the upheavals is searching desperately for the wise guides ("those soothsayers of international affairs who may help to add more light than heat"). His advice is to look to those who take the longer view.

For government leaders and their senior officials there are in-house soothsayers: intelligence assessments officials. In this monograph I sketch what the analysts do, primarily to show that at the core of their efforts is much the same information which is available for the public. Thus when a tourist, a business executive or a journalist looks at the South Pacific, Eastern Europe or China to take a decision affecting his or her intentions, each is doing the same as the analyst, evaluating what has been gleaned about a place and then making the best judgment of what it means. I will be using illustrations from my South Pacific experiences to highlight my story and in the second half develop a case study to indicate what can be done within the limitations intelligence has.

Intelligence assessments are valuable for governments. Obviously good ones, which enable a government to know how to react to troubling circumstances overseas where their own citizens might be adversely affected, can save lives. Diplomatic representations might be timely if intelligence alerts to a looming crisis. International incidents might be averted or prompted depending on policy priorities when intelligence brings in new insights.

Intelligence officials have a special responsibility because they put material before a Prime Minister or a President which may be acted on; otherwise they are no different from journalists, academics or business executives as they attempt to understand another country’s political dynamics.

The main focus here is on how well intelligence assessments might predict crises, rather than the more usual intelligence tasks of commenting on latest events or of forecasting likely developments. A major endeavour is to provide for better understanding when further crises occur in the South Pacific. Another intention is to explain why a crisis is so often a surprise.

Regional Stability in the South Pacific

In the years ahead the South Pacific will not be immune from crisis. Where, when and why a crisis will occur can seldom be predicted. Analysts’ best intuitions can probably highlight circumstances which might become crises, but there is little prospect of their having any profitable warning of the next international crisis or the one after that.

In October 1987 one of the most experienced commentators on South Pacific affairs, David Hegarty pondered on how best to analyse the changing South Pacific. He noted then the security outlook in the region was changing, referring to the beginnings of superpower competition for influence, the appearance of extra-regional disputants and of countries with no intrinsic interest in the region and the increasing possibility of domestic instability in the island states.

On that occasion Hegarty considered\(^3\) that traditional concepts of international relations used to analyse regions are often inadequate when applied to the contemporary South Pacific. He saw

the particular mix of small and larger states, of their vulnerabilities and fragilities, of the patterns in their relationships, of the degree of change currently under way and the range of endogenous and exogenous factors affecting that change, does not easily lend itself to characterisation by the usual terminology.

Hegarty concluded that comparative studies of regional politics - "subordinate state systems" - offer more useful insights. He agreed with Buzan that in the field of international relations, a focus on global rivalry between the superpowers has left the study of local security sub-systems sorely neglected.\(^4\) Hegarty suggested that the South Pacific was clearly not a "zone of conflict" nor was it a region of turmoil or revolt; further, "balance-of-power" analyses when applied to the South Pacific were not particularly instructive as the hegemonic influence and general orientation is decidedly western. He rejected the notion of a power vacuum which French commentators had recently argued would develop were the French to withdraw from the region, and which the Soviet Union might attempt to fill.

Subsequently Paul Dibb has suggested that analysis of security prospects in the South Pacific requires a different

\(^3\) ibid., pp.2-3.

approach and methodology from that applied to the analysis of global strategy or even of security prospects in Southeast Asia. Dibb considers

the conclusions by the Commonwealth Secretariat about the vulnerability of small economies are useful but other assertions need to be tested against the specific political, social, demographic and geographic circumstances that apply quite specifically to the South Pacific countries.6

A forthcoming study for the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) by Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, who have previously specialised on the Caribbean states and are undertaking a comparative look at that region and the South Pacific, may provide new insights. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre’s South Pacific Security Project is focussing on ways that sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Pacific island states might be threatened in the 1990s.

In the meantime Hegarty’s Stability and Turbulence in South Pacific Politics is the most useful introduction to the subject of regional security in the South Pacific.7 And in my view, the key to regional security is the internal stability of the individual island countries and not the activities of non-benign external influences, though the latter could prey on domestic political turbulence.

As Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China experience internal pressures for more democracy the South Pacific is hearing more often voices from within suggesting there is too much democracy there. Such a value judgment is not the issue here, but the monograph does look at the impact of democratic conventions in the South Pacific.

5. Paul Dibb, "An Australian Defence Perspective on the South Pacific", in David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds), The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.1: Views from the Region (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra 1989), p.69
6. ibid., p.69.
7. (Working Paper no. 185, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, June 1989).
It is interesting to look back 20 years to be reminded of what was being said about the prospects for the region. Mary Boyd, a New Zealand academic, presented a paper on the South Pacific saying that while constitutional development would encourage a variety of political parties - mass or elite, territorial, regional, or ethnic - the tendency will be for the emergence of a single-party system of government with one dominant party and/or leader, not the two-party system. Discussion on Boyd’s presentation included comment that the Westminster/Washington model of democratic government had broken down all too often in newly-independent countries and on the face of it the emerging new states in the South Pacific were in many respects among the least viable prospects. Perhaps it wasn’t realistic to expect them to do better, commentators suggested, venturing that a military coup producing a Cuban situation was not impossible.

Twenty years later the concerns expressed by Boyd and other participants had not been realised. In mid-1989 Hegarty, wrote that until the military coup in Fiji the record of political stability in the new states of the South Pacific region had been impressive. He said "there had been no high incidence of political conflict and disorder, no impositions of one-party rule, and no unilateral changes to the constitution to entrench a particular leadership in power... governments in the South Pacific had been changed regularly and in orderly, constitutional fashion".

Hegarty considers the Fiji coup severely dented the South Pacific’s reputation for stability and that the coup has become a benchmark in the assessment of regional stability. He elaborates a key explanation for what may be developing in the region, a tendency toward domestic political volatility and suggests "an examination of the prospects for domestic stability and instability...is appropriate to a consideration of the future regional security outlook".

9. ibid., p.83.
11. ibid., p.4.
6 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

I will pick up this theme with a case-study, Vanuatu’s November 1991 general election, to show how an analyst (or any other observer who used the same information) can derive from public sources a perception of what is happening.

South Pacific Crises

In recent years in the South Pacific there have been several crises which have involved the Australian and New Zealand governments.

Australia’s Defence minister, Kim Beazley, acknowledged in May 1989 that elements of the country’s defence force had been put on alert several times in the previous two years because of events in Fiji and Vanuatu. On two of those occasions New Zealand also had defence elements on increased alert status.

Five years before the May 1987 Fiji coup, the first of the Beazley alerts, Coral Bell had suggested "the South Pacific area is clearly the only diplomatic arena which is likely to be readily seen as a sphere of potential crisis management" for an Australian government.

In Crises and Policy-makers Bell provided a most apt description of a crisis when she said they, "like giraffes, are readily recognisable even if one has not got round to defining them." Bell has put some emphasis on "pseudo-crises" which, she contends, are "more often manufactured by the media than by policy-makers". She also classifies as pseudo-crises "those episodes where some real incident is involved, and a wide-spread media sensation is created but the consequences only affect the ‘atmospherics’ of some public event".

12. ABC Four Corners programme, 22 May 1989.
15. ibid., p.18.
16. ibid.
An example of a pseudo-crisis from my own experience is the 19 hours lapse between hearing late on Saturday 4 December 1987 a Radio Australia report that Barak Sope, a leading figure in the ruling Vanua’aku Pati who was engaged in a power struggle, was Vanuatu’s Prime Minister-designate, and discovering the reality. It took until the next afternoon to find out that the news story was based on a report from Vanuatu by a correspondent of Agence France Presse. My concern arose because the previous day I had picked that Vanuatu’s Prime Minister, Walter Lini, would be untroubled by Sope’s challenge expected several days later at a special meeting of the party’s leaders. So what had gone wrong with my prediction? Nothing, the story was quite incorrect. Lini was indeed untroubled by the Sope challenge, winning by a big margin and possibly helped by Sope having been identified within Pati circles as being in some way culpable for the international publicity about him being Prime Minister-designate.  

Bell was writing five years before the turmoil in Vanuatu in 1987-88 but her words were prescient for a lot of what was to happen there. A recent interview with Grace Molisa, Prime Minister Lini’s private secretary, was introduced with the comment "Vanuatu’s government likens Australian journalists to reef sharks which cruise around till they scent trouble, then wham, there’s a feeding frenzy".

Other than some media reporting of the crises as they occurred there has been little substantial commentary on those events. (The one exception is the considerable literature on Fiji written since the May 1987 coup.) There is much that has yet to be said that is not public: this monograph will not be breaking new ground in that respect.

Vanuatu has the most potential of the South Pacific states to join Fiji in departing from constitutional democracy with serious political turmoil that could prompt concern among its neighbours. That, in my view, is not the most likely outcome for

17. The AFP story was carried in the New Zealand media as well. See Dominion Sunday Times, 5 December 1987, and the Evening Post, 8 December 1987, p.10. The latter printed the original piece in its entirety which portrayed Sope in the most glowing terms.
8 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

Vanuatu, but makes it a telling case study of how prudent observers build up an understanding of the countervailing pressures in a country.

The 'Fiji effect'

Anthony Payne, a British academic, wrote in the October 1989 issue of The Round Table about trends in South Pacific politics. His opening lines read

the military intervention in Fiji did to political commentary on the South Pacific what the revolution in Grenada did to discussion of Commonwealth Caribbean politics eight years earlier: it gave rise not only to fresh external interest in the region, but also to a line of analysis which emphasized its growing political instability. Fiji, like Grenada, was seen by many as the forerunner of other similar political changes... in the aftermath of Grenada in 1979, the 'Fiji effect' was nevertheless born. Attention eagerly focussed on signs of political unease in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu, the other two leading Commonwealth South Pacific states, and scenarios involving the overthrow of existing regimes by various means were soon envisaged or invented.19

Payne argued in the article that the thrust of much recent analysis on the South Pacific has been misleading. After looking at Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu his conclusion was that there is no neat pattern. He saw the Fiji and Papua New Guinea "situations as emanating from the pressures that traditional and conservative political systems come under in the face of accelerating social and economic change."20 whereas in Vanuatu "a political system seemingly better adapted to the management of change appears to be coming under pressure from a traditionalist

20. ibid., p.445.
personalist type of politics". Payne was referring to Barak Sope's unsuccessful attempts in 1987 and 1988 to topple Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Walter Lini.

Payne sees recent turmoil in the three countries as arising from domestic issues and conflicts. He acknowledges that "as the South Pacific is drawn more and more into the international system, a range of rivalries between both the great powers and old and new 'middle powers' has the capacity to destabilize still further the region's inherited political ways". Other commentators have sought to explain the recent turmoil in the South Pacific with the reverse emphasis, seeing external influences as the prime prompt for events in Vanuatu and Fiji. George Tanham and Owen Harries are two such observers who have published substantial papers recently but have, I suggest later in the monograph, misread developments. Payne concludes: "the 'Fiji effect' is certainly there, but it is not to be understood as a model of what is to come in any serious or precise sense. It is more accurately a signpost, bearing a message which says to the South Pacific: 'Welcome to the Third World!'". This seems more perceptive.

The chapters in this monograph which focus on the South Pacific are intended to add some insights to recent events, such as those in Vanuatu during 1987 and 1988; and aspects of the 14 May 1987 coup in Fiji. They suggest some considerations which seem to be of value but which have not had the "airing" in public they could do with.

21. ibid., p.446.
22. ibid.
23. George K. Tanham (with Eleanor S. Wainstein), Security Trends in the South Pacific: Vanuatu and Fiji, A Rand Note - Prepared for The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, November 1988. Tanham has also written for Pacific Defence Reporter on the same themes, notably the role of Christian churches, labour unions and the anti-nuclear movement. See the July 1988 issue for "Understanding Vanuatu - or how to regain the high moral ground". Owen Harries in his Strategy and the Southwest Pacific: An Australian Perspective argues that regions acquire strategic significance not because of their inherent characteristics but by being caught up in patterns of great power rivalry and he says that is happening in the South Pacific after having been a geopolitical backwater for several decades.
CHAPTER ONE

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

In his *World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* Walter Laqueur made a most sustained attempt to tackle the main issues facing intelligence’s role in American foreign policy making. He took till the end of his introductory chapter before he sought to define "intelligence" and then simply said "the term ‘intelligence’ has thus far been used without clearly defining it, and not without purpose. Like ‘history’, it has more than one meaning. On the one hand, it refers to an organization collecting information and on the other to the information that has been gathered".¹

For this monograph I will follow that joint usage and suggest, as does Laqueur that

those in favour of more detailed and more rigorous definitions will find them in the textbooks, which also deal with the differences between strategic and tactical intelligence. In the present context, all that needs be said is that ‘intelligence’ is by no means the only collector and producer of intelligence. Information reaches the policy maker from a great many other sources, and intelligence agencies draw their information largely from open sources. Thus the intelligence agencies have no monopoly, perhaps not even an oligopoly, in the product they bring to market.²

Colby reinforces Laqueur with his reflection that "no longer is intelligence information only the private prerogative of an intelligence priesthood: to an increasing degree, the intelligence

---

2. ibid., p.12.
What is Intelligence?

The analyst is wrestling with the meaning of the same raw information as his colleague in the academic community, the think tank, or the commercial risk analysis service."[^3] Journalists are, hopefully, also in there wrestling!

The impression of Gates, after working for four American Presidents, is that most presidents attach as much or more credibility to the views of family, friends, and private contacts as they do to those of their experts and "despite the mystique of intelligence for the public, for most presidents it is just one of a number of sources of information. Intelligence reporting must compete for the president's time and attention, and that competition is intense."[^4]

**Expectations of Intelligence**

Robert Jervis, one of the long-time observers of intelligence, writing recently on what's wrong with the intelligence process, contended that for Americans to expect their intelligence community to predict many, if not most, of the world's crises is unrealistic. He suggests that if the intelligence community is "right, say, one time in three, we would be doing quite well".[^5]

Jervis has outlined what I see as a realistic expectation of what a top-class assessment team can accomplish in the field of warning intelligence. Jervis said then:

- realize that no matter how good an intelligence system is, it cannot predict all important events;
- decision-makers should not feel that the prime responsibility of intelligence is to beat the wire services in reporting riots and coups;
- intelligence should have more insightful things to say than the mass media, but should not necessarily be faster in reporting sudden events;

Prospects for Crisis Prediction

- decision-makers should appreciate the importance of having an intelligence system that can raise the general quality of discussions within the government.\(^6\)

Yet as Robert Gates reports from his experience of working with Presidents they expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the product should be able to predict coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy.\(^7\)

The monograph takes a particular look at warning intelligence and the seemingly inevitable failure to predict crises. Jervis' "one-in-three" appears on the high side! Rather, upsetting presidents is more the norm. The academic journals have numerous articles picking over the bones of such well known failures as the Cuban missile crisis, the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Falklands, and Grenada pre-Maurice Bishop's death in October 1983.

Richard Betts, a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, has written extensively on intelligence failure. Three of his articles will be used to take us through the complexities of intelligence failure and to identify the skills most suited for warning analysis. The first article, published in October 1978 in *World Politics* was "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable"; the second "Intelligence for Policymaking" appeared in *The Washington Quarterly's* Summer 1980 issue; and the third in the Winter 1983 issue of *Orbis* was "Warning Dilemmas: Normal Theory vs. Exceptional Theory".

Betts puts prime emphasis on intellectual sources for error, describing them as more fundamental and less remediable, and as going beyond the barriers that authority, organisation, and scarcity pose to intelligence.

Betts' final words from the 1978 article are most salutary for conveying the dismal tale that is to be told: "Intelligence failures are not only inevitable. They are natural. Some are even benign (if a success would not have changed"

---

6. ibid., p. 40.
policy). And "my survey of the intractability of the inadequacy of intelligence, and its inseparability from mistakes in decision, suggests one final conclusion that is perhaps most outrageously fatalistic of all: tolerance for disaster."

Intelligence literature

Farson has provided a useful survey of the rapidly expanding literature on intelligence-related matters. He categorises it into seven groups: fiction, official documents, semi-official documents, unsanctioned accounts, reports and documentaries in the media, special interest scholarly studies, and "big picture" scholarly studies. His survey is substantial but it is overwhelmingly focussed on North America and Europe.

Intelligence - an academic discipline

In the United States the study of national security and intelligence have developed during the last quarter century as significant academic disciplines. Elsewhere in the English speaking world that has yet to occur. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University does have in its Masters course a significant component focussed on national security concerns, including the role of intelligence. That, it seems, is the only teaching on intelligence available at tertiary level in Australasia.

The most useful guides published in the United States on current intelligence studies - who is teaching what and what intelligence studies can teach - are respectively Marjorie Cline's *Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s: A Survey of College and University Courses on the Subject of Intelligence* (1985) and Stafford Thomas's 1988 article "Assessing Current Intelligence Studies" in *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*.

9. ibid., p. 89.
Australasia/South Pacific

As McClelland aptly states "world-watching has turned into a major research activity". Intelligence assessments organisations are integral elements in the Australian and New Zealand governmental systems. Several of the other South Pacific Forum members have set up similar units and a concerted effort is now underway by the Forum Secretariat to enhance the exchange of security information between member governments.

In recent years South Pacific heads of governments have discussed the security situation in the region at their annual Forum meetings and how to facilitate the exchange of security information. The Forum's Secretariat has been tasked to act on the matter. In July 1989 the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre organised a workshop, with the Secretariat's assistance, on the security outlook for the South Pacific Forum states in the 1990s.

In Wellington the External Assessments Bureau (EAB) is attached to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet while within the Defence Force there is a Directorate of Defence Intelligence. As explained in the Directory of Official Information EAB "is an intelligence and research organisation charged with preparing assessments of overseas developments which are likely to affect New Zealand's interests.... These reports are normally subject to approval by the interdepartmental Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC) before being issued".

12. 1989 South Pacific Forum’s communiqué.
13. ANU Reporter, 11 August 1989, p.3. See also Pacific Report, 3 August 1989, p.3 and Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1989, p.20 for other reports of the workshop. Two publications are forthcoming from the project: one, a summary of the workshop’s discussions; the second, a handbook on information and assessment needs prepared for the Forum Secretariat. Already published is David Hegarty and Peter Polomka, (eds), The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol I: Views from the region (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1989).
Seldom is EAB in the news except when there has been an organisational review; as in 1975 when it became the External Intelligence Bureau and was placed in the newly created Prime Minister’s Department after having been for several decades in its previous incarnation, the Joint Intelligence Bureau, and attached to the Defence Department. Then in April 1987 when the office of the Co-ordinator, Domestic and External Security (DESC) was established and the Prime Minister’s Department dis-established, EIB was for operational purposes responsible to the DESC with administrative support provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now the Ministry of External Relations and Trade). In September 1988 the Bureau was given its present name.

In Canberra there are the Office of National Assessments (ONA), which reports direct to the Prime Minister, and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), which is part of the Defence Department.

ONA was established by an act of Parliament in 1977. The Hope Commission, an official enquiry which sat as a Royal Commission from 1974 to 1977 considering intelligence and security matters, had proposed a new national assessments body be created.

ONA’s first Director General, R. W. Furlonger, wrote in Pacific Defence Reporter in September 1978 of "some of the misconceptions that appear still to exist in the media about what ONA is and does". He went on that it is occupied with the analytical task of estimating or assessing situations as distinct from gathering information about them. This means it is not an intelligence organisation in the popular sense of gathering information from delicate sources, but of course it handles a certain amount of such information. That material of covert origin is in volume (though not always in value) slight

compared to the immense amount of published information, both journalistic and scholarly, as well as diplomatic reports, on which ONA bases its assessments. Essentially its task is to coordinate knowledge from all sources into the best estimate.16

In the remainder of the article he outlined candidly the growing pains of ONA’s first year. Since Furlonger’s piece the only substantial appraisal that has appeared was in 1983 when Mathams and Dibb tackled the topic for Pacific Defence Reporter of what’s wrong with Australia’s intelligence community.17 Their article is a short but comprehensive exposition from two former senior members of JIO, and mirrors in most part the same issues which have been canvassed time and again in the American literature. It would be most likely that were they to do the same task now - six years on - comment on the insolubility and intractability of the same concerns would be prominent. They are topics which will feature in the next several chapters.

Types of Assessments

Arthur Hulnick has provided a useful explanation of what analysts do: they "are supposed to explain what they know, what they surmise, and what they cannot know, and couch their judgements in such a way that their level of uncertainty becomes clear".18 He has outlined the range of assessments which intelligence organisations may prepare for their "consumers", the policy makers. Of the five types: warning, current, estimative, basic and raw, Hulnick’s short explanations are:19

Warning intelligence (which is of most interest for the monograph) is "alerting policy-makers to the possibility of crisis".

16. ibid.
Current intelligence "involves the daily reportage on what happened yesterday, what is going on today, and what might happen tomorrow".

Estimative intelligence is "the most controversial and involves both judgements about the future and intelligence analysis generated in direct support of the policy process".

Basic intelligence is "the compilation of encyclopedic, in-depth data on various countries or subjects".

Raw intelligence is "unevaluated reporting taken directly from sources".

The only important role which Hulnick does not elaborate on is one which intelligence analysts are rarely called on to address. This is their involvement in any rescue operation which their government may contemplate.

Shlomo Gazit gives insights into this in his "Risk, Glory, and the Rescue Operation" article,20 prompted by the failure of the American attempt (Eagle Claw) in April 1980 to rescue the 52 American hostages in Teheran. Gazit, who was the Israeli Director of Military Intelligence (1974-79) and participated in the planning for the Israeli operation at Entebbe, set out "to shed some light on the essential qualities of these missions". In doing so he highlights that such operations must be "heavily intelligence-dependent missions" because of the absolute necessity for surprise and that "as long as certain intelligence has not come in, approval of the (rescue) plan may better be withheld".21

**Understanding Problems of Method**

Methodology is a contentious subject among practitioners. Attitudes range from seat-of-the-pants 'specialists' to zealous theorists. Michael Handel's *Orbis* article has the best, compact description of the pitfalls associated with preparing assessments:

---
21. ibid., p.123.
although the number of valuable works dealing with analysis is still quite limited, the detailed examinations that have been made of the dilemmas involved in anticipating possible surprise attacks demonstrate that much progress has been made in advancing our understanding of analytical intelligence work in general. The study of surprise and the frequent failure to avoid it has also led to a better understanding of the methodological problems involved in intelligence - the need to make forecasts and predictions under conditions of uncertainty and the inherent contradictions, tensions, and "paradoxes" of this type of work. Certain basic concepts (for example, signals, noise, indices, capabilities, intentions, alert fatigue, the "cry wolf" syndrome, perception and misperception) and key issues (for example, the psychological problems of perception, deception, organizational and bureaucratic problems) have been identified.22

In his *World of Secrets* Laqueur looks at these methodological points in the context of how they contribute to intelligence failures. His discussion of the technical concepts is a comprehensible explanation for the non-specialist.23

Gazit reminds us that although constantly enshrouded in secrecy, intelligence work is nothing more than a straight-forward scientific and technological discipline that should serve distinct analytical needs. Intelligence certainly has capabilities and advantages that should be understood and exploited; but one should be equally aware of its limitations.24 Godfrey says "at heart

23. Laqueur, *World of Secrets*, particularly chapter 9 "The Causes of Failure", pp.255-292. For specialist consideration of methodology see articles such as Handel's or books such as Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962) for thorough appraisals of concepts.
intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles: truth
telling" and "the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the
intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker
with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is
humanly possible".25

The Intelligence-Policymaker tangle

How intelligence and policy relate is a major topic.
Gates comments "that bookshelves groan under the literature of
proposed rules of engagement to be followed when these two
worlds collide".26

Hughes' *The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign
Policy and Intelligence-Making*27 is a monograph from a former
State Department intelligence official who has "some heretical
reflections on the unconventional wisdom, on the life and times of
intelligence and policy-making as a two way search: of
intelligence in search of some policy to influence and of policy in
search of some intelligence for support."28

While he was in his positions Hughes often felt like the
Cheshire Cat of *Alice in Wonderland* did after it had talked with
Alice. He found that the unresolvable tension between
policy-making and intelligence rests in part on an unresolvable
definitional problem. No one agrees what is policy and what is
intelligence. (The men who wear these labels give different
answers.)29

Hughes is far from being alone with that reflection,
Handel sees that there is no simple solution to the tension in the
real world of the politics of intelligence.30 Harkabi's term "the

---

25. E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., "Ethics and Intelligence", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.56,
no.3, April 1978, p.625.
27. (Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1976). Hughes was deputy
director (1961-63) and then (1963-69) Director of the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. This is the best short piece about the colliding
worlds of intelligence and policy.
28. ibid., p.6.
29. ibid., p.15.
30. Michael Handel, "Intelligence and the Problems of Strategic Surprise",
Intelligence-Policy Maker Tangle" well describes what has been written about those tensions. Specifically, he explains that

the intelligence service should enter the policymaking process twice: first, by providing data and assessments of the situation, which will contribute to the shaping of policy; and second after the policy has been formulated, intelligence should also evaluate the likely reactions of adversaries and third parties to that policy and its success or failure. However, it often happens that statesmen refrain from seeking the Intelligence service's opinion on this, for basic reasons. For by making such a request of the Intelligence they elevate it to the position of judging their policy. Thus a tangle is created whereby the Intelligence arm which is a subordinate body, becomes an arbiter, a kind of supervisor over its master.31

Anne Armstrong, a former United States ambassador to London and now Chairman of President Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, supports Harkabi with her comment that "in any situation where the United States is heavily involved, policymakers are interested, not so much in a simple prediction of what will happen, as in what the likely effects of their various possible actions might be."32

There is a substantial literature about the role in Washington of the National Security Council, which is the "highest executive branch entity directing and overseeing all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special (clandestine) activities. The NSC and its various committees and subcommittees are also major consumers of all types of intelligence information in the fulfillment of their policymaking and coordination functions."33 There are various Presidential memoirs. Kissinger and other top advisors have written books and

What is Intelligence?


Intelligence’s cousins: academics and media

Intelligence analysts need academics and journalists. In many ways, the three trades are one and the same task; with only nuances to distinguish each from the others.

What sets apart the intelligence analyst from the academic and journalist is a "burden of responsibility". Gazit contends that if they are wrong in their prognosis, the academic and the journalist can rewrite their pieces and there is no danger to their careers but the analyst has not the luxury of a second chance when his conclusions are crucial elements in about-to-be-made decisions. If he is wrong then there can be immediate and severe repercussions. 37

Usually, the media is first with the news. Then intelligence has the onus to raise the quality of discussion for policy-makers. A considerable part of the intelligence community’s onus rests on double-checking the media reporting. The historian Michael Howard captures that point when writing "recent events may be the most deceptive of all, for they are the most easily misunderstood. They come to us, in the first place, in the massively oversimplified imagery of the daily press". 38 When the news is wrong, and from my own experience that is too often, for instance in the already mentioned Prime Minister-designate Sope story, then getting the truth out is often the immediate task.

Gazit emphasises that the analysts’ "access to special, intimate, and sensitive data complements authoritative knowledge of a given area. The obvious significance of this characteristic is

35. Foreign Policy, no.69, Winter 1987-88, pp.80-99.
that the greater the amount of reliable and accurate classified information at his disposal, the greater the intelligence analyst’s advantage over other experts in the same subject."39 The flip-side for analysts is in knowing which classified information is reliable and accurate; it is tempting fate presuming that by being classified, information is bound to be correct.

Colby speaking a decade ago reckoned that intelligence analysis is no longer a special discipline limited only to the secret corridors of a shadowy intelligence service. He suggested then "whatever intelligence might lose from this in romanticism or exoticism, it can gain more by a frank recognition of its partnership with the world of academic research, commercial and industrial information and risk analysis centers, and the media."40

Anecdotes

Intelligence analysts can spend long hours having to show that the latest hot tip which has been slipped to them (or to policy-makers) is of no significance to the real world.

John Horton, who was a CIA Latin American specialist, elucidates this facet of intelligence work in an article, "Mexico, The Way of Iran?"41 He starts with the dismal story of a Californian businessman, part owner of a firm in Mexico, who in the early 80s spoke grimly of Mexico’s future. As Horton recounts, the businessman looked sombre making his point "by saying that his partner in Mexico City kept his plane constantly warmed up so that he could leave in a hurry - if it came to that. The businessman seemed to think it might."42

Horton explains that the businessman was someone who moved in Presidential circles and that his view was like other stories told by people in the administration who had views on Mexico.43 Such businessmen with their hair-raising tales

42. ibid., p.91.
43. ibid.
generated excitement within the administration about Mexico becoming another Iran.

Horton suggests that such anecdotes are influential, and this one had possibly "helped to form the opinions about Mexico of members of the Reagan administration; few people in the administration had direct experience with Mexico".44

The South Pacific is a playground for conspiracy theorists desperately seeking would-be conspirators according to Rowan Callick. Yet he concluded, from nearly two decades of reporting about the South Pacific, that there is no region less prone to conspiracies and more to bureaucratic bungling and sheer eccentricity.45

44. ibid., p.91.
CHAPTER TWO
BUTCHERS AND BAKERS

Thomas Hughes compares those who deal in current intelligence, the butchers, with those whose job is to stand back and take a longer view, the bakers, or estimative types. He describes so well the ecstasy of the former, and the agony of the latter that I turn to him as the pillar for this chapter. Of the butchers, he says:

No one kind of intelligence monopolizes a policy-maker’s attention, and intelligence in toto is only part of the overall concatenation beating in upon policy people. Nevertheless, amid all the prima donnas and the paper flow, the butcher - the current intelligence man with the hot item - usually wins the daily competition to reach the policy-maker. He exults in his indispensability.¹

And Hughes adds:

Current intelligence regularly possesses the raw material that most regularly commands high level attention, and penalties tend to run against those who resist. This is true despite the inherently ephemeral nature of the encounter. Meanwhile the moving finger of current intelligence writes, and having writ, moves on.²

The fragility of the butcher’s satisfaction is soon known, for, on one side, Hughes reminds us that it is the fate of the creators of current intelligence that they cannot really hope to manage the consequences of the processes they set in motion or the papers that they let loose.³ He makes it clear that sometimes the process can get out of control when a potent mix develops between eager butchers and activist consumers. But more typically, "the

¹ Thomas Hughes, The Fate of Facts, p.36.
² ibid., p.37.
³ ibid., p.38.
drumfire of current intelligence confronts policy-makers psychologically either with excessive warnings or disheartening details".\(^4\) so that in the end "the all-seeing eye of current intelligence may not see the forest for the trees. It may defeat itself by its own success".\(^5\)

The final irony of the customers’ fascination for current intelligence is that the more substantive, more slowly assembled package of estimative intelligence finds it much harder to catch the eye of the policy-maker, yet it might have more to say.

**The bakers**

Yet Hughes is also blunt about the estimators; "verbalizers, they risk becoming ‘heroes of the word’, champions of the inflated phrase".\(^6\) He says that they "arm themselves with their own semantic scale of value judgments - almost certainly, highly likely, probably, the chances are just better than even, we doubt, the chances are slight."\(^7\) All the customer wants from them is yes, no or don’t know. Betts’ contends that often the best intelligence can do is an elegant variation of the last and he quotes Sherman Kent and Hughes’ respective wisdoms that "estimating is what you do when you do not know" and "it is inherent in a great many situations that after reading the estimate, you will still not know".\(^8\)

As Hughes puts it: "So tomorrow’s weather will be fine, if it does not rain or snow".

The pinnacle of American estimative intelligence has been the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and their heirs and successors since the demise of the NIE in the early 1970s. Their success and failure have been discussed often in intelligence literature. Hughes is tough on the bakers and their intelligence managers because when they are most needed at times of crisis is, in his experience, when they are least seen. Ruefully he notes when the crisis is over "the intelligence estimators often discover that they have been talking largely to themselves".\(^9\)

---

4. ibid., p.39.
5. ibid., p.40.
6. ibid., p.42.
7. ibid.
Chester Cooper, who was involved in preparing NIEs in the 1960s, describes with an insider's perspective that what emerges reflects a mass of distilled information, a painstaking search for the *mot just* and an assiduous effort to coordinate the views of all appropriate elements of the intelligence community. And, when all is said and done, what emerges is an opinion, a judgment. But it is likely to be the best-informed and most objective view the decision-maker can get.\(^\text{10}\)

Hughes' successor at the State Department, Ray Cline, has contended of the same NIEs that they were "the dry bones, almost the archaeological remains, of a big debate with real intellectual conflicts and attempts by many hundreds of people to express themselves in ways which were circulating in Washington at that time".\(^\text{11}\)

A more cynical view of NIEs comes from a former senior customer McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's national security advisor. At a Senate hearing in 1978 he said "to this day you can read NIEs, and what they will say to you is that you had better get into the same room with the people who are in the process and ask them just what that sentence means because the sentence is obviously designed to hold in place six or eight different agencies."\(^\text{12}\)

Then why do them? There is no glib answer and as we shall see in later chapters there are severe limitations on even the best intelligence estimate. The failure syndrome is oppressive. For example the failure in Washington in 1978 to finish an NIE on Iran prompted finger-pointing of if only it had, then, maybe what followed, may not have! Yet Flanagan notes the draft failed to foresee the fall of the Shah.\(^\text{13}\)

---

13. ibid., p.92. Flanagan provides a lengthy appraisal of NIEs and their successors, see pp.85-93.
Betts has pondered on the U.S. intelligence performance on the revolution in Iran and the failure to anticipate the seriousness of the challenge to the Shah. He contends that half the battle in improving the contribution of intelligence is to recognize the limits of analysis. He says "on the most challenging issues - such as Soviet strategy or political developments in important but volatile Third World countries - success in terms of precise predictions is usually impossible". Betts concludes: "what can be expected from the analyst is a clarification of the variables in play, a highlighting of details that generalists are not aware of, a narrowing of the range of probabilities, and a series of tentative propositions about alternative developments". He accepts that that is a long way short of what the President wants, namely to know exactly when the generally predictable event will happen.

And that goal, unattainable as it is, is the prime product which intelligence’s customers want of it. Laqueur reiterates this need early in his World of Secrets, when he says that the decisive test for an intelligence agency is to warn the policy-maker of trouble before it occurs. My basic intent in this monograph is to show how daunting that task is and in the next chapter to support Laqueur’s main conclusion that it is the quality of analysts which will remain the decisive factor for getting the best result in intelligence in the future as it has been in the past.

A brief mention has to be made of the intelligence manager. This is the senior official, and Hughes and Cline are examples, whose task is to minimise the damage as the intelligence and policy worlds collide. Hughes says their task is in part that of rectifying the imbalance of impact between current and estimative intelligence and that of broking many intelligence-policy relationships. Hughes’ job description for the position is dauntingly realistic:

the intelligence-maker may be an embattled coordinator himself. He will know that neither advice nor receptivity is likely to come in straight

15. ibid.
17. ibid., p.308.
doses. Usually he will be called upon for too much or too little. He will experience the sea changes - the exhilarating times when yes-men are sought, and the soberer times when the no-men recover. In any slice of current history, he will watch agreements arrive on tactics while disagreements deepen on strategy. His may be the duty to highlight, reemphasize and intervene, to correct high-level misconceptions, to recall the minutes of the previous meeting, to impose new interests on ranking readers, to claim time for competing priorities. He must develop a fine sense for the appetites among his consumers, and for their toleration of repetition and saturation. Often he must make a human estimate - calculating when to press intelligence on a policy-maker and when to grant him relief. 18

It is debatable that Le Carre, Deighton or the best of the quality television spy series capture the complete depth of the intelligence-maker's loneliness as he goes about his business.

CHAPTER THREE

FORTUNE TELLERS?

In the previous chapter the skills involved in preparing the ordinary assessments - current and estimative - were outlined. Now, the focus is on whether crises can be predicted before they are about to happen. Ordinary assessments, which are essentially either forecasting the most likely next development or explaining the last development, should see analysts getting it right most times. Predicting crises is different. Experience tells us that it is rare for an intelligence organisation to precisely foretell the turn of events which lead to major political troubles.

The circumstances surrounding the assassinations in May 1989 of the two top Kanak independentists, Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene, were a combination of events I had not contemplated. I had long held the view that Tjibaou was perpetually at risk of assassination because of the legacy of violence in New Caledonia (confirmed when the French provided him with bodyguards). In November 1988 his assassin, the militant independentist Djubelli Wea, was prominent in a Television New Zealand current affairs programme and from seeing him then it was apparent to me that he was a seriously disturbed person. (He was outraged by the Matignon Accords which the independentists had signed in Paris in June 1988. Wea at the time had just been released from a Paris prison where he had been for six weeks after French security forces whisked him from his island, Ouvea during the early stages of the cave siege. The siege had ended with the killing of 19 Kanaks.) A year later Tjibaou and many other leading independentists were on Ouvea to commemorate the first anniversary of the death of the 19. Wea was to have a prominent role in the ceremonies. Notwithstanding all of that general knowledge what happened was totally unexpected. A new political crisis in the South Pacific resulted.¹

¹ In the following days media coverage was considerable but none rivalled the numerous contributions of Helen Fraser for explaining what had happened and what might follow. Of non-Kanaks she had an unparalleled knowledge of the personalities and politics of the Independentist movement. Her New Caledonia: Anti-colonialism in a Pacific territory (Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988) is the best resume of New Caledonia’s
Two earlier periods in New Caledonia were marginally more predictable. They were the occasions in November 1984 and April 1988 when Kanak independentists mobilised against the French to force new negotiations on the territory becoming independent. Such mobilizations, which involved isolating much of the territory from French control, seemed to be inconceivable given the substantial presence of French security forces. Even so, having watched the independentists for several years and met their leaders in and outside New Caledonia I judged that the independentists had no option if they were serious about their hopes but to carry through with their threats to mobilise. They realised the political advantages of a successful outcome even though they accepted that there would be some deaths. However, I doubt that they or anyone else had foreseen either the Hienghene ambush on 5 December 1984 when two of Tjibaou’s brothers and 8 other Kanaks were murdered, or the Ouvea siege of late April/early May 1988.

The major event in the South Pacific during the 1980s was the 14 May 1987 coup by Colonel Rabuka. There may be someone somewhere who when asked in 1979 to predict what would be the most significant event in the South Pacific in the 1980s would have answered, a military coup in Fiji. It would have been even more incredible to be able to foretell precise details of such a coup: the players and their motivations as well as the consequences.

Warning intelligence is the tool assessments staff use to try to reduce the gap between general expectations and making precise predictions. Betts contrasts the expertise needed in his article "Warning Dilemmas: Normal Theory vs Exceptional Theory" where he explains his normal theory as involving probability, making the best possible estimates about numerous instances of behaviour over time. The purpose being to project the adversary’s objectives, capabilities, and propensity to risk over the long range - to estimate the likely incidence of crisis.

recent political history. In Your Flag’s Blocking Our Sun (Australian Broadcasting Commission Books, Sydney, 1990) Fraser recounts her years reporting on New Caledonia, initially as an ABC correspondent in Noumea and subsequently from Paris and Canberra.
His exceptional theory is in stark contrast. It aims at "guessing what the enemy will do about a specific issue in the short range or in a crisis when one does occur". That means specific crisis-oriented predictions must concern themselves with exceptions to the normal, on complexity, contingent propositions, and the residual risks within the usually accurate normal theory. In this field "the severity of low-probability threats takes analytical precedence over the higher probability of less intense threats".

Betts' formulation is not earth-shattering: in large part it is stating the obvious. But what is intellectually obvious does, however, present practical problems for intelligence organisations, especially small ones where the same analyst covering the South Pacific would be doing all three tasks of current, estimative and warning assessment. It is Betts' contention that an analyst, by increasing his chances of being right most of the time, is more likely to be wrong in the rare but critical instances of crisis. He says this on the basis that the two approaches require different analytical instincts, attitudes and styles and if the same analyst does both it is not particularly efficient. His conclusion is that intelligence officials cannot easily shift mental gears and consciously apply different standards of evaluation.

Does it matter if crises are not predicted? Hughes recalls the story of a British Foreign Office researcher who reputedly said, after serving from 1903-50, that year after year the worriers and fretters would come to him with awful predictions of the outbreak of war. He always denied it and quipped that he was only wrong twice. To put it another way, Dean Rusk recalled that while he was Secretary of State in the 1960s the CIA had predicted eight of the last three crises.

We are now picking through the area where government leaders most want assistance but which is most difficult to get right from the assessments side. Betts sums up the dilemma: "predicting dire threats that are not highly probable, but require expensive or unpleasant hedges (such as military alerts or

---

3. ibid., p.829. Much of the intelligence literature specifies, as does Betts in this quote, the enemy concept. It is not necessary to have an enemy for assessments to be valued.
4. ibid., p.830.
mobilization that will prove controversial if they later seem unnecessary) is a tricky business, and such predictions will often be wrong".7

The subject of coups helps to illustrate this. When he was a top CIA official Gates acknowledged8 that the agency had difficulty forecasting coups. (He noted that it usually also came as a surprise to the targetted leader.) Handel has commented that while it is easy enough to say that sooner or later a coup d'etat will take place in Saudi Arabia, its precise timing cannot be anticipated if only because the colonel or prince who might take the lead does not yet know it himself - he may act on the spur of the moment.9

The South Pacific has witnessed only two coups. In Latin America, Africa and the Middle East they are a prolific industry. When in 1981 Finer revised his The Man on Horseback10 he noted that in the 18 years (1963-80) since he had written the book, which is still regarded as a leading piece on the topic, there had been another 152 coups and that 48 states which had not experienced a coup previously had in that time had at least one. At the end of 1980 by his count 37 countries were governed by men who had come to power as a result of military intervention, that is, a quarter of the world's independent states at that time.

Finer observed in 1981 that this long train of military intervention has called into being an increasingly voluminous literature. He commented that work on civil-military relations has, in fact, become a great growth-industry in sociology and political science.11 In addition to Finer's The Man on Horseback other significant books on coups were Ruth First The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat; Cynthia Enloe Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society; Edward Luttwak Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook; Eric Nordlinger Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments; and Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies.12

11. ibid., p.224.
12. See bibliography for details of these books and other readings on coups.
LaPalombara has noted that military coups are now so frequent and widespread that they must be considered as significant as elections.\textsuperscript{13} Coups have not reached epidemic proportions in the South Pacific but some discussion of two talked-about possibilities, a third for Rabuka and one in Papua New Guinea, provide further insights into the complexities of predicting crises and the limitations of the predicting process.

The spectre of a coup in PNG has been raised on and off ever since its independence from Australia in September 1975. The best recent assessment is by Hegarty who, writing in early 1989, explained:

\begin{quote}
it is unlikely that a \textit{coup}, along the lines, for example, of that which occurred in Fiji in 1987, could be replicated in PNG. Topography, ethnicity, military capability, institutional rivalry and other constraints would seriously inhibit a successful army takeover, unless there was a substantial shift in circumstances, including support for military intervention from such institutions as the bureaucracy and the police. Such changes seem unlikely in the near and medium terms. An attempted takeover, however, or at least an attempted limited intervention (such as some of the plotters had in mind in 1977) by disgruntled, disaffected, maverick or ‘wild card’ elements within the army cannot be entirely excluded from a range of considerations. At this stage, such interventions appear low on the scale of probability.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} Joseph LaPalombara in Foreword to Nordlinger’s \textit{Soldiers in Politics}, p.x.
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

Hegarty's assessment is an example of the best available insights, drawing on his two decades of observing Papua New Guinea, yet he can not get closer to a prediction until developments occur which alter his overall appraisal. It then becomes a matter of watching, which is what Saffu, an African political scientist who has spent the last decade at the University of the Papua New Guinea, also does, looking for changes which may portend dramatic developments. His most recent analysis was in early December 1989 when he highlighted his concern that a serious crisis of ungovernability is looming in Papua New Guinea. He postulated the failure of political leaders as the prime reason for his pessimism. Saffu stops short of saying the military will intervene but does canvass what is the most likely scenario and comments on events that have prompted coups elsewhere to see their relevance to PNG's situation. The backdrop which Hegarty and Saffu provide is the starting perspective an analyst might work with as he sifts through his material each day looking for signals which will influence his judgment when next assessing the prospects of a military intervention in light of political developments.

As Fiji's leaders made progress during 1989 with the constitutional review, which had been underway since the interim government led by Ratu Mara had replaced Rabuka's regime in December 1987 with the mandate to complete the new constitution in two years and arrange new elections, it was apparent that the schedule may not be maintained. As a result, given the recent volatility in Fiji, there was media and academic speculation about how Rabuka might respond if he was unhappy with the outcome and whether that could prompt a third coup.

On that basis then, pondering whether there would be another coup became an elusive task during the second half of 1989. There were periods when it might have become a distinct possibility. At other times it seemed unlikely. It will probably


16. In 1989 there was little detailed coverage by the foreign media of events in Fiji, and little forthcoming from academics - in contrast to the previous year when a wealth of academic material was published on the events of 1987. The most informative reporting in the Australian media was by Rowan Callick for the Australian Financial Review.
never be known what Rabuka was contemplating. No doubt at some time in those six months he seriously considered such a move.\textsuperscript{17}

Writing in December 1989 Stephanie Lawson considered political conditions in Fiji were then more unsettled then they had been for the previous two years despite the lack of overt activity on the part of dissidents and the apparently low-key role that the military had assumed. She wrote then that Rabuka was waiting and watching to see how current developments with respect to the constitution, and the issue of Mara’s successor, will affect his future. Lawson suggested "if the results of these leave him in a relatively insecure or marginal position, there may well be a third coup in Fiji".\textsuperscript{18}

Rabuka’s not stepping in with another coup exemplifies the fine line in intelligence analysis between success and failure. The situation outlined is one of the most frustrating for analysts, namely the self-negating prophecy. When a first prediction becomes obsolete through altering circumstances, then the analyst needs to revise his prediction and so it goes as the analyst keeps apace of the changing world.

The fascination of coups is that, while there have been so many in recent decades, they are still largely unpredictable. In \textit{World of Secrets}, Laqueur considered in some detail to what extent predictions can be made about impending internal change by violent means. He noted that the debates about surprise have produced a great many post-mortems, but no predictive theory.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{18} Lawson, \textit{The Prospects for a Third Coup}, pp.11 and 13.

\textsuperscript{19} Laqueur, \textit{World of Secrets} pp. 260-267, 269-271.
In intelligence literature numerous articles and some books take a more specialised consideration of surprise and other important factors in improving the ability to predict crises. From that material, which is listed in the bibliography, I want to outline what I consider is the best working description of the methods an analyst needs to be on top of his job. It is taken from Gazit's article "Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work". 

Gazit’s typology is based on three analytical situations:
- identifying a decision already taken
- analysing responsive decisions
- analysing the outcome of a developing situation.

In his first situation the intelligence organization tries to ascertain whether a major political, strategic decision has been taken by another state. The object is to come up with straight-forward answers to the questions: was such a decision made, and if so, what is its content? His example is how Israeli intelligence faced up to such a situation on the eve of the October 1973 war; an example of the intelligence machinery getting it badly wrong.

In Gazit’s mind there is no fool-proof answer to the problems of uncertainty, though a partial solution may be achieved by putting more effort into the collection of data. This will never be perfect and still leaves the need to worry about unexpected, unknown decisions remaining in the decision-making pipeline.

Gazit contends the analyst’s main concern now is a specific collection effort which needs to explore simultaneously in three directions, each of which might hold the necessary information:
- examine the context of new and different opinions, options, and decisions

20. *International Security*, vol.4, no.4, Spring 1980, pp.45-55 for his three different analytical situations which provide us with the guidelines for better perceiving looming crises.
21. Gazit looks at this in some detail, see pp.45-47. Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War", *World Politics*, vol.28, no.3, April 1976 is another analysis. The key mistake was that senior Israeli intelligence officials misjudged Egyptian and Syrian tactics leading to the war’s start.
- look at the persons involved in the decision-making
- continue the routine monitoring of activity.

The image he uses for the third is a regular check of the other country’s temperature and pulse. It is essential to establish what the norm is (to determine the normal political, military, economic and social pulse). Only with a working knowledge of ‘normal’ activity can we identify a "fever" of extraordinary activity among different functions and functionaries (e.g. lights on at unusual hours, atypical diplomatic activity, unusual military activity). Gazit accepts that when considered in isolation, this kind of information provides very little understanding of what is going on. But that like a thermometer it alerts intelligence personnel to the need to immediately adjust the collection effort in that direction.\(^{23}\)

We look now at Gazit’s second analytical situation which deals with situations where there are no prior decisions but some that might be expected from one party in reaction to decisions made by another party or to a particular outside development. In this situation, intelligence analysts have a twofold task: they must be aware of developments that will call for a reaction by the other side, and they must try to anticipate the opponent’s responses. The example used by Gazit is the case of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose behaviour in the May 1967 crisis led to the Six Day War. Gazit contends that throughout the crisis developments might have taken different courses in accordance with the many possibilities, and the outcome would have been virtually impossible to predict.\(^{24}\)

The second situation presents problems which are radically different from the first, when it was just a case of working out what a certain decision was. Much more speculation is involved with the second; however, if general knowledge and data are reliable and comprehensive there is a better chance of the analyst being right. A good general knowledge must include:

- the overall considerations and constraints that influence the decision-making process of the other side;
- a record of precedents and actions taken by the different decision-makers in similar circumstances in the past.

\(^{23}\) ibid., pp.49-50.
\(^{24}\) ibid., pp.51-52.
Gazit stresses that analysis should enumerate possible reactions by the various sides. It is not a substantiated forecast.25

The third analytical situation Gazit specifies is that of analysing the outcome of a developing situation which is especially crisis prone. Intelligence collection will be of the least help in this case because events are constantly evolving according to the different forces and actors involved. The task is to try to predict which of the sides will eventually gain the upper hand, and what the timing of each phase will be. Gazit acknowledges that there are many obstacles to making such a forecast.26

He was writing in 1980, and used two examples here: the civil war in Lebanon and the recent revolution in Iran. Of the latter, he queried whether an evolutionary process had begun. How was one to decide that events in early 1978 were not just another passing episode? The Shah had faced many attempts on his life, many riots, and many demonstrations.

Gazit has reached the stage in his model which in my view needs to be emphasized as the most volatile point in the whole process of assessing. At this point events are often decided by something quite accidental. Gazit explains: "it can be a question of luck, or the result of mistakes or inaction by one of the major parties involved. Obviously these factors cannot be foreseen. With the beginning of the process one wonders what unexpected variables might intervene to alter the situation".27 He goes on to explain that the outcome of such an uncertain process will be decided by several factors:

- one party's resolution to force a decision and proceed to the bitter end. In the absence of such resolve, a crisis is likely to subside, perhaps to reappear at a later date.
- the overall strength of the organization heading the campaign, its political posture, its propaganda effort, and of course, the military balance of the two sides, are of great importance in deciding the outcome of the struggle. The committed force is no less important than the potential force, for in many cases, one party involves only a small part of its forces.

25. ibid., p.52.
26. ibid., p.53.
27. ibid.
-the decisions, the reactions, and of course the inactions of the different parties. All of these acts, or failures to act, may be critical in deciding an issue.\textsuperscript{28}

Summing up, Gazit’s insight is:

Close monitoring of the process may prove to be of great importance to the analytical effort: it can indicate a shift in the balance of forces, emphasize a moment when one could predict the ultimate outcome, or outline a timetable for the crisis resolution. The main test for intelligence is to point out, as early as possible, the exact moment at which the outcome of the conflict is determined.\textsuperscript{29}

Gazit holds that intelligence cannot reasonably be expected to forecast the end of the process. Rather, the main task in warning is to lay out the alternatives and indicate the possible milestones or turning points which would help in deciding the outcome. The measure of success for intelligence is whether it has been able to alert its customers to a developing process at a point early enough for them to effectively intercede on behalf of their own interests, if they have any.

Odeen in his study of the American National Security Council puts a straight-forward appreciation of how vital this work is for policy-makers:

\begin{quote}

crisis planning is a demanding and often unrewarding effort. It is difficult to anticipate the locations or the nature of specific crises, let alone the sequence of events. As a result, potential participants often underestimate the value of planning in the mistaken belief that forecasting is futile. In many instances, the payoff is not in the plan itself but rather in the process, resulting in the questioning of assumptions, in sharpened perceptions of U.S. interests and options, and in familiarization with other agencies’ personnel and resources.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28} ibid., pp. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{29} ibid., p.54.
Betts' suggestion that the best way to avoid or temper the consequences of crises is to think about them and plan well in advance, before they become full-blown, is as sage advice as can be rendered to analysts as they confront a world intent on mayhem.\footnote{Betts, "Intelligence of Policymaking", p.120.}
CHAPTER FOUR
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

This chapter will lack what would have made the monograph a much more interesting read for many. I am not about to expose and dissect a previously unknown intelligence failure from my South Pacific experience. Instead it is a more humdrum exercise of setting out the best explanation I am aware of which makes sense of why there are intelligence failures and how responsible intelligence organisations are for those failures.\(^1\)

By using Gazit in the previous chapter to show how I think analysts might get the best possible results I was emphasising the possible as an optimist. Now I am attacking the need to avoid misleading assessments from the other side, the pessimist’s view of what is possible.

Academic and popular literature contain many hindsight analyses of intelligence failure. There are movies and television docudramas made on some alleged instances, a recent case being the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland on 10 July 1985, where there is the suggestion of an intelligence failure in not picking that the French would be willing to take such a preemptive move.

The two classic studies of intelligence failure are Roberta Wohlstetter’s *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* and Graham T. Allison’s *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Both, as well as being very readable, are impressive at dissecting major events in recent American diplomatic history. Other books which are decidedly specialist in presentation provide important material. Dunn and Watson’s two studies of the 1982 Falklands War and the events in Grenada in

---

1. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision", p.61 says that in the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce the finished analyses, but most often by the decision-makers who consume the products of intelligence services. I am concentrating here on the middle group, the producers.
1983 are in that category. Then there are the many academic articles, some specialising on particular case studies while others focus on trying for a theoretical appreciation of intelligence failures. Among the best in the former are Knorr’s piece on the Cuban missile crisis and Shlaim’s look at the Yom Kippur war; examples of the latter are Betts, Ben-Zvi and Chan. The International Studies Quarterly and Orbis have both devoted an issue of their journals to the topic of how to reduce the probability of not predicting crises.

Since 1978, when his article "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable" appeared, Richard Betts has been identified with an idea which I consider from my experience has the most cogency for appreciating what is possible. I propose to outline his basic tenets, to foreshadow what I’m getting at in the next chapter when I assert that a good analyst is not a gung-ho character but might better be contemplated as a secular Jesuit.

Betts’ essential proposition of strategic surprise is that most nations rarely suffer surprise for lack of warning but fall victim, with astonishing regularity, because they fail to respond to

---

2. Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson (eds), American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury" (Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs, Boulder, Col., 1984) and Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson (eds), Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States (Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs, Boulder, Col., 1984). Both books have chapters devoted to the role of intelligence.


5. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1982) and his several articles, see the bibliography, of which "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable" is the one which established his reputation in this field.


8. International Studies Quarterly, vol.21, no.1, March 1977 was devoted to various perspectives on international crises and Orbis, vol.26, no.4, Winter 1983 had five articles looking at intelligence and crisis forecasting.
warning. Betts and other like-minded theorists have concentrated their analysis on situations where there has been an attacker and a victim, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States over the former’s missiles in Cuba. The Falklands War also provides a victim and attacker scenario.

It is my contention that the methodology developed by Betts and the others for application to superpower confrontations has considerable pertinence for anyone analysing the South Pacific. The skills which Betts raises as being most appropriate for minimising strategic surprise are the same as I would want to use when watching for a potential crisis. A look at events in Grenada in the months before the drama of October 1983 when the Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, was murdered by supporters of a rival faction in his government illustrate my contention. Intelligence analysts in Washington, for instance, were not involved in the situation but they had an appropriate responsibility at that time to be interested observers, pondering what might be the turn of events on the island. Nevertheless, it appears there was much surprise in Washington when the political turmoil developed in Grenada.

The Framework

Betts’ framework rests on two important assumptions: that lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement in foresight, and that hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally produce improvement in practice. In my experience both assumptions are correct. He conceptualises intelligence failure in three ways:

- the most reassuring explanation is failure of perspective, based on the contention that particular failures are accorded disproportionate significance if considered in isolation.

10. Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley contend that the United States intervention of Grenada provided a dramatic illustration of policymaking without intelligence. See their chapter "Policy Without Intelligence" in Dunn and Watson (eds) American Intervention in Grenada, especially pp.56-59. They assert (p.58) that all accounts agree that during the several sessions of the decision-making group (in the White House) there was little intelligence available about conditions in Grenada.
Rather we need to look in terms of general ratio of failures to successes. Betts doubts there could be a widely agreed "rule" of what would be the acceptable ratio of success to failure. An obvious example is a pundit who for 17 years picked Fiji's general elections successfully but then failed to predict the coup.

- the most common explanation is the pathologies of communication where in some way the system broke down so that the intelligence organisation did not perform as well as it should have. Here optimism is possible because new procedures will rectify the fault!

- the most important is paradoxes of perception which is regarded by Betts as the most pessimistic because the roots of failure lie in unresolvable trade-offs and dilemmas. The remainder of this section looks more closely at these paradoxes.

Over and above the barriers that authority, organisation and scarcity pose to intelligence there are more fundamental and less remediable intellectual sources of error. The first is ambiguity of evidence. The capable analyst must sift through the maze of information to find the important pieces and then put together a meaningful story for customers. The odds are high that observers will not notice a key piece of information or realise they are missing it. It is also easy to place the wrong emphasis on irrelevant data. Betts explains the role of intelligence as being to "extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment".

In such circumstances decision-makers can not wait for the intelligence team to work out a new assessment in due course. Decisions are needed now. Then, Betts concludes that intelligence fails because the data are too permissive for policy judgment and that allows intuition to drive analysis.

The second is ambivalence of judgment. Betts' tenet here is that where there are ambiguous and conflicting indicators the need for honesty and accuracy leaves a careful analyst no
choice but ambivalence. In other words, there is usually some
evidence to support any prediction. Betts notes that hedging is
the legitimate intellectual response to ambiguity, but it can be
politically counter-productive, if the value of intelligence is to
shock consumers out of wishfulness or cognitive insensitivity.

Ambiguity of evidence and ambivalence of judgment are
the major intellectual hurdles for assessment teams. They are, as
Betts contends, inherent in the nature of intelligence. They are not
accidents of structure or process therefore they do constitute severe
constraints on the efficacy of structural reform.

There has been a considerable debate in the United
States about what are the best solutions for these faults. Betts has
reviewed numerous proposals, ranging from "always assume the
worst" to employing a devil’s advocate, and including such ideas
as having rival assessment teams or even providing sanctions and
incentives for the results. I am not debating the pros and cons of
the various proposals here but I have picked what from my
experience are the significant points, bearing in mind that what
happens in the American intelligence community, which has been
aptly labelled a "tribal federation", is a world apart from what
happens in Wellington. Thus, here I focus on what could be
regarded as pertinent generalities about intelligence’s tasks
irrespective of national circumstances.

Betts’ response, having described the intellectual
problems of ambiguity and ambivalence and looked at the reforms
put forward by others, is to conclude that though there is no
guaranteed prophylaxis against intelligence failures there is the
possibility of some incremental improvements. It is important to
expect modest refinements rather than systematic breakthroughs.
His homily for living with fatalism is that mistakes should be
expected because the paradoxes are not resolvable; that minor
improvements are possible by reorganising to correct pathologies;
and that despair is unwarranted because, seen in perspective, the
record could be worse.

14. ibid., p.71.
15. ibid., p.72.
16. ibid., pp.73-84. Betts has discussed these and other proposals in
subsequent articles, which are listed in the bibliography.
Betts’ prescription for a best possible approach contains the following elements:
- to present relevant and undisputed facts to non-expert principals who might otherwise make decisions in ignorance.
- in the more important situations the intelligence official may perform most usefully by not offering the answers sought by the authorities, but by offering questions, acting as a Socratic agnostic, nagging decision makers into awareness of the full range of uncertainty, and making the authorities’ calculations harder rather than easier.17

My conclusion is that we can do no better than accept analysts’ best efforts for predicting crises. As Betts has told it, a high incidence of failure is inevitable and acknowledging that is preferable to a false confidence that unambiguous intelligence is possible, or that political dilemmas can be solved by good intelligence.18

---

17. ibid., p.88.
18. Betts "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy:”, p.339 and 342. Betts was responding then to Ariel Levite who in his Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (Columbia University Press, New York, 1987) was critical of the dominant (orthodox pessimists) theories of strategic surprise.
CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSTS: BORN, BRED, AND HOUSE-TRAINED?

The essence of this chapter is contained in Laqueur's conclusion that the only known way to minimize the risk of failure is by analysts relying on the experience they have and their general competence. They need imagination and instinct, to be able to listen with the "third ear" and even to the "still, small voice" mentioned in the Bible.¹ Laqueur acknowledges that those observations may not be startling or original but he contends they do have the decisive advantage; no other prescription is as good in minimizing failure.

Now I want to pick up the reference I made in the previous chapter that gung-ho characters are out-of-place as intelligence analysts. Am I right in suggesting that a good analyst is a secular Jesuit? As a preliminary, I need to establish that the analyst is of some importance for assessment work. It may seem too obvious a point but there are indications to the contrary. An obvious indicator of how little the analyst is worth is how much governments pay for their analytical components in the intelligence system. Virtually everywhere the collecting agencies cost many, many times what the analysts do. There are even advocates of the idea that analysts are an unnecessary hurdle between the collectors and the consumers.

There are government leaders who see themselves as the best available analysts and Hughes makes that point with his story of a German ambassador saying to Kaiser Wilhelm II shortly before World War I started "that war with Russia was not inevitable". The diplomat remarked cheerfully that no one could see three or four years into the future. "The gift sometimes occurs," the Kaiser replied. "Among sovereigns frequently, among generals seldom, among diplomats almost never."²

¹ Laqueur, World of Secrets, p.292.
² Hughes, The Fate of Facts, pp.8-9.
Horton’s preoccupation with showing that Mexico in the early 1980s was not another Iran pinpoints the task of the good analyst. He talked then of the scepticism of the intelligence officer and the pragmatism of the career foreign service officer, portraying both as needing to be suspicious of those who are sure about what must be uncertain. He accepts that they do not shine in comparison with the cockiness of the doctrinaire. He also contends that intelligence officers, by training and by experience, must be suspicious of attempts to make the world fit someone’s intellectual mould, whether that of the Marxists or of bumptious social scientists!

Most people, as LaRochefoucauld observed, judge men only by their success or good fortune. In reminding us Laqueur contends that this is doubly true for intelligence performance. In most fields of human endeavour allowances are made for difficulties and obstacles, failure may be counted as a step on the way to success, and even the unsuccessful effort may hope for recognition; but Laqueur suggests intelligence cannot count on this sympathy: it is thought that to fail in intelligence is to fail utterly.

Laqueur mentions various indicators of what makes a good analyst:
- most jobs in intelligence demand no superior talents; solid competence and common sense suffice. In top positions, however, outstanding qualities of leadership, political judgment and technical genius are needed.
- broadly speaking, able people will produce good intelligence, while those lacking flair, knowledge and general competence will not.
- success in intelligence is more often than not the result of patient and painstaking work. But on many occasions the element of creativity is also of crucial importance. And lastly, luck.

Gazit has prescribed from his experience as head of Israeli military intelligence (1974-79) the following concerns:

4. Laqueur, World of Secrets, p.139.
5. ibid., p.10.
6. ibid.
7. ibid., p.68.
- it is important to employ analysts who are open to changes and able to appreciate the possible significance of new developments. The analyst should be capable of quickly changing his previous analysis once the data indicate the need. Without the necessary quality of analytical flexibility, any analyst is doomed to be taken by surprise. It is only a question of time and chance.

- intellectual arrogance is one of the most dangerous qualities for an analyst. Those who are sure of themselves after having come to a decision have no place in intelligence.

- an analyst who is responsible, meticulous, and open-minded produces good results. An appreciation of the consequences of one's mistakes develops an analyst who is constantly vigilant, prepared to check his conclusions again and again.

**Empathy**

White has devoted an article to empathy as an intelligence tool. With me he struck a receptive response, spelling out a technique I had developed by intuition, making assessments largely borne out by events. Where empathy worked well for me was in having a "feel" for how the independentists in New Caledonia would most likely react at critical points, for instance in late 1984, then at various occasions from 1986 to 1988 when the Chirac government initiated moves, and most recently in May 1989 to the loss of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. Another example is my observing developments in Vanuatu and noticing the growing gulf between Sope and the other leaders of the ruling Vanua’aku Pati.

Empathy, the understanding of others' thoughts and feelings, is not the same as sympathy, but there is a dangerous proximity. The latter can cloud an analyst's perceptions. Brookfield, a geographer who wrote a seminal book on Melanesia in the early 1970s, explained his technique on that occasion by invoking Simon Bolivar, who is reputed to have said that if one is to understand men and revolutions one must observe them from close at hand, but judge them only from far away.

In arguing the importance of empathy White sums up its value by explaining that it means understanding others from the inside looking out and not merely from the outside looking in. He expands this by stating that intelligence analysts need more than superficial knowledge of the target nation, its governing elite and its opinion leaders. Indeed, the analysts must know the target's political and cultural history, including its religion and its traditions. And they must know the weaknesses and strengths of the people, and their leaders in particular - their values, inhibitions, expectations, frustrations, fears, anxieties, habit patterns, perceptions. The greater the familiarity with the characteristics of the people, the greater the likelihood that the intelligence analysts' assessments will be realistic and their estimates fulfilled.11

"Street-wise" analysts

How are the best analysts found? Horowitz maintains that the key capability which has to be evident is a capacity to analyze within the framework of someone else's problems. His great emphasis would be on intuitive judgment to get insights which cannot be reached by a committee but which an individual "arrives at because of his intimate knowledge of a particular problem or a particular area".12

By now I suspect it is evident I am putting considerable emphasis on quite unquantifiable talents, such as empathy and intuition, as important attributes for the best analysts. What I do not know is whether such attributes are readily apparent when potential analysts are being recruited or if it is only after experience that some people seem to have an uncanny knack in sensing what will happen next. In veering this way I'm showing a bias towards analysts being born rather than bred. I am sceptical that anyone can be trained to be an analyst who does not have this knack, though training is useful for improving good analysts' performances.

Analysts: Born, Bred and House-trained? 51

Betts acknowledges that some training is warranted, both on methodology and on subject responsibility. He advocates that every analyst be trained in the standards of rigour, evidence and evaluation, and talks of analysts ideally having a thorough appreciation of epistemology and all the issues related to the philosophy of science - but he notes sagely that there aren’t many with such an appreciation even among the best academics who do this well. His primary requirement is simply to understand the need for rigour in analysis - "that an analyst should have a sensitivity to the implications of uncertainty as he presents his product and that he should be able to distinguish the three basic functions of analysis: description, explanation, and prediction".13

If, as Laqueur argues and I agree, intelligence is a craft, it is not one that is easy to master. He explains rightly that it involves competence not only in current affairs, in history and geography, in psychology and sociology, in economics, science, and technology, but it should include firsthand experience (or at least a working knowledge) of a foreign language. Laqueur notes that much thought has been given in recent decades to improving medical education, but very little to the acquisition of the skills and the knowledge needed in intelligence.14 Laqueur makes a telling comparison with clinical medicine when he points out that it is precisely in critical situations in which there are elements of ambiguity that the dramatic insight comes back into its own, and this applies to both clinical medicine and intelligence.15

Arrogance amongst analysts is a mortal sin. At any time the wise among them know, as Shlaim and Gates have pointed out, that evaluations by politically informed amateurs can display more sensitivity than those of intelligence professionals.16 He notes that Roberta Wohlstetter, for example, in comparing the top-secret intelligence evaluations of Japanese intentions before the attack at Pearl Harbor with estimates in the contemporary press, was struck by the relative soundness of the less privileged judgments, and that she concluded a general knowledgeableability in the world of international affairs and close observation of overt developments

15. ibid., p.304.
are the most useful ingredients in making such estimates.\textsuperscript{17} Shlaim in his study of the Yom Kippur war found that that conclusion was supported by the fact that Israeli observers who stood outside the centers of decision and had no access to classified information estimated enemy intentions correctly.\textsuperscript{18}

Wohlstetter has projected the detective-type nature of the analysts’ job by asserting that a willingness to play with material from different angles and in the context of unpopular as well as popular hypotheses is an essential ingredient of a good detective, whether the end is the solution of a crime or an intelligence estimate. She notes that this sort of flexibility is probably not good for one’s reputation as a sound estimator, since an all too common measure of sound judgment in the workplace is agreement with the hypothesis on which current departmental policy is based. But intelligence is always confronted with this choice: whether to be popular or alert.\textsuperscript{19}

Gazit invokes the fable of the Emperor’s New Clothes as a relevant story for analysts. He contends they must look to that boy from Copenhagen ("The Emperor is naked!") as their prototype; like him, they must be able to feel no constraints in speaking up, expressing whatever they think without inhibitions.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} I had originally planned to include an appraisal of the foreign media’s recent coverage of the South Pacific. Part of that task was to take up the point made here that there is considerable value in analysts monitoring media reporting. Some journalists are among the best observers of the region. There are also some dangerous contributions from the press. As well, there is much written that is confusing and/or seriously wrong in fact and insight. The analyst has to learn quickly which is written by whom and where to look for them.

\textsuperscript{18} Shlaim, "...The case of the Yom Kippur War", p.370.

\textsuperscript{19} Wohlstetter, \textit{Pearl Harbor}, p.302.

A major aspect of post-independence politics in the island states of the South Pacific has been the democratic systems left by the former colonial powers and incorporated in the constitutions of the newly independent states - constitutions which have stayed in place with the one exception of Fiji, and even there a new constitution is being sought.

Even so, in April 1989, an Australian Parliamentary committee reported that "democracy, as Australians define it, has fairly shallow roots in the South Pacific". Three months later several participants from the South Pacific highlighted at a workshop how alien concepts such as western-style democracy, a free press and trade unions are to the cultural makeup of their people. One speaker, Jioji Kotobalavu said "the imposition of these ideas has actually led to instability because these ideas have been brought in and applied in a situation where the cultural makeup of the people is totally different".

At the same workshop a prominent Papua New Guinean, Tony Siaguru, after painting a dismal picture for political stability in Papua New Guinea, pleaded for support "for those few but decisive changes in our Constitution that can bring us responsible government, politicians concerned about their credibility, and political, social and economic stability".

1. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with the South Pacific (Australian Parliament, Canberra, 1989), p.162.
2. Jioji Kotobalavu, "Trends in Perceptions of Security" in David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds), The Security of Oceania in the 1990s vol 1: Views from the Region (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1989), p.29. Kotobalavu is a former Fiji Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and since 1985 has been Director of CCOP/SOPAC, a Suva-based organisation.
3. Tony Siaguru, "Small 's' Security for Small Island States" in Hegarty and Polomka (eds), The Security of Oceania, p.23. In February 1990 Siaguru was appointed Deputy Secretary General at the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Constitutional succession

In the South Pacific democratic constitutions are the norm, which sets it apart from any of the other Third World regions. Ghai is the most insightful writer on this subject. He has commented that "constitution making has been important in the Pacific for it has often represented the first real exercise in national politics" and suggests "the making of the independence constitution was of great significance for these countries - a sort of rite de passage into formal statehood and the international community".

Ghai, when discussing the constitutional framework and its impact on post-independence political developments, says "it is possible to talk of a distinctive Pacific style of constitutional politics". Fry has elucidated a "South Pacific model of succession", where "the power to appoint governments is given to parliament, the head of state has no discretionary role on questions of succession, and the convention that a Prime Minister should resign following the passing of a no-confidence motion is encoded". He says in the South Pacific "these constitutional mechanisms have actually governed the way in which power has changed hands...in contrast to the experience of most other post-colonial societies". Fry concludes that they constitute a

---

4. Yash Ghai, a law professor at the University of Warwick, was a constitutional advisor to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu when their constitutions were being created prior to independence. The several chapters he wrote in Yash H. Ghai (ed.), Law, Politics and Government in the Pacific Island States (Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, 1988) are valuable surveys of the experiences the different countries had in drawing up their constitutions. Ghai has made another important contribution with his chapter on Vanuatu in Peter Larmour and Ropate Qalo (eds), Decentralisation in the South Pacific (Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, 1985), which reviews the constitutional framework for local government in Vanuatu.

5. Ghai (ed.), Law, Politics..., p.5.
6. ibid., p.3.
7. ibid., p.55.
8. Greg Fry, "Succession of Government in the Post Colonial States of the South Pacific: New Support for Constitutionalism" in Peter Sack (ed.), Pacific Constitutions (ANU Press, Canberra, 1982), pp.189-206. Fry revised the paper for Politics, vol.18, no.1, May 1983, pp.48-60. I have used the revised version so pages references are to Politics. The 10 countries in his study were Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Niue, and the Cook Islands. Only Tonga was excluded as a change of government can only occur there when the King dies or abdicates.
9. ibid., p.48.
unique variant of the Westminster mechanisms adopted by other Commonwealth countries. He noted that up to the time he wrote force had not been used either to remove or entrench a government.

Fry’s is the most detailed study of this theme. By April 1982, he reported that there had been 12 peaceful and successful transfers of power in the region following general elections, or the appointment at other times of a new Prime Minister following his predecessor’s death or loss of confidence by Parliaments. There had been no failures, though the Fiji situation following the March/April 1977 general election when the governing Alliance, led by Ratu Mara, lost its majority and the National Federation Party appeared to have a majority, was an awkward situation.  

Since Fry wrote, there have been another 20 peaceful and successful transfers of power to new governments. The one failure was in Fiji. Following the defeat of the Alliance in the April 1987 general election and the appearance of the Labour/NFP coalition government, headed by Timoci Bavadra, there were five weeks of political instability until the new government was overthrown by a military coup on 14 May 1987.

Fry was aware that where change had not occurred, the constitutional mechanisms were still operative and provided an opportunity for change if there was enough support forthcoming. He said that this was of particular significance because the South Pacific states had experienced few changes of government. Up to April 1990 there have been something like 35 general elections when the out-going Prime Minister has kept his position and about 30 votes of no confidence have failed. All told, the 10 countries Fry looks at have between them had one failure out of approximately 96 possible occasions when peaceful and successful succession was tested.

10. For an outline of events see Rod Alley, "Fiji’s recent election - stalemate or watershed?", New Zealand International Review, July/August 1977, pp.10-12. Also Fry, "Succession...", pp. 52, 54-55.
11. The details of the Bavadra election victory and the Rabuka coups have been comprehensively commented on. The bibliography lists the more important contributions.
A second failure?

The question posed now is whether there will be a second failure - Vanuatu. Vanuatu's political history of the last 15 years indicates that were the government to be defeated at the next general election, due in December 1991, then a peaceful and successful transfer of power may not necessarily occur. Rather, there could be new turbulence.

The Vanua'aku Pati (VP) has held power since November 1979, eight months before independence. It has won general elections comfortably in 1983 and 1987 and the Prime Minister, Walter Lini, has successfully faced several no-confidence motions in Parliament. There has not been a test of whether a peaceful succession would follow, were the VP to lose its long-time parliamentary majority.

For much of 1988, democracy and constitution were central themes in Barak Sope's struggle to topple the Lini government. As the struggle was about to climax, Sope issued a lengthy press release which canvassed those themes. He claimed that the country "is now poised on a precipice, ready to topple into the international junkyard of destroyed democracies". Two weeks later, Sope was in jail awaiting trial for sedition, and the Prime Minister was saying, as a result of the previous fortnight's events, Vanuatu "has proven we have decided to continue to be a democratic and a constitutional government".13

The Union of Moderates Party (UMP), the main Opposition in Vanuatu, which supported Sope in a boycott of Parliament and as a consequence lost its seats, has recently admitted that its plan in 1988 had been "...simple. If Parliament could not meet, because it lacked the simple majority provided by Section 19 of the Constitution of the Republic, then the Vanua'aku Pati government would cease functioning and general elections would have to be held".14

14. Undated letter circulated widely and intended for distribution at the Pacific Democratic Union meeting in Tokyo in October 1989. The letter was signed by the UMP's President, Serge Vohor, and General Secretary, Maxime Carlot.
As later chapters will elaborate much came out in the foreign media about Vanuatu’s turbulent months, May to December 1988, but there has been little considered assessment of what prospects Vanuatu now has - one-party state or constitutional democracy? Is it a crisis waiting for a catalyst or can Vanuatu adeptly (or even by muddling) handle the political tensions glimpsed in previous paragraphs. One of the few public commentaries says, "the impact of the boycott cannot be ignored, nor can the absence of an effective opposition group for the long term credibility of the parliamentary system" and "although the government has the vast majority of seats as a result of free and fair by-elections, it is not healthy in any parliamentary system for one group to have almost total control. The Committee would hope that at the next election there will be sufficient members elected to ensure a viable opposition group".15

As a case study, Vanuatu is a useful example but it is necessary to emphasise that it does not have to develop in the ways outlined in this chapter. The VP could win the next general election. (That scenario is the most likely.) It is also possible that power could be transferred peacefully and successfully to a successor government if the VP loses in 1991 or 1995, or loses in 1991 and regains power in 1995. Another possible scenario is that even though the VP may not get a majority of its own in the 1991 elections, it stays in power with the help of a minor party or independent MPs, who prefer to side with the VP rather than the UMP, with or without Sope.

**Theoretical perspective**

In 1962 Apter reflected on the role of a political opposition in new nations. He said that in most newly independent states the opposition’s role has proved ambiguous: "new governments rarely see the necessity for a regular opposition party nor do they always accept the idea of opposition as a normal feature of government".16 The case Apter presents has much pertinency for Vanuatu, more so than for the other South Pacific countries which Fry looked at.

58 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

Apter considered it necessary to reiterate that "the Western view of democracy as the open competition of political parties catering to diverse public needs and thereby transforming demands into policy, is not wholly accepted in most new nations". His conclusion was that the outlook for the opposition appears bleak in many of the newly independent nations.

Thirty years later in the South Pacific, conditions for opposition politicians are not so bleak. Indeed, in eight of Fry's ten countries, many have been, or will be in government some time during their political career, even if one-term parliamentarians. (In the last and in the present PNG Parliaments, most MPs have become ministers.) It is only Fiji and Vanuatu where the situation is otherwise.

Lawson's recent doctoral thesis is the most comprehensive examination of the notable exception - Fiji. Her model as to why democratic politics failed there is an appropriate model for this case study.

There are important differences between Fiji and Vanuatu. But Lawson's reasons why Fiji could not sustain a non-Alliance government may have considerable import for Vanuatu if it is faced with a non-VP government in 1991. The question is whether Vanuatu will find, as Fiji discovered in April/May 1987, that it had not had, at any time, a properly functioning two-party system of government and opposition.

17. ibid., p.155.
18. I am not discussing here whether parliamentary democracy is the best system of government for the region. Rather, I am looking at what is in place and what happens as a result. There are voices in the South Pacific highly critical of parliamentary democracy. Hegarty and Polomka (eds), The Security of Oceania... addresses some of the issues about democracy's relevance in the region.
19. Stephanie Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji, Ph.D thesis, University of New England, 1989, see especially the chapter "Constitutional Opposition and Democratic Politics" pp.11-36 which discusses this subject. See also the bibliography for her several articles on Fiji's recent political developments, where the various themes are discussed. There is a considerable literature on the failure of democracy in the Third World. Lawson's thesis, to be published shortly under the same title by Clarendon Press, Oxford provides the best linking of theories on democracy, particularly the importance of a constitutional opposition, with recent events in the South Pacific.
Lawson stresses correctly that constitutional opposition is one of the most distinguishing characteristics of modern democratic politics and has a crucial role therein. She suggests that the idea of alternation in office between government and opposition and the conditions under which political opposition is regarded as legitimate needs to be more than a good idea - that it has to be a functioning component. In addition, she points to the need for the opposition to be an effective restraint on the majority, including opportunity for the expression of dissent, and that the constitutional opposition provides for peaceful succession of government within the constitutional framework.

If there is a permanent majority and a permanent minority then democratic politics do not exist in Lawson’s model, which hinges on the competition generated by rival parties chasing the spoils: one becoming the government and the loser being the opposition. She identifies this two-party system as distinct from one- and multi-party systems. (There can be more than two parties but the key is that two groups dominate electoral support well in excess of all others.)

Such concepts as Lawson discusses may appear unexceptionable in New Zealand and Australia. Elsewhere, as Apter has already shown, that is not so. In the South Pacific, Fiji has shown that democratic politics is not as important as other factors. One of these is also a major element in Vanuatu, namely what Shils has denoted as those in power regarding themselves as the "sole bearers of the charisma of nationality".  

The critical consideration then becomes whether they will accept defeat. If such a group loses a general election after a long time in power Lawson suggests because of the past lack of alternation there can be very considerable strain on the two-party system if the losers are not willing to accept defeat. How long is a long time in this context? She refers to Giovanni Sartori’s Parties and Party System: Vol.1 A Framework for Analysis in which he indicates that a sufficient measure may be the same party winning three successive general elections. In Vanuatu the Lini government has done that. If the VP retains power in 1991 then the one-party dominant system as described by Lawson may be a more apt description for Vanuatu.

CHAPTER SEVEN

VANUATU: SCENE-SETTING

The following chapters focus on political factors which will be crucial to understanding a new crisis if one were to develop. The more general economic, foreign policy, cultural and historical scene is by-passed unless there is a specific point to be made.

Vanuatu's recent political history will be outlined to establish the depth of division which resulted from the joint British and French administration of this condominium from 1906 until independence in 1980. In their last years of tutelage, people colloquially referred to the decolonization process as pandemonium. Grace Molisa, a key figure in the push for independence, put it more forthrightly: "if it weren't my country and my people I would consider it the greatest farce the South Pacific scene has to offer the world. This farce is our tragedy".1

General

A useful introduction to Vanuatu's cultural complexities is Joel Bonnemaison's article "The Tree and the Canoe: Roots and Mobility in Vanuatu Societies".2 For the history of the European presence in Vanuatu Jeremy MacClancy's To Kill a Bird with Two Stones: A Short History of Vanuatu3 is the best. James Jupp's chapter "Custom, Tradition and Reform in Vanuatu Politics" in Proceedings of the 1982 Politics Conference: Evolving Political Cultures in the Pacific Islands4 is a good introduction to Vanuatu's political system. The best exposition on the importance of land in Vanuatu and how it impinged on pre-independence political events is Howard Van Trease's The Politics of Land in Vanuatu,5 which is

4. The Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University, Hawaii, 1982.
based on his PhD researched in the late 1970s. Robert Tonkinson has covered the importance of custom and chiefs.6

Useful general fact-books on Vanuatu are Norman Douglas’ *Vanuatu - a guide*,7 the section in the latest edition of *Pacific Islands Yearbook*,8 and *Vanuatu*,9 published at the time of independence.

**The 1980s**

There is a dearth of academic material available on political developments in Vanuatu since 1980. A recent article by Henningham provides the most detailed account of Vanuatu’s political parties.10 The article by MacClancy11 is a useful piece on the 1980-83 period; Premdas and Steeves12 have written on the 1987 general election and its aftermath but the article is poor: pitted with factual errors and showing little comprehension of the dynamics of Vanuatu’s politics. Premdas13 has also written about Vanuatu’s quest for self-definition and misses the mark. He and Howard14 do likewise with a consideration of Vanuatu’s foreign policy. Robertson15 on the same subject does better but still is not particularly perceptive. Payne16 has shown a better comprehension.

---

On-going developments have usually been well-reported by the two specialist magazines, Pacific Islands Monthly and Island Business. In recent years Helen Fraser reporting for Pacific Defence Reporter and her own fortnightly, Pacific Report, has provided quality coverage.

On the three occasions in 1987-88 when Vanuatu hit the international headlines there was extensive coverage, especially by the Australian media. At those times Sope's viewpoint was widely covered; he assiduously cultivated the Australian media. The Vanuatu government was much less adept at being available for the journalists but even when they were interviewed, government figures, including Lini, were often angry about the coverage.17

Not surprisingly, within Vanuatu the media is modest. The government publishes a weekly three-language news-sheet and has a radio station with a small news component. The only two private news magazines started up since independence failed quite quickly: Hilda Lini's effort soon after independence lasted several months. An expatriate, Christine Coombe, started Voice of Vanuatu, a tourist-oriented weekly, in 1980 but by 1982 turned it into a news-sheet and by February 1983 was embroiled in an argument with the Lini government when Voice of Vanuatu published various allegations made by John Naupa, a recently sacked cabinet minister, against the Prime Minister. Coombe was deported because as a foreigner she had involved herself in local politics.18 Her paper closed with her departure.

Since 1983 there have been no further commercial attempts at English or French language news-sheets. Sope's associates have published occasional give-aways, which reflect the journalism training some of his group received in Libya in late 1986/early 1987; they seem to be of marginal importance. Though the VP's magazine, Vanua'aku Viewpoints, had been an important element in the pre-independence struggle it has had a fitful existence since independence.

Two recent perceptive pieces on Vanuatu have been the sections on Vanuatu in the Australian Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade report of a sub-committee on the South Pacific and the study mission report of minority staff of the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. In contrast, George Tanham's contributions have focussed on external influences on Vanuatu, claiming that they have had a considerable impact, and discounting the capacity of the ni-Vanuatu to determine their own way. Lamont Lindstrom, an American anthropologist, has prepared a backgrounder on Vanuatu for the United States Information Agency.

As the previous paragraphs show, there is a wide range of opinion on what the implications of recent developments might be. My conclusions are different, and to explain them better given the absence of an existing general survey of the 1980s in Vanuatu this monograph will present key developments in some detail.

---

By 1970, the British and French in their condominium partnership of the New Hebrides had by acting in concert created an arrangement which had "a comic opera quality". The two powers sought, even though they had different interests, "to maintain the classical nineteenth century colonial pattern in the New Hebrides long after it had vanished elsewhere."

That was in the year when Fiji gained independence. Nauru and Western Samoa already had it and Papua New Guinea was moving towards it. In the condominium the only channel for participation was an Advisory Council established in 1957 but recently expanded. Even so its 30 members were predominantly European, a race that comprised less than ten per cent of the condominium's population. There were no direct elections for places on the Council.

The Council was limited to dealing with Condominium responsibilities. The French and British had established their respective national administrations to look after their own citizens resident in the New Hebrides and came together as a joint administration - the Condominium - to deal with the "natives". It was only in this area that the Advisory Council had a role. In 1960 there were 700 British nationals and 4250 French while there were 55,500 New Hebrideans.

George Kalkoa, then the most senior ni-Vanuatu in the employ of either the British (whom he worked for) or the French, told the 1970 Waigani Seminar in Port Moresby of the political situation in the New Hebrides. He was generally complimentary of British and French activities in the New Hebrides though he was prescient in commenting "if the governments tend to bring up their own little French or British New Hebrideans, the Group will have a bad and sorrowful future".3

Within four years Kalkoa was publicly much more disparaging of the Condominium powers. He explained his problem as "facing an animal with three heads - first the British, second the French, third the Condominium: two governments and three administrations. The New Hebrides is known as a Condominium but I think the appropriate name is Pandemonium".4

The early 1970s

The early 1970s saw three important developments which explain Kalkoa’s tougher posturing in 1974. The first, which he had mentioned in his 1970 Waigani Seminar speech, was the recent surge in alienation of land to expatriates. Of most concern were the activities of Eugene Peacock, an American, who purchased several substantial plantations on Santo for subdividing on a speculative basis. Peacock envisaged that 10,000 foreigners mostly Americans who had fought in Vietnam, would settle on Santo.5

The second was the return to the New Hebrides of several subsequently important personalities who had been studying overseas. Most notable among them was Walter Lini, who had been away eight years, five (1962-65, 1969) in Solomon Islands and three (1966-68) in New Zealand at an Anglican theological college. Lini arrived back in early 1970 to be a parish

priest at Longana on Aoba, a small, isolated island. Nearly a year later Lini met up with another Anglican priest, John Bani, who had trained with him, and with Donald Kalpokas, whom they had known in New Zealand while he was training to be a teacher.

**The National Party**

Out of that meeting a magazine, *New Hebrides Viewpoints*, was started and soon afterwards they formed the New Hebrides Cultural Association, which three months later was renamed as the New Hebrides National Party. Lini was a key figure though not the first leader. He was then 29 and still based at Longana, from where he edited *Viewpoints*.

For the next two years the National Party had three centres of activity. The party leader, Aiden Garae, was on Santo, Lini was at Longana, and in the capital the leaders were Donald Kalpokas, Peter Taurakoto and George Kalkoa, all of whom were employed by the British. The main public concern of the new party was the activity of the foreign land developers such as Peacock. Demonstrations were held and representations made to the French and British with some success.6

The third development was that differences were becoming apparent between the two administering powers over the condominium’s future. From the British viewpoint there was no political justification for holding back on the political change taking place in the other territories in the South Pacific. Independence had come or was being discussed for Fiji, Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (now Kiribati and Tuvalu).

The French on the other hand were fearful of political instability in New Caledonia if the New Hebrides were to become independent and accordingly resisted the idea of giving the New Hebrides early independence.

One observer wrote that the British were "not prepared to make a unilateral withdrawal from the territory in the absence of guarantees from the French that they will allow an eventual

---

transition to self-government or independence, and it is feared that without British initiative and presence there will be no transfer of power to blacks under French rule." 7

By January 1974 the leaders of the National Party realised that the struggle to gain independence for the New Hebrides was going to be unlike that in other South Pacific territories where independence had come, or was about to come in a smooth and peaceful manner. The party reorganised. Lini was elected Party President on a full-time basis; the Anglican Church released him from pastoral responsibilities, which remains the position, though he does still preach and officiate. Fred Timakata, a Presbyterian minister trained at the Pacific Theological College in Suva, was elected Vice-President. Barak Sope, who had just completed his studies at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, became Secretary-General on a part-time basis. (He was working for the Co-operatives Federation.) Kalkot Matas-Kele suspended his law studies at the University of Papua New Guinea to be the full-time Information Officer.

Within a couple of months Lini made his first appearance before the United Nations. He acknowledges that it was Tanzania and Jamaica who initiated his travel to New York. On that occasion, he addressed the Committee of 24 calling for the New Hebrides to become independent in 1977. 8

1975-77: The Representative Assembly fiasco

The National Party was the first group to make the call for independence. It soon became apparent that the party was getting substantial support among New Hebrideans. The party’s leadership was Melanesian and most had been employed in the British administration or with the two major Protestant churches. It concentrated on building the party’s appeal in the rural areas where 90 per cent of the total population lived.

The National Party gained in credibility by working through the custom chiefs, the churches and the co-operatives movement to explain the party’s demand for independence.

The French settler community, numbering several thousand, were quick to respond: several anti-independence parties were formed and custom groups, such as Nagramiel on Santo and John Frum on Tanna, were cultivated for their support.

The French-inspired groups were centred on the condominium’s two towns (both predominantly Francophone), Luganville and Port Vila. When Town Council elections were held in August 1975 Francophones had big majorities in both places. The National Party won 6 of 24 seats in Port Vila and 1 of the 16 in Luganville. Molisa and others argue that a consequence of those results was that the French thought there was a Francophone majority throughout the condominium and on that presumption agreed to national elections, expecting the National Party to fail.9

The Advisory Council was replaced by the Representative Assembly. For the first time direct elections were to be held and 29 seats were created. In addition, there were to be four representatives of chiefs and nine business representatives (six from the Chamber of Commerce and three from the Cooperatives movement).

At elections held in November, the National Party won 17 of the 29 directly elected seats and received 59 per cent of the popular vote. When a year later all the appointed chiefs and indirectly elected representatives were finally known, and by-elections had been held in several seats after electoral disputes, the National Party and its opponents each had 21 supporters. The National Party objected strongly to their loss of the elected majority in the Assembly. The Assembly had a fitful existence and never met to do substantive business before the administering powers dissolved it on 28 February 1977.

The Vanua’aku Pati (the name change for the National Party was made in January 1977) put five demands for new elections but the two administering powers refused to agree. The main VP demands were for democratic elections, majority rule and early independence. Instead, the British and French proceeded with elections for 29 November 1977 for another Representative Assembly. The VP declared they would boycott and put in place a People’s Provisional Government (PPG).

Without any voting taking place, a new Representative Assembly was declared elected on 28 November. The other parties and groups had worked out a sharing arrangement for 38 of the 39 seats to ensure no contests were required. The final seat had no candidate.

The VP’s Provisional Government

The next day the VP’s Provisional Government quickly took control of much of the country other than around the two towns. Jupp and Sawer describe the PPG’s accomplishments as including enough strength "to exclude representatives of the ‘self-governing’ ministry and of the British and French authorities. Most airstrips and landing places were under PPG control and a system of permits and licences was created. While administration officials were instructed not to take out such permits, many private traders, taxi drivers or missionaries did so. Movement into and within many islands was impossible without PPG permission."\(^\text{10}\) Their conclusion: "the condominium authorities and the Kalsakau government wisely decided to leave the PPG alone, although conservative party activists were less tolerant".\(^\text{11}\) The VP suspended the PPG on 11 May 1978 when the Pati, the administering powers and the other parties reached an understanding which led finally, in December 1978, to the creation of a Government of National Unity.

The Representative Assembly had in December 1977 chosen George Kalsakau, one of the few non-Francophones in the Assembly, as the Chief Minister. Jupp and Sawer suggest that Kalsakau’s ministry, with four of the seven members Francophone was "certainly not representative of the general population nor were most of its members well educated or politically very experienced. The ministers were advised by French public servants and were, in general, much closer to the French than to the British residency".\(^\text{12}\)

11. ibid.
Between May and December 1978 the VP strenuously negotiated most of their demands, including independence. The major discussions were with the French and it was only when the Minister for Overseas Territories, M. Paul Dijoud, visited Port Vila from 11 to 14 August that agreement became possible.

Dijoud agreed on independence but with several stringent conditions. The VP, believing that they had popular support to win elections, accepted a deal that saw a constitution prepared before independence to ensure that "government should be decentralized and autonomy assured to each island. All political groups should be fairly represented and, again in the French tradition, this was taken to mean the institutionalization of proportional representation".13

With the VP, French and British closing ranks the Assembly was becoming something of a side-show. Kalsakau was an ineffectual performer and on 15 December he was heavily defeated in a vote of confidence. His successor as Chief Minister was the most talented of the Francophone New Hebrideans, Gerard Leymang, a university-educated Catholic priest. Twelve days later he was to head the Government of National Unity with Walter Lini as the Deputy Chief Minister.

1979: Constitution and elections

The Leymang-Lini government was a short-term device pending a new general election but that in turn was dependent on the French agreeing to the post-independence constitution. The initial procedure wanted by the British and the French was for the ten ministers in the Government of National Unity to submit proposals to them for their approval and enactment but that "was disregarded, as too secretive and bureaucratic".14 Instead, as Ghai writes, "in the absence of an existing acceptable body for this purpose...the Council of Ministers proceeded to establish a Constitutional Planning Committee consisting of representatives from all political parties, chiefs, women and churches, with the task of preparing and adopting the constitution. It had no statutory basis and operated with a minimum of rules of procedure, but agreed that its decisions would be made by consensus".15

13. ibid., p.213.
15. ibid.
Consensus was reached on a constitution. The VP and the French as the two main antagonists each got what they wanted. The French got French as an official language, a proportional representation factor in the electoral system, and a decentralised political system, particularly for the two strongly Francophone islands - Santo and Tanna. The VP got the commitment to independence and acceptance that the new Parliament would be a wholly elected one (without special interests being represented).

Lynch, who is well versed in Pacific Islands constitutions, having been involved in drafting several, says of the Vanuatu constitution that "it reads more like a blueprint for, or a description of, an 'English' style of constitution" and suggests "it seems to include only the minimum political decisions and compromises that were necessary if independence in some form of political unity were to come".

The constitution was accepted by the British and the French on 19 September and elections for the new Assembly and the Regional Councils for Santo and Tanna were set for 14 November.

The November 1979 elections

The elections were a stunning setback for the French and the Francophones; the sheer size of the VP victory also surprised many in the Pati itself. In the Assembly they won 26 of the 39 seats; there was a 90 per cent turnout and 62 per cent supported the VP. The French had reckoned on the VP not securing a majority. More startling, the VP defeated the

16. During the 1970s the French were more obstructionist than the British were to the VP. In "From New Hebrides to Vanuatu, 1979-80", Journal of Pacific History, vol.16, no.2, April 1981, p.92 MacClancy says "the British government, unwilling to upset Anglo-French relations for the sake of a small archipelago, was not prepared to take unilateral action when difficulties arose and so, as in the past, effectively allowed the French to set the pace of events".
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

Francophones on Santo and Tanna winning in both cases by 8 to 7 seats. There was now no disputing that the VP held overwhelming support throughout the country. Their dominance would increase with independence as the five thousand strong pro-French mixed race and Asian communities concentrated around the country’s two towns would be faced with a painful decision, that of becoming a citizen of Vanuatu or remaining French. Dual citizenship was not permitted.19

Not unexpectedly there was widespread dismay and bitterness amongst the French community and many Francophones. Both groups had expected French officialdom to have got it right in protecting their interests. The French government was taken aback by the realisation that the VP had a substantial majority and especially, as it had a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the Constitution could be easily altered.

Within weeks it was clear that serious trouble was looming for the new government as the French government and the Francophones sought to retrieve something from the political setback which they had suffered. As a date for independence had not been set they had some leeway for manoeuvre. The events of the eight months before independence finally came about on 30 July 1980 are crucial for appreciating the intensity of the subsequent divisions within Vanuatu.

On becoming the government the VP was thrust into a frenetic political whirlpool. There were never-ending final negotiations with the British and the French, and the Francophone parties; they tried, without any resources (as they still were held by the administering powers), to thwart the secessionist activities of Jimmy Stevens and others; and they sought to settle a date for independence. The VP election victory had put an end to French plans for stalling independence. Even so it was not till 10 April

19 By December 1982, 810 had been granted citizenship and others were still being considered. Most formerly held French citizenship. Six of the nine member cabinet were affected as they had married foreign women; at least five of the wives, including Mary Lini, became citizens. The French community was decimated soon after independence: 31 were deported, another 110 were declared prohibited immigrants and many more were "voluntarily expelled" (by agreement between the French and Vanuatu governments). At least 500 were relocated in New Caledonia pending longer term arrangements; most of this group are still living in Noumea.
that the French publicly conceded independence and only a month before the independence date of 30 July sought by the VP that they agreed to that date.20

The secessionist threats on Santo and Tanna turned into action in early June. The more significant on Santo was not put down until a month after independence when the Lini government brought in Papua New Guinea troops to reassert law and order on Santo; it had no troops of its own at that time. (It had still to create a new police force to replace the previous British constabulary and the French gendarmerie.)21

MacClancy sums up these months: "in a land of long memories, it is unlikely that the events of 1980 will be quickly forgotten by either side".22

Lessons for later

This sketch of the New Hebrides' final decade as a condominium is important in order to register several features of this story relevant to Vanuatu's prospects through to the 1991 general election.

The Vanua'aku Pati's experience is unique in the South Pacific. It is the only political party in the region which had to struggle for independence. Elsewhere independence came peacefully and quickly. Parties were a feature of parliamentary politics in most countries but except for the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia only in the Cook Islands and Fiji were parties important for electoral politics. The VP had to start from scratch. There was no electoral forum for them in the

20. For the final negotiations and the 1979 general election refer to Beasant, Ghai, Jupp (various articles), Jupp and Sawer, Lini, MacClancy, Molisa et al, and Van Trease.
New Hebrides. It took three attempts at general elections before the VP made its point - in November 1979 - and then at a heavy cost because the losers called "foul". In the meantime the Pati had created a structure which was nation-wide, met often and (when pushed to the extreme in November 1977) showed, by putting in place the Peoples Provisional Government, that it could take control of most of the country. And in that eye-to-eye stand-off with the British and the French, the Pati realised it could win, as the two administering powers were unwilling to assert their authority throughout the condominium: to do so some thousands of security force personnel would have been required.

By independence the VP had already had considerable administrative experience, some on a country-wide basis. The decade of pitting themselves against the British and French had honed their plans to achieving more limited goals. Unlike the other countries of the region where a bureaucracy and institutions were in place at independence the VP was obliged to create a new bureaucracy and establish new institutions, notably for welfare services and security forces. The two separate systems left by the British and the French were radically overhauled, in part to get a single service but also to pare down the more expensive facilities to ones that the new state might afford.

The VP was virtually alone in the political arena. Its opponents had been routed. Jupp's conclusion captures this situation well:

By the end of 1981 Vanuatu was effectively ruled by a single party whose opponents were scattered and, in many cases, deported. This fate reflects the foolish policies of the French administration, who put their allies into a situation from which they could not escape once the Santo rebellion had been suppressed. The Vanua’aku Pati had no need to destroy their opponents, even had they wished to do so, because their opponents had destroyed

23. MacClancy's comment "an electoral contest was a fight with one group winning, the other losing. Moreover there is little, or no 'floating vote' in Vanuatu: members of a village vote en bloc according to religious affiliation" reinforces the sense that "no prisoners are taken" when elections are fought in Vanuatu. See MacClancy, "From New Hebrides...", p.93.
themselves. By resting on expatriates and ethnic minorities, by openly accepting subsidy from the French, and by opposing independence and national unity after all former British Pacific territories had already achieved both, the 'moderate' opposition produced the result they feared most - a one-party domination by the Anglophone Protestant radicals.\textsuperscript{24}

As MacClancy puts it, the Opposition had been "devastated during the suppression of the rebellion: by December 1980 only three of its 13 MPs could attend Parliament; the rest were either dead, in jail, or prohibited immigrants".\textsuperscript{25}

The final lesson for the VP was that they had eye-balled the French and not blinked first. As will become evident in the next chapters Vanuatu/French relations have remained troublesome and could impinge on events in 1991.

\textsuperscript{24} James Jupp, "Custom, Tradition and Reform in Vanuatu Politics", in The Politics of Evolving Cultures in the Pacific Islands (Institute for Polynesian Studies, Brigham Young University, Hawaii, 1982), p.156.
A decade later, Vanuatu seems little different. We concluded the last chapter with Jupp and MacClancy telling us of the misfortunes, self-inflicted, of the opposition parties. Now, again, the circumstances in Vanuatu are unusual. Since July 1988 the major opposition group, the UMP, has not been represented in Parliament. Though this situation was achieved by due constitutional process, upheld by the Courts, the lack of an effective constitutional opposition in Vanuatu and consequent lack of a representative voice for minority interests can be seen as seeds of future instability. In this and the next chapter I look at what has happened in the intervening 10 years. The '80s decade breaks into four periods:

- the first, from independence to the first post-independence general election, held on 2 November 1983 was initially dominated by the after-effects of the Santo rebellion and then by cabinet upheavals.

- the second, from that election until early February 1987, when Cyclone Uma largely wrecked the capital, Port Vila, and the Prime Minister, Walter Lini, suffered a major stroke in Washington, where he was to attend a Congressional Prayer Breakfast and to meet Secretary of State Shultz. This mid-'80s period was comparatively calm and the Lini government sought to consolidate its achievements.

- the third, from February 1987 until April 1989 was again turbulent, with Sope's various attempts to bring down Lini. The culmination of his endeavours was the December 1988 Presidential "coup" as a consequence of which President Sokomanu, Sope and five others, including the then Leader of the Opposition, Maxime Carlot, spent nearly four months in Vila's jail awaiting trial on sedition and related charges. They started their sentences after the Supreme Court found them guilty, but were released after the Court of Appeal acquitted them on the ground
that the Prosecution had failed on the evidence presented to show that there was a case to answer.

- the fourth, from the freeing of the five until the present (April 1990) has been uneventful.

The first months after independence saw the new government preoccupied with putting down the rebellion and then bringing to trial many of the nearly 2,500 secessionists detained for their part in the troubles. The several hundred French citizens (settlers and *metis*) arrested were saved, through French intervention, from a Hobson’s choice - stand trial or be deported - by accepting "voluntary expulsion".

**Cabinet turmoil**

MacClancy writing of the Lini government’s initial years (1980-83) says the VP "stayed the dominant political force in the country despite open crabbing of its leaders, their aggressive jostling for power, the adverse publicity of its internal disputes, and the forming of a separate party by a disaffected minority. Certain political lines may have changed but the major divisions remain the same".¹

Lini’s first cabinet, appointed after the 1979 general election, was substantially changed by the next general election. Of his original eight ministers only two remained; the first to go was George Kalkoa, the Deputy Chief Minister, when at independence he became the country’s first President; in December 1981 Lini sacked Thomas Seru Reuben and George Worek for private "misconduct";² then in February 1983 two others were sacked - Fred Timakata and John Naupa - and another, Donald Kalpokas, resigned in protest at Timakata’s dismissal. The turmoil reflected serious differences between Lini and most of his cabinet on their respective lifestyles, rather than on policy issues.

Reuben and Naupa, in particular, were sufficiently angry with the Prime Minister to attack him publicly but to little effect. Reuben and Worek plus another ex-VP MP, Kalmer Vocor, formed a new party, the Vanuatu Independent Alliance Party (VIAP).

². ibid., p.103.
Naupa accused Lini of an unauthorised business deal with a foreign businessman. Naupa's charges failed to stick and his conduit, the editor of Voice of Vanuatu, Christine Coombe, was deported. Eight months later at the general election Naupa, Vocor, Worek and Reuben were heavily defeated by VP candidates when they contested their old seats.

The beginnings of the drift by Sope out of the inner circle of the VP became perceptible. He had started as Lini's senior advisor when Lini became Chief Minister but left that position soon after independence to be Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the country's sole Roving Ambassador, both positions he held until his election to Parliament at a by-election in August 1982. His previous influential position as Secretary-General of the VP became less significant when the Pati's head office was stripped of its staff at independence and the officials transferred en masse to be ministerial advisers. (The VP Head Office soon became a preserve of Sope's associates who were minor players in the party leadership.) It was at this time that Sope started developing his business activities, primarily through the firm Cabinet d'Affaires, which operated as a construction, real estate and development group.

These years saw the government creating a new bureaucracy as it broke loose of the condominium's three administrations. Many of the new civil servants were Pati supporters but, except for a cadre of about 50 who became ministerial advisors, they were not political appointees. Rather, they were the most capable ni-Vanuatu available. Some effort was made to retain Francophone ni-Vanuatu but not with great success.

At this time the Prime Minister's dream to "have the basic essential services for the people - health, education and housing - effectively organised in each of the islands, the villages of Vanuatu" was being implemented. Major reform of the competing services the British and French had provided was underway to get a single structure in place for each.

3. ibid., p.104 has an outline of Naupa's charges as well as Lini's rebuttal. The National Times, 8 to 14 April 1983, pp.23-24 also details the allegations.
The Opposition

The parliamentary Opposition started afresh. Its leader Vincent Boulekone was, however, virtually on his own. His two remaining colleagues were somewhat hamstrung: Carlot because he was the Speaker and Leymang, the Catholic Priest, was under church pressure to pull out of politics and did not stand at the next general election in 1983.

Boulekone created a new group, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) to unite the former Francophone and the custom parties. He was having to overcome the complications from the first generation of the anti-VP parties, which when formed in the mid-1970s had been "urban-based, supported financially by French and Vietnamese business interests and the French Residency, and of a highly fragmented nature". Boulekone was a veteran of this period but had broken with the original parties in 1979. MacClancy says "despite Boulekone's efforts, however, the UMP remained but a pale shadow of the well-organised VP with its experienced well-educated staff and its comprehensive, much more coherent policy". Many of the Opposition MPs, elected in 1979, never sat in Parliament before it was dissolved for the 2 November 1983 general election.

The VP comfortably won the election, taking 24 seats to the Opposition's 15. While all 18 VP MPs who stood on the Pati ticket were re-elected the six who defected either to the VIAP or stood as independents all polled poorly. The Opposition had 12 UMP MPs and three others who together were a loose coalition. Boulekone continued as the Opposition Leader but he had a new team; 11 of the 15 MPs were newcomers.

MacClancy says of the voting patterns, the "Moderate vote has not increased significantly while the drop in the VP vote was picked up almost exclusively by Pati independents and the VIAP" and "the VP may have lost some of its support, but the country is still divided sharply along the lines of Anglophone Protestants versus Francophone Catholics and followers of kastom".

7. ibid., p.112.
Lini was re-elected Prime Minister and the only significant change in his cabinet was the appointment of Sela Molisa as Foreign Minister. Previously Lini had held that position. Fred Timakata was the new Speaker and his predecessor in that position, Maxime Carlot, became a senior Opposition MP.

Meanwhile the President, Ati George Sokomanu, soon showed his irritation with being constrained by the Constitution to a ceremonial position. MacClancy noted "it was well-known that Sokomanu was discontented with his position: his powers were not defined and the Government rarely sought his advice". In April 1983 the President told an Australian journalist that he wanted the Lini government to be replaced by a government of national unity. His comments read like the action plan for the Presidential "coup" he was party to five and a half years later, which led to his own ignominious departure from public life.

Calm in the mid-1980s

The mid-80s were calm and as such are a stark contrast to the decade before and the years since. The Lini government was working smoothly. The economic prospects were still promising. The Opposition were barely visible. But the seeds for the later turmoil were maturing.

During these years Vanuatu was in the international limelight occasionally for its new contacts, having in mid-1983 joined the Non-Aligned Movement and formalised diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations with Vietnam and Libya (as well as numerous other less "exotic" countries) were established. The French connection was calm; relations had recovered from the depth of February 1982 when Lini expelled the French Ambassador after Sope was refused entry to New Caledonia.

8. ibid., p.108.
9. Colleen Ryan, "A President who wants to be PM awaits the call", The National Times, 8 to 14 April 1983, p.25. Sokomanu's antagonism to Lini was apparent from his comments in that article. The then Finance Minister, Kalpokor Kalsakau, was quoted saying of Sokomanu "he is just bored now. But it is his own fault for taking the job on. We told him it would be only ceremonial".
10. The monograph does not look at Vanuatu's foreign policy except for those incidents which have a bearing on the internal political turmoil, e.g. relations with France, the ties with Cuba and Libya. Except for speeches at the United Nations and at Non-Aligned meetings, foreign policy is seldom expanded upon at much length. A Parliamentary statement by Sela Molisa in January 1984, reported
The President resigned in February 1984 when he was prosecuted for non-payment of his 1983 car tax but the government renominated him and on 8 March he was re-elected. The Opposition boycotted the first vote but that was not unexpected as they had been prone to boycott Parliament. (In 1983 the government pushed through Parliament an act which entitled the Speaker to dismiss as an MP any parliamentarian who failed to provide a note explaining his absence after three consecutive sitting days.)

The few foreign correspondents who checked Vanuatu out during this calm generally reiterated the impression given by Stackhouse in August 1982 when he wrote "there appears to be a general consensus in Vila that Vanuatu, despite the problems which attended its birth, is beginning to work. The economy is in fairly good shape, buoyed by a surge in tourism (mainly from Australia), continuing aid from France and Britain with the prospects of new industries developing in the years ahead". Two years later Keith-Reid wrote "in business offices and government departments around Port Vila the verdict on Lini’s government most commonly heard is that it is doing much better than expected, when you consider its troubles at the start". Keith-Reid noted "the current assessment in Port Vila is that Lini’s position has never been more secure and that Vanua’aku Pati internal affairs are stable". A year earlier Robie had found Lini in control having "survived two challenges to his leadership and patched up the rifts in his party".

---

11. There was no woman MP until 1987, when Hilda Lini (VP) and Maria Crowby (UMP) were elected to Parliament.
A contrary view was Sheridan's who, writing in May 1986, portrayed Vanuatu as "leading a radical regional push that threatens Western values and interests in the Pacific". One of his two articles featured comments from Sope.

**Sope goes his own way**

Meanwhile Sope was furthering his business activity, with French interests among others. He was also having, as Sheridan's article showed, a second wind with his radical predilections, which had been quiescent while he was in the government's ranks. He visited Cuba in September 1985 and Libya, and sponsored the arrival in Vanuatu of a group of musicians, the Black Brothers who, in part at least because of their political inclinations, had had a chequered musical career since leaving Indonesia. From January 1985 he had several times hosted Libyan officials in Vila and in January 1987 let it be known publicly that he expected Libya to establish a presence in Vila.

---

17. *Tam Tam*, 10 March 1984, p.7 reports Sope's appointment as Chairman of the Board of Directors for UNELCO Vanuatu, the firm which ran the capital's public utilities since before independence. *Tam Tam*’s front page for 19 April 1984 mentions Sope’s new Hong Kong office for his firm, Vanuatu Consultants Investment Office.
18. The fact that Sope did not become a minister in 1983 was surprising given his experience and seniority in the VP. His own explanation - that his commitments as Secretary-General of the Pati did not permit it - is unconvincing since the post was largely a sinecure by that time. A more likely explanation could be that unpublicised divisions were already occurring between Sope and his VP colleagues.
20. The group, which is West Irianese, identified with the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) rebels active in Irian Jaya. The Black Brothers had lived in Papua New Guinea until 1979 when they left for Holland. They arrived in Vanuatu in 1983. While resident there they became the leading pop group in the country and also toured Solomon Islands and New Caledonia. Their leader, Andy Ayamiseba, became a key business associate of Sope’s. The group was a casualty of Sope’s falling out with the VP. After the government revoked their entry permits in June 1988 the group’s leaders were held in prison pending deportation. In November 1988 they went to Australia and by mid-1989 the band was becoming a feature of the Canberra music scene. (*The Canberra Times*, 24 July 1989, article "Black Brothers building bridges" profiled them.)
CHAPTER TEN
VANUATU: 1987-1989

The calm of the previous three years was shattered in early February 1987 by Cyclone Uma's devastation of the capital, which was a major financial setback to the government, followed by deteriorating economic prospects as tourism faltered and the world price for the principal export, copra, tumbled.

Cyclone relief brought complications for the government as some international donors sought to make public capital out of their assistance. The French were quick on the scene: this was the time of Gaston Flosse's active diplomacy in the region. In April 1986 Flosse, a senior French Polynesian politician, had been brought into the Chirac government as the Secretary of State for South Pacific questions with a brief to improve France's tarnished reputation in the region. The French military in New Caledonia were the vehicle for assistance but it became evident that there was little disposition to fit in with the Vanuatu authorities' priorities. When the French started dealing direct with the Francophone Opposition politicians and giving them substantial funds to disperse, the bilateral relationship took another nosedive.

The Libyans sent their representative in Canberra, Shaban Gashut, to show their interest. The Soviets did likewise but their contribution, a dozen tractors, arrived in July 1989. The Americans with their experience and skill in delivering emergency assistance in the region took a much more practical approach arriving with tents, which became prized possessions for many, and relief supplies.

1. Mark Baker, "Libya Boosts its Pacific role", Melbourne Age, 7 March, p.1. This article prompted much interest as it indicated a growing Libyan presence in the South Pacific. Its publication coincided with a visit to Vanuatu by a four member trade delegation from Libya and was only days after a group of six associates of Sope's returned from three months in Libya.
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

As the cyclone hit Vila the news came that in Washington the country's Prime Minister, Walter Lini, had suffered a serious stroke only hours after arriving there for his first visit. It was a month before Lini returned to Vanuatu; much of the time was spent recuperating in Fiji.

Sope was quick to move when Lini's hospitalization became known. During February he made moves to consolidate his claim to succeed Lini. Lini's supporters outmanoeuvered Sope until the Prime Minister returned on 7 March. Several thousand were at the airport to see Lini; they saw him walk, albeit slowly, from the aircraft. Lini then addressed the nation over the radio and he spoke with his usual authority. His reassuring talk ensured that, except by Sope and his associates, it was accepted that Lini was going to continue as Prime Minister, though few appreciated how severely the Prime Minister's right arm and leg had been affected by the stroke.

The Libyans depart

For the next ten weeks Lini kept a low profile and only returned to work in mid-May at the height of the Libyan affair. On 26 May Lini announced in Parliament that the Libyans would not be invited to set up in Vila. In the same statement he confirmed that a New Zealand High Commission would be opening later in the year. The two Libyan diplomats who had been hosted by Sope were ordered to leave and did.

The foreign media had taken considerable interest in the Libyans in Vanuatu but with the coup in Fiji in mid-May their attention switched to Fiji and then the South Pacific Forum meeting in late May/early June as the region's leaders tried to

2. *Islands Business*, March 1987, pp.12-20 had several stories about Vanuatu, including an interview with Lini and a report of Lini's return to Vila by Robert Keith-Reid.
resolve how to handle the new regime in Suva. When thoughts returned to Libyans in Vanuatu there were none, and visits by Vanuatu officials to Tripoli appeared to be out of the question though Sope supporters have trickled that way from time to time.

The second half of 1987 saw Vanuatu’s politicians readying themselves for the 30 November general election. During the year Lini dismissed two ministers, Albert Sande and Willie Korisa, both of whom were closer to Sope than to himself, though neither was dismissed for that specific reason.

The failure by Sope to accomplish a major task given him by the government also became public: Air Vanuatu, a joint venture with Ansett Airlines, had folded in 1985 and the government had wanted to get the airline back in the air. Sope produced a Hong Kong company, China Pacific Airline (CPA), but the venture failed spectacularly and cost the government a considerable amount of money as well as embarrassing them shortly before the election.

1987 General Election

Sope’s differences with the rest of the leadership remained out of the public arena until the election campaign but then became evident, most obviously in the capital after the selection of candidates for the VP. The three candidates were to be Sope, Finance Minister Kalsakau, and recently dismissed minister Sande, whose "home" electorate was not the capital’s five-member seat but the surrounding Efate Rural electorate. As most of the

6. David Jenkins, "Fiji, goodbye Sandhurst, hello banana republic", The National Times, 17 May 1987 describes the switch of interest by Australian journalists then looking for Libyans in Vanuatu to get to a coup in Fiji. His "How Vanuatu shot itself..." in the same issue of The National Times is an example of the more able Australian media coverage of the Libyans then in Vanuatu.
7. David Hegarty, Libya in the South Pacific (Working Paper no.127, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, October 1987) and Denis McLean, "The External Powers: Other Extra-Regional Powers" in Henry Albinski, John Dorrance and Fedor Mediansky (eds), Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands, National Defence University, Washington, forthcoming) are the most detailed accounts of Libyan activities in the South Pacific.
VP’s support in Vila came from non-E fateans they were angry that none of their people had been chosen. When none of the three would stand aside an additional VP candidate, Hilda Lini, was announced. Having four nominations undermined the prospects of each of them for winning a seat. The VP was in disarray as supporters revolted against Pati instructions, laid down by Sope supporters, as to which candidate the different island communities living in Vila were to vote for. On election day Hilda Lini topped the poll for the VP. Sope beat Kalsakau by four votes for the fifth seat. Kalsakau and Sande lost their seats in Parliament.

In the rest of Vanuatu the VP campaign team found that the two issues causing most dissatisfaction were the connection with Libya and Sope. The VP had another comfortable win, taking 26 of the expanded Parliament’s 46 seats but their slice of the total vote slipped below 50 per cent for the first time. Several new parties - Leba, New People’s, and New Democratic - contested some seats but none of their candidates came anywhere near winning a seat. The UMP, led by Boulekone, improved its share of the vote and won the other 20 seats; it was still a coalition of smaller parties rather than a single party.

Leadership challenges

Immediately after the election there were leadership challenges in both major parties. Boulekone was replaced by Maxime Carlot as the Opposition leader. By June 1988 Boulekone and the one other MP aligned with his Tan Union party had split from the UMP and were to be crucial for Lini and the VP when Sope and four other MPs split with the VP. The two Tan Union parliamentarians represent Pentecost, as does Lini, while the new dominant faction in the UMP were Efateans like Sope.

The more dramatic challenge was the one Sope set in motion on 4 December when his supporters held a rally in Vila calling for Lini to be replaced as Prime Minister by himself. Sope used his position as Secretary-General of the Pati to announce publicly he would challenge Lini for the Prime Ministership (but not as leader of the Pati) at a special VP Congress called for the

9. Observation by the author when present at the VP’s final rally in Vila at Independence Park on 28 November.
following week. Sope's challenge failed by a wide margin. The seriousness of the split was apparent when on 14 December Lini announced the new cabinet and did not include Sope.

The May 1988 riot

In mid-January 1988, as Lini left for New Zealand for medical treatment, in a move intended as a reconciliation he added Sope and Fred Timakata to the cabinet. Soon, there were indications that feuding between Sope and other ministers was going to be disruptive. The first major move was on 10 May when the Lands Minister, Willie Mahit, abolished the Vila Urban Land Corporation (VULCAN), which was set up on behalf of the customary claimants to the land where the capital is situated and collected rents for all properties in the capital. Since VULCAN's creation shortly after independence Sope had sat on the Board and was the Chairman of the Board of Directors. VULCAN had accumulated considerable financial reserves but the three villages could not agree on how to share their percentage. That stalemate continued until Mahit's move though it became widely known that VULCAN's reserves - some of which were meant for the three villages - were disappearing.11

Sope's response was to inspire a march by the three villages to protest at the closure of VULCAN. On the morning of Monday 16 May nearly 2,000 marched along Vila's main street and up to the Prime Minister's office. There was some unruliness but their petition was handed to the Lands Minister and the marchers dispersed before lunch. About 150 gathered at the town's foreshore for a barbecue lunch provided by Sope. In the

10. The claimants are the three villages, Pango, Erakor, and Ifira, which are situated on the outskirts of the capital. The fourth nearby village, Mele, is not included. Sope represented Ifira, his village. For background on VULCAN see Van Trease, *The Politics of Land*, p.261 and Peter Lamour, "Urban Land is at the heart of power struggles", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 May 1988, p.25.

11. Mahit broadcast on Radio Vanuatu, 25 May 1988. He stated "the government has already made an offer of compensation to all the custom owners but none of these offers have been accepted by the custom owners". An interim report prepared by an accountancy firm confirmed that there had been irregularities and financial mismanagement. Senior staff have been prosecuted and found guilty, others left Vanuatu before being charged, Sope and the general manager (and Sope associate), Georges Carlo, have not been charged. See Rowan Callick, "Australia awaits outcome of Vanuatu powerplay", *Australian Financial Review*, 29 July 1988, pp.3 and 46-47 and David Robie, "Vanuatu's fight for democracy", *Dominion*, 12 August 1988, p.11 for details of the accountants' report.
afternoon, fueled up on pig and liquor, many of them went on a rampage along the foreshore and the close-by main street. Many shop owners were prepared and their cyclone shutters were down before trouble arrived.

The Mobile Force took the rest of the afternoon to get on top of the disturbance. It was the first time they had used tear-gas in action and in their initial attempt set it off up-wind to themselves. During the resulting panic a VMF truck backed over, and accidentally killed, Sethy Shem, a handicapped person unable to cope in the panic. By early evening the rioters had exhausted themselves. The damage done was reckoned to be about two million dollars Australian.12

That night the Vanuatu government sought urgent assistance from the New Zealand and Australian governments to restock their tear-gas and additional riot control equipment. The material arrived the next day. There were no further disturbances but even so the Lini government openly sought further support from Canberra and Wellington. The press reported that two Australian Navy ships, HMAS Jervis Bay and Stalwart, sailed close to Vila. Army units in Australia and New Zealand were put on standby for several days.13

Blame for the disturbance was pinned on Sope and his supporters, including some at least of the OPM/Black Brothers group. Subsequently about 50 of those involved in the rioting were arrested for related offences. Two of Sope’s brothers were among those jailed.

Sope was sacked as a minister on 23 May and in early June he was suspended from his Pati positions. He and 127 others were expelled from the Pati by the annual Congress in October.

13. Radio Australia, 20 May 1988 in its evening broadcasts mentioned the navy ships were being diverted to be near Vanuatu. Bronwyn Young, "Aust may send troops to Vanuatu", Australian Financial Review, 23 May 1988, pp.1-2 and Dave Wilson, "Burnham force on standby", Christchurch Press, 26 May 1988. Mary-Louise O’Callaghan in Vila reported "the government fears small-scale terrorist attacks by supporters of Mr Sope, who are mainly based on his home island of Ifira, in Port Vila’s harbour. Some of them have been trained in Libya". See her "PM to Lini: I’ll send military", Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1988.
Parliamentary manoeuvres

The day following his sacking Sope spoke on Radio Vanuatu claiming many government MPs would side with him in a show-down with Lini and that he had been blamed unfairly for the troubles. His next move was to attempt to table a no-confidence motion in Parliament. He failed to do so. A special session was needed and 24 of the 46 parliamentarians had to sign a petition for Parliament's recall. Sope did not have sufficient support. In a counter-move the government had Parliament recalled. The business specified ensured a no-confidence motion could not be put forward as it would be ruled out-of-order. The clear purpose was to enable the Speaker to rule, in accord with section 2(f) of the Constitution, that Sope and the four other break-away MPs had lost their right to be parliamentarians.

When Parliament met on 21 July there were insufficient MPs present to do its business. Sope, his four supporters and the 18 UMP parliamentarians had stayed away, claiming the Special Session was a ploy to expel the five former VP MPs. Within a week the 23 boycotting MPs were all ruled by the Speaker as having lost their seats. For the next three months the 23 sought through the Courts to regain their seats. In late October the Court ruled in Sope's favour but against the UMP.

By-elections, boycotts

Immediately, the Leader of the Opposition, Maxime Carlot, in an open letter to Lini, urged him to "advise the President to dissolve Parliament and call a general election. I ask you to examine the underlying precepts of a true constitutional democracy". The Prime Minister was set on holding by-elections for the vacant seats and the Opposition was intent on boycotting the by-elections, demanding a new general election. Carlot ended his letter "if the government genuinely thinks it represents the majority of the electorate then let it have the courage of its convictions and call a general election. Let the people decide!"

While awaiting the Court's rulings Sope announced he was creating a new party, the Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP). Fifteen months later the MPP was formally created. Its
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

launching has been delayed by Sope several times. In the meantime, Sope has appointed office-bearers and the MPP had run candidates in local government elections.

The government proceeded with by-elections on 12 December for the 18 former UMP seats. The day after nominations closed (7 November) Sope and his group of four resigned from Parliament; they did so in accord with an understanding with the UMP that if either but not both were successful in their Court appeals then those reinstated would resign.

The five new resignations were timed so that a further round of by-elections would be required; administratively time had run out for them to be included with the others. The UMP and the MPP announced they were boycotting the by-elections and demanded a new general election. When nominations closed, nine seats, including the three in the capital, were filled without a contest, another electorate had only two candidates for three vacancies. That left eight seats requiring a vote. Boulekeone’s Tan Union was the only party to put up candidates against the VP though several independents nominated as well.

Sope had announced that his supporters would actively boycott the by-elections. The Efate Rural electorate was the obvious target; the VP support was weakest there and Sope and the UMP were popular. The result had something for each of the parties. The turnout was only 25 per cent on Efate. Elsewhere it was considerably higher, averaging 50 per cent, which meant with the exception of Efate, turnout compared favourably with the only previous set of by-elections in August 1982.14

Presidential coup

President Sokomanu’s antagonism for the Prime Minister was again manifested publicly. In the run-up to the by-elections he sought to intervene, even though he had no constitutional authority to do so. The President had the same problem regarding his wanting to broadcast to the nation a message critical of the government and supportive of the boycotters, who were keeping him informed of their views.

Sope and Carlot declared their next move would be a demonstration outside Parliament when it opened on the following Friday, 16 December, for the Budget session. Sope claimed he would have more than 5,000 supporters at the demonstration and that parliamentarians would not be able to meet. His people would stop them from getting into the chamber. The government responded by banning the demonstration and keeping a high-profile security presence around the capital and at Parliament. When Parliament met, MPs were unimpeded by Sope who had a small group of supporters with him at the other end of town, a kilometre from Parliament.15

The President had taken centre-stage. As was established practice, he addressed Parliament at the beginning of proceedings (broadcast live on the country’s only radio station). The speech was his own rather than a statement from the government. Many of his previous speeches in Parliament had been critical of the government. It was expected he would be so again but MPs were not expecting his announcement that there and then he was dissolving Parliament, would form an interim government, and arrange a new general election to be held in February 1989 (two and a half years ahead of schedule). The President had no constitutional authority to take this action. He left the building but Parliament carried on after his exit and went about its business. Nevertheless, the government sought an early ruling from the Supreme Court on the President’s announcements.

An interim government!

The President made the next move on Sunday, 18 December, when he appointed Sope as Prime Minister and four others as ministers in an interim government. Two of the four were leading UMP figures, Maxime Carlot and Willie Jimmy; the others were John Naupa and Frank Spooner. The swearing in of the five was done with foreign media, including television, present to record the event.16

15. As apparent from ABC television news, 16 December 1988
16. The most comprehensive media report of the week is in Island Business, January 1989, pp.8-14. Other reporting of note was Mary-Louise O’Callaghan’s pieces for The Melbourne Age/Sydney Morning Herald, for example “Why we’re not trusted in Vanuatu” and “Sope’s Caged Canary”, both in the Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1988, p.29. Rowan Callick’s “Vanuatu’s problems are a mix of religion, egos and ambitions”, Australian Financial Review, 20 December 1988, p.8 provides a succinct outline of Vanuatu’s politics.
The President sent a formal instruction to the security forces to acknowledge their allegiance to him rather than Prime Minister Lini. He stated that if they did not, then he would bring in foreign troops to provide for the country’s security. (Sope announced publicly after his swearing in that he would request other governments in the region, including Fiji, to intervene militarily to protect the interim government.) He also sent messages to several overseas governments seeking their recognition.

The President’s coup was quickly ended. The next day the Supreme Court ruled that the President had no constitutional basis for his announcements in Parliament the previous Friday. The security forces remained loyal to the Lini government. No foreign governments recognised the Sope government. The President and the interim government’s ministers were arrested on sedition and related charges and were held in Vila’s prison awaiting trial.

1989

The trial spanned late February/early March 1989 and the presiding judge, with the assistance of two ni-Vanuatu assessors, found Sokomanu guilty and sent him to prison for six years, Sope and Carlot received five years each, and Willie Jimmy was sent to jail for two years. Appeals were lodged on the ground that the trial judge had been wrong in allowing the case to be heard as the prosecution had not shown there was a case against the defendants on the evidence presented. The Court of Appeal heard the case in late March and announced on 14 April that the grounds for the appeal were justified. The guilty verdicts were overturned. The five were released from prison the same day.

18. Stuart Littlemore attended much of the trial for the International Commission of Jurists (Australian Section Trial Observation). His report, Mistake of Law? The Vanuatu Sedition Trial, Port Vila 20 February - 7 March 1979, to the ICJ background the case and details his criticisms of the trial, for the latter see particularly pp.28-34.
19. The judgment made it clear that the President had no constitutional power to dissolve Parliament or appoint the Sope government but they were matters separate to the sedition charge.
Meanwhile Sokomanu had lost his old job, the Presidential Electoral College having met on 12 January and dismissed him for gross misconduct. On 30 January Fred Timakata was elected President by the College.

From April Vanuatu's political scene has been quiet. Local government elections in February for Vila and in August for four other councils (Malekula, Tongoa/Shepherds, Amae/Maewo and Tanna plus the Southern Outer Islands) provided some comfort for the VP and the UMP but less so for Sope's MPP, as little of the latter's proclaimed support was evident.

Sope travelled overseas, including to Suva to renew his acquaintance with Rabuka. He also visited Canberra where he admitted for the first time publicly that the Presidential coup was unconstitutional. In December, Sope was in Noumea. In this period Sope fitted Hughes' quip about public figures: "some will be busy accumulating their first reputations; others will be working overtime to make a fast get-away from their old ones".

UMP leaders also went overseas to seek support. As well as being represented at a Pacific Democratic Union conference in Tokyo visits were made to Noumea and Paris. Such travels reinforce Robie's comment that "in the eyes of most ni-Vanuatu the UMP is linked to Paris and colonial control". He noted that the UMP had been embarrassed at the time of the

---

20. David Robie, "Lini rides out the shockwaves from Fiji", PNG Post-Courier, 13 January 1989, p.11 where Sope is described as "an ardent admirer" of Rabuka. Sope had met Rabuka in 1988. They met again in April 1990. Ifira (Sope's village) and Mele (Sokomanu's village) are regarded in Vanuatu as being Polynesian outliers, as are several small outer islands, which sets them apart a little from the Melanesian majority. See Van Trease, The Politics..., p.9. Though, on the following page, Van Trease says "one must be careful not to overemphasize the importance of Polynesian influence".

22. Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes, 7 December 1989, p.3, which reported Sope "est en train de se construire une image beaucoup plus modérée".
November 1987 general election by the publicity surrounding the expulsion the previous month of the French ambassador for allegedly funding the UMP.26

The government was not coping especially well with the worsening economic situation. Tourism was in the doldrums. A major cause was the political turmoil in Vila being featured on Australian television. In addition, airline services with Australia in particular but elsewhere as well, were shaky. The third attempt at putting Air Vanuatu on a satisfactory basis was being made, this time with Australian government assistance. The airline has now been flying for a year with one aircraft, an ex-Australian Airlines Boeing 727.27 The most serious case ever of corruption by Vanuatu government officials was heard by the Supreme Court in September and October 1989 and two senior officials were found guilty of receiving significant amounts from a Taiwanese businessman.

The remaining parliamentary by-elections were held on 28 November. Again, the UMP and MPP boycotted repeating their call for an early general election. The Tan Union and the VP contested them. This time there were five contests which the VP won easily while the Tan Union was elected unopposed in another seat where the VP nomination arrived late. The VP obtained the other unopposed. Polling was light in Vila, with a 25 per cent turnout, but higher in the other four, though overall turnout was down on the by-elections a year earlier. There was no disruption of voting. But the results were of no particular comfort to the government or the other groups; rather they suggested the prevailing stalemate was unchanged.

26. "Lini considers his future", Islands Business, March 1987, p.14 reported Prime Minister Lini saying that French money was being channelled to the UMP through Vila's offshore (tax-haven) banks.
Vanuatu's recent political history has been outlined in the last three chapters; before that we looked at Ghai, Fry and Lawson's work on Westminster democratic constitutional conventions in the South Pacific. The task now is to provide in Laqueur's words what government leaders expect, namely "a trenchant explanation of developments reflecting the judgment of informed intelligence analysts and a range of likely future developments based on the best information currently available". On this occasion it is only one person's best endeavours, but it still provides the model of what needs to be done professionally.

There are two outstanding issues to work through in this case study if the final assessment is to be of value:

- who will win the 1991 general election in Vanuatu? More specifically, can the VP make it four in a row and, if so, does that mean the one-party dominant system will become permanently entrenched in Vanuatu? Or if the VP loses the election who will be the winners?

- will the elections result in serious political turbulence? Specifically could another VP victory prompt its opponents to turn to extra-constitutional tactics, or if the VP loses will the winners be able to govern?

The tentative assessment will come together towards the end of the next chapter. Now I will look again at the raw material of the past two decades to suggest some major assumptions for reaching judgments, and will highlight what could be crucial gaps in available information.

This chapter will concentrate on matters of fact, which is what Betts suggests people in government like to deal with. He contends that in such circles there is a distaste for theory "because it seems soporific or sophomoric". He contends the dilemma for

---

1. Laqueur, World of Secrets, p.106.
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

intelligence is that it can not live with theory and can not live without it - theories are necessary for judging the importance of data though they can also be the source of mistaken judgment.2 Theory is turned to in the next chapter in an endeavour to improve the judgments made in coming to an assessment.

While much of what has been written in previous chapters is useful background, a broader perspective of Vanuatu's stability is not being considered. That is a separate and important subject. There have been past extra-constitutional attempts to bring down the government in Vila - the 1977 People's Provisional Government, the 1980 Santo rebellion and the 1988 Presidential coup - and it is not beyond the realm of speculation that, in the future, Sope could try that tactic.3 In this case study, we are looking only at the prospects at the time of the 1991 general election, most particularly for a successful and peaceful transition of power were the VP to lose.

The most immediate tasks are to project into the future the consequences of Sope's departure from the VP, and to ascertain if there are yet significant cracks in the major long-standing political division between Anglophones and Francophones. The most difficult task is to explain the electoral system, especially its idiosyncratic aspects, which in a close result could play a major role in who wins.

Anglophones-Francophones or ni-Vanuatu

There is no final answer for how divided the country is on the Anglophone-Francophone cleavage. It remains a basic feature of political life and, superficially at least, it seems to be the single most obvious ground for most ni-Vanuatu's political allegiance though that belies some other variables such as religious affiliation which relate closely. Roman Catholics are overwhelmingly Francophone while the protestants are

3. Mary-Louise O'Callaghan has reported the South Pacific for three years. Writing in the Melbourne Age on 8 August 1988 she said "at present he is willing to use the courts and legal process open to him to try to regain his seat in parliament but Mr Sope's bottom line remains that any solution must be acceptable to his supporters. An assertion that contains an inherent threat that the issue may once again spill into the streets of Port Vila".
Anglophone. There is no reliable information available which pinpoints how most ni-Vanuatu regard their identification as Francophone or Anglophone. Leading ni-Vanuatu contend it is a lessening factor and point out how it cuts across families without dividing them. Even so in public life there is not much evidence that during the 1980s there has been any important blurring of that division.

The VP shows no signs of having absorbed significant Francophone support. Its leadership remains the Anglophones who were present during the tumultuous events surrounding the country’s independence. In the opposition ranks there have been few new personalities appear who are Anglophone. Even the most visible, Luke Dini, an Anglican priest who won a parliamentary seat in 1987, was a minister in George Kalsakau’s ill-fated ministry in 1977 which set Dini apart from the VP. His 1987 election victory in the Banks and Torres electorate was prompted by the charismatic revival movement being influential amongst Anglicans, who made up the bulk of that electorate. Dini’s 1987 victory was probably a one-off instance: the November 1989 by-election turnout for the VP indicates a strong revival in its support in that electorate.

A catalyst for the political relevance of the Anglophone-Francophone division has been the downs and ups of bilateral relations between Vanuatu and France. There have been several difficult periods and during the 1980s at least two and possibly a third French Ambassador were expelled. In early 1990 relations were on the mend but what the situation might be nearly two years later is quite unpredictable in such a volatile relationship.

An interesting indicator of the seeming ongoing importance of the division is Sope’s recent cultivation of a pro-French and pro-Francophone image. He may be acknowledging the need to be on one side or the other if he is to be influential and he has chosen to identify now with the Francophones.

4. Except for the sedition trial in late February/early March few foreign journalists visited Vanuatu in 1989. In mid-year Michael Fathers of The Independent (London) and Pauline Swain of The Dominion did. Fathers reported three French ambassadors had gone while Swain reported two. It is unclear if the third ambassador, Marc Menguy, was expelled. Of the four French ambassadors only Phillip Baude served a full term.
A reconciliation?

What are the prospects for a reconciliation between Sope and the VP? I suggest that can be ruled out before 1991 even if Lini was to step down as Pati leader, and I don’t think he will. The divide is too great. Sope’s challenge for the VP leadership in 1987 and 1988 is not just a clash between him and Lini. It has set him apart from the whole leadership. There is no sign of an early reconciliation being possible.5

Sope is the most formidable of the various former VP personalities who have left the party, mostly after their sacking as cabinet ministers. Former colleagues know Sope’s capabilities from when he was the VP’s Secretary-General, and though in recent years he had not handled that job particularly well, his pre-independence performance was highly regarded by the party. Even so, within the party’s innermost circles he was not held in the same perspective as the foreign media often portrays him - being the toughest of the tough among the VP leadership. 6

5. “Vanuatu Prime Minister looks to institutional change”, Pacific Report, 29 September 1988, p.3 where Lini says of a reconciliation with Sope "it would have been possible if the Vanua’aku Pati did not have a written-down constitution, and...if Mr Sope - after he has taken the government to court, the Vanua’aku Pati to court and the Parliament to court -after all has happened, then maybe after one or two years if he decided he was completely sorry for what he did" and "the Vanua’aku Pati should not be confused with Melanesian custom for the settlement of disagreements between us leaders in the Pati". Sope has shown no signs of repentance, his press statement of 8 December 1988 being a flamboyant example, where he says "the Lini gang has chosen to pursue a series of appallingly illegal, unconstitutional, undemocratic, and basically immoral measures in the hope that somehow, somewhere along this shabby trail they will find surreptitious salvation". He chooses different words for the Australian media but the message, so far, is the same - no reconciliation. See Canberra Times, 31 August 1989, p.5.

Vanuatu: Looking to 1991

Lini

The VP's strength is its leadership. It is still young: the Prime Minister is 48. His 10 years in power have toughened him. He acknowledged as much in July 1989 when he said that in the early days he had thought that all you need is the right policies and things would get done. "Now it's clear to me, to do the job properly you need to have a critical look at the cost of it, and most importantly to have the right people involved, and to work closely with them". Lini has gathered around him such a group. Most of his ministers are younger than him as are his key advisers. Most of the key advisers - Joe Natuman, Grace Molisa, Nkenike Vurobaravu and Kalkot Matas-KeleKele - have been close to Lini throughout the decade and were crucial for the Prime Minister when he faced off with Sope.

Concern about the Prime Minister's health had long passed. In 1989 he appeared to have recovered as much as he ever could from the Washington stroke. He would have a permanent disability in his right arm and a limp which hampers his mobility but neither were of themselves anywhere near serious enough for him to give up his job.

One of the most difficult aspects of Vanuatu's politics to explain to a non ni-Vanuatu is the staying power of Walter Lini. Throughout his decade in power he has been misunderstood by many and comprehended by few outsiders. Lini is very much explained by his Christian faith; he seems to be one of the few individuals who, in their public and personal lives, have balanced the love of power with the power of love.

The smallness and the moderateness of government operations has been an important constraint. Losing several million dollars on the second version (Sope's) of Air Vanuatu was a major setback for the government; it simply had not wasted money like that before.

---

Lini has weaknesses as a leader but they are matters which his supporters appear forgiving of and his strengths are important within Vanuatu, though less apparent in international forums. A recent profile noted that Lini "seems to have stayed untainted by corruption or indecorous behaviour which, if it's true, is a rare quality in a long-term leader".  

It is his countrymen who give him credibility as their leader. Such support is partly a result of who associates with whom. There is a distinct contrast between Lini and Sope; the latter's numerous foreign contacts - West Irianese, Libyan, extreme right-wing French New Caledonians, Major-General Rabuka, the hard-line Kanak independentist Yann Celene Uregei and British PR consultants - worried many ni-Vanuatu. Lini's foreign contacts are much more comprehensible to other ni-Vanuatu and largely arise from his Anglican church contacts. Even so Lini has had bruising experiences, notably his association with the foreign businessman who was the prompt for Naupa's accusations in March 1983.  

**Sope**  
Sope's challenges to Lini's leadership of the VP have had the effect of introducing a regional factor into what was previously an Anglophone-Francophone division. Since his expulsion from the VP Sope has sought to use his support from his home village and the other Vila villages previously strongly supportive of the VP to create his new party. He has got alongside the UMP leaders who come from the same villages and emphasised local rather than ideological considerations - in the short term a successful ploy as between them they have largely wiped out the VP's support on Efate. One of the biggest questions for 1991 is whether Sope and the UMP leadership on Efate can sustain this dominance.  

10. See p.78.
The down side of Sope’s prominence on Efate may be that elsewhere an anti-Efate mood becomes more significant as a political consideration. The most likely beneficiary would be the VP. The UMP is deeply divided over their Sope connection; many did not want to go along with his June/July 1988 attempt to bring down the Lini government.  

Sope has developed a pro-Francophone and pro-French image intended, it seems, to consolidate his connections with the UMP leadership. If his MPP is to become a significant party in Parliament his best strategem in the 1991 general election campaign would seem to be form an electoral alliance with the UMP to share their voting support by putting up a single list of candidates. In the 1989 local government elections the MPP took more of its support from the UMP than it did from the VP. By April 1990 the UMP had backed well clear of Sope. The party executive in forthright language had declared the UMP would not enter any agreement with the MPP. Until the UMP reverses its current distaste for becoming entangled with him Sope appears set for a minor part in the 1991 general election.

The electoral system

Vanuatu’s electoral system was worked out in the 1979 constitutional discussions and derives some of its features from French electoral philosophy, particularly affecting proportional representation. Except for the two towns (Port Vila and Luganville) each of which forms an electorate, one or more of the islands form the other 14 electorates. The electorates range in size from one to six seats. As each voter has only one vote for one candidate, in the larger electorates the VP has to ensure the best spread of its support in those electorates to maximise the number of seats they win. The Opposition is not so affected as it has been a coalition of smaller parties with localised support.  

11. Such considerations influenced Boulekone, the rejected Opposition leader, when he took his Tan Union out of the UMP in mid-1988, soon after the Efate group had engineered his removal. (On its own Tan Union is not a major group and its present share of 6 MPs is abnormal. In a new general election it would probably win two seats.)

12. Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes, 7 December 1989, p.3 and Les Nouvelles Hebdo, no.99, 11 to 17 January 1990, pp.9-10 are recent reports in Noumea newspapers which reflect Sope’s new inclinations. Les Nouvelles Hebdo, no.106, 1 to 7 March 1990, p.6 reports Sope has sent a son to school in Noumea.

When first introduced, in November 1979, the French expected this system to favour smaller groups in the larger electorates. The French (and their supporters) miscalculated. Instead of the VP amassing large majorities for a few of its more popular candidates, it spread its support with the result that the VP got two-thirds of the seats with 62 per cent of the vote.

As explained already by MacClancy, Vanuatu villages vote en bloc according to religious affiliation. This pattern, which eliminates the important element in western democracies of the floating voter, has been so regardless of whether a village is nativist, such as John Frum or Nagramiel, Catholic or Protestant. That respective political parties knew where their support lay was particularly advantageous for the VP, the only party with a nation-wide structure. Pati officials and village elders were able to direct support in the multi-member electorates to their best advantage.

In 1983 the VP was less well organised and missed four seats that they could have won if their votes had been spread more skillfully.

In 1987 the VP had a mixed performance, in some electorates spreading its votes well but in others missing seats it could have won. In Santo Rural the VP had plenty of votes to win three seats but got only two of the electorate’s six. While top-polling candidate, Sela Molisa, received 1,250 votes, the VP’s third candidate had 715 votes, 92 short of winning the sixth seat, which went to a UMP candidate. The VP did particularly well on Tanna by putting up just three candidates and spreading their support well. All were successful even though their combined support did not warrant the VP getting three seats. On this occasion their rivals split their support badly, letting the VP get an extra seat. The shambles which the VP got itself into in the capital has already been described.

An illustration of how complex the electoral system can be is the situation now for Sokomanu and Sope, given that the former President has declared he is an MPP supporter and going to

15. See pp.85-86.
stand at the next general election. Both rely on the same supporters from the Vila villages yet it is unlikely that there is sufficient support for both of them to be elected in Efate Rural.

They know that at previous general elections, when they were still in the VP, the four Vila villages combined to ensure one of their own standing for the VP was elected in Efate Rural: in 1979 it was Sokomanu, in 1983 it was Sope. But the understanding among the villages and with the VP was that a different village nominated at each election so that no individual could hold the seat for more than one term: which is the explanation for Sope’s switch in 1987 to Vila Town electorate, a less certain route to Parliament.

Resolving such considerations are the tactical decisions each of the parties faces as it works out how many candidates to put up in each electorate. It is a nonsense to put up candidates for all 46 seats; in 1987 the VP had 36 candidates while the UMP had 28. With 40 MPs at present the VP will need to persuade several of them, particularly among those representing Efate Rural and Vila Town, to step aside if the party is to make the most of its electoral support.

Voting patterns

Henningham as well as Premdas and Steeves agree that the 1987 general election saw the Anglophone-Frangophone dichotomy persist as the main voting pattern with the VP and the UMP the beneficiaries. But there was some movement between those two: the VP lost support, in the 1987 general election its country-wide support was 26,617, down from 29,372 eight years earlier though up from 23,718 in the 1983 election. The UMP had jumped from 15,930 to 24,328 in the same period. Other parties and independents were inconsequential, taking only 10 per cent of all votes.

Henningham, who has observed Vanuatu for most of the 1980s, contends the VP will face a difficult task in winning re-election in 1991. He emphasises that the events of 1988 which

saw the Opposition lose its parliamentary seats could lead to a back-lash against the Lini government’s determination to protect its short-term political advantage. With those comments he touches a key unknown: what did most ni-Vanuatu make of the political turmoil in the capital? That and the political consequences of the last several years’ economic recession for the country are the two most crucial issues to focus on but where there is barely any reliable information. Nor is it prudent to simply project our own expectations of how we would react to conclude that is how most ni-Vanuatu would react. My intuition is that the VP may not suffer such a backlash on either matter as Westerners might expect. As a hunch this is not defensible on what is known but neither, it seems, is any other view. All foreign observers, whether academic, media, business or analysts, have to extrapolate at this point because none of us has data that tells us what most ni-Vanuatu think about the two issues.

It is a task where others have failed, including the French in 1975 who projected nation-wide from town council election results in Vila and Santo. They did this in spite of knowing that the two urban centres had only 10 per cent of the country’s population and many residents in the two towns entitled to vote were not ni-Vanuatu. Now the two towns are larger and represent 20 per cent of the total population. The 5,000 foreigners have mostly gone. Those who remain must have become citizens to vote. Even so it is still uncertain ground to make generalisations for the whole country on the basis of what is happening in the capital, or for that matter on the rest of Efate, the island where the capital lies. How widespread support might be for Sope’s MPP beyond Vila and Efate is a key consideration.

There is talk of substantial change within the Anglican and Presbyterian churches, with traditional loyalties weakening and the growth of fundamentalist sects and charismatic factions apparent. Until the 1989 Census figures are available or some academic research is published there is little basis to speculate on what the political significance of such developments may be. In 1987 the New Peoples Party, which was started by a disaffected young graduate civil servant, Fraser Sine, picked up few votes but most of them were from Seventh Day Adventist villages.

The Leba Pati, which had been started by a leading unionist, Kenneth Satunga shortly before the 1987 elections, fielded four candidates, all of whom found what little support they received was from their villages. New parties have failed to break the grip the VP and the UMP have had on the 90 per cent of voters who have supported them. The MPP has yet to be tried in the arena of a national election to show whether it is the exception.

The UMP has fought all three general elections as a coalition but in 1988 it became a single party, immediately suffering internal turmoil. First there was the change of leader, then the co-operation with Sope, followed by the Tan Union's defection. The loss of their parliamentary seats was next. In December 1989 another party, Fren Melanesian, backed out of the UMP to stand alone at the next elections.

If the VP was to lose significantly more of its former supporters, the UMP and the MPP could find themselves winning the election virtually by default. Their prospects would be considerably enhanced if they formed an electoral coalition to avoid splitting their respective electoral support. A similar strategem was used in Fiji in 1987 when the long-established main Opposition, the National Federation Party, joined with the recently formed Labour Party, and put up a single slate of candidates. They did not attract additional support by doing so but became the winners when large numbers of Fijians stayed at home and support for the ruling Alliance dropped dramatically. A repetition of that scenario would seem the most probable way the Lini government would be ousted.

Yet it is hard to see that scenario coming about. It suggests significant changes will have occurred. The credibility of the Lini government is central to what will happen. There have been major difficulties, but what they mean for ni-Vanuatu is largely unknown. Keith-Reid, one of the South Pacific's most respected journalists, who has visited Vanuatu throughout the eighties for his magazine Island Business has said that Vanuatu's

18. Robert Keith-Reid, "In the shadows...", Islands Business, March 1987, p.14. While at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre the author gave a seminar on Vanuatu's political scene calling it "Vanuatu: Enigma, Mystery or just a Puzzle. An Introduction to its Politics."
politics have a reputation for being obscure and largely a mystery to foreign residents and observers. His most recent commentary followed a visit in December 1989 when he considered that the VP was reasserting its dominant position after a period of some erosion of support.19

There are several other institutional elements which may have a bearing on events surrounding the 1991 general election.

**Constitution**

The Constitution has shown a resilience through all the testing it has had. That it has done so well is not necessarily a credit to those who drew it up, except in the sense that brevity and imprecision have helped rather than hindered the resolving of constitutional tussles. Lynch has argued that "presumably, when the Parliament, the courts and the politicians have had time to work out or agree on more details a fuller, more orthodox constitution will emerge".20 In early 1990 Prime Minister Lini initiated discussion about possible constitutional changes. He foresaw a Parliamentary committee being set up to consider suggestions but that no proposals would be discussed by the present Parliament. Rather he hoped the government elected in December 1991 would have a mandate to initiate changes. Lini highlighted his interest in clarifying the role of chiefs as well as religious and community leaders.21

**The judicial system**

The Constitution specifies the Supreme Court as the avenue for redress for anyone concerned for their constitutional rights. Various cases have gone to it and both Supreme and Appeals Courts’ performances in dealing with the constitutional issues referred to them appear to have been accepted and respected.

---

19. Robert Keith-Reid, "Vanuatu’s good time is dawning", *Islands Business*, January 1990, p.15. Keith-Reid thought Vanuatu was shaping up for a tourism and property boom. The author visited Vila in April 1990 and came away with the same impression.


Parliament

Parliament has been a minor player. It seldom meets, being required to do so only twice a year, and then sessions generally last about two weeks. There have been few special sessions. There is little general debate, not a great deal of legislation to handle and the Budget dominates the November/December session.

The "establishment"

Writing recently about Britain’s leading Catholic, Cardinal Basil Hume, John Cunningham described him as part of Britain’s Hidden Establishment, which he explained as "the periphery of the unaligned on whose integrity (but not necessarily allegiance) the political centre counts, to be able to prove that society’s common values have not been corrupted". Vanuatu has its own hidden establishment which fulfills the role outlined by Cunningham. Over the years the VP leaders have cultivated this body of opinion.

The important political forums are constitutionally informal settings, such as the VP congress with around 400 representatives attending, major church gatherings, meetings of the custom chiefs, or events like visits by overseas dignitaries which generate discussion of issues.

In the wider arena of Vanuatu society the VP appears to have several important pillars of support. It has a major legacy of support amongst custom chiefs and the main Protestant churches. The VP still remains committed to both custom and Christianity as being of major importance for the country’s well-being. It appears to have retained its credibility with key church and custom leaders.

The bureaucracy

For the South Pacific, an unusual feature in Vanuatu’s political system is the politicisation of the bureaucracy. That could have a considerable impact were there to be a change of government. At the top level of the public service is a group of 50

---

to 60 VP figures who are political heads of the government departments or senior officials who would presumably lose their jobs if the VP loses power. They are a cadre of the most well-educated ni-Vanuatu and by default, the only group with any executive experience in bureaucracy. Their loss would be crucial.

A related uncertainty is that many in the public service have been VP faithful though not political appointees as such but if there was much rancour, or turmoil, were the VP to go out of government, then they may walk out of their jobs and return to their home islands. The importance of the bureaucrats needs to be stressed; Ghai does so, pointing out "the bureaucracy is still the lynch pin of the new states, acting both on its own interests and those of other dominant groups on the whole as a conservative force and keeping in effect, to a large extent, the former systems of decision making".23 It is necessary to appreciate that the bureaucracy now in place is substantially a creation of the Lini government's initial years.24

Ironically, even though the Lini government has been an activist government, Ghai's view is apt in the sense that the bureaucracy now is likely to conserve what the VP has put in place rather than being eager to support a new government. A non-VP government will need a similar-sized group for its senior adviser cadre; even more so than the VP as it is most likely the new ministers would be inexperienced and not well educated. But there is no alternate group of advisers in waiting in Vanuatu. The temptation to get French help could be overwhelming and controversial.

**Foreign media**

In December 1988 the foreign media became a significant player in the action and could be so again. As already noted in the Introduction, Coral Bell's term "pseudo-crisis" encompasses situations "where some real incident is involved, and a wide-spread media sensation is created but the consequences

---

24. I observed the putting in place of the bureaucracy as a New Zealand diplomat involved, from our post in Solomon Islands, in handling our bilateral affairs with Vanuatu from independence in July 1980 until January 1982.
only affect the 'atmospherics' of some public event'. The Presidential coup is, in my view an example of a pseudo-crisis. Sokomanu's behaviour is largely explainable by his thinking that, by using the foreign media as his conduit, the Lini government would collapse when Radio Australia broadcast back into Vanuatu his and Sope's views. During the days running up to the President's dramatic action this was attempted. Both print media and television were cultivated so that their views might be heard in Australia in order to undercut the support that the Lini government might secure from Canberra.

The Vanuatu government's position was stated by Grace Molisa, who told one of the Australian journalists covering the events, that if the ni-Vanuatu had been left to resolve it, it would never have got to this level: "once the media kick it up, it takes it out of our context and puts it in a different dimension."

In the media battle, the Lini government was on the back-foot which complicated its relations with other South Pacific governments. The Prime Minister, for instance, had to explain to his Melanesian Spearhead colleagues when they met in January 1989 precisely what Sokomanu and Sope had been up to. It was a classic instance of Dihm's comment:

"It may seem ironic, but it can sometimes be harder to obtain reliable information about developments in other Pacific island countries than about developments in countries farther away, primarily because of the weakness of media flows which often go via Australia and/or New Zealand en route to or from other countries in the region."

Commentators on the South Pacific have had a hard time analysing where it is going. The region neither allows itself to be pigeon-holed into academic models developed elsewhere nor into a superpower battlefield. The island states appear intent on doing their own thing, in their own way, though in my view that does not add up to the much loved "Pacific Way" which was heralded in the 1970s. The rest of the world - religious, educational, commercial, sporting and cultural - has arrived and changed the region's ethos. Vanuatu is no exception, although it is different to its neighbours: the condominium had chic as well as farce.

Hegarty’s Stability and Turbulence in South Pacific Politics is the best introduction to the region’s diverse nature and the difficulty in generalising about the political stability or instability of each island state. He places considerable emphasis on the prospects for domestic stability and instability as the key to better appreciating the regional security outlook for the future. He acknowledges that the tendency toward domestic political volatility has coincided with important developments in the wider world which, in turn, have brought about change in the regional security outlook, and suggests that while many island states’ politics are turbulent, instability is not endemic. Vanuatu fits that mold.

I have sought in the second half of this monograph to explain how Vanuatu’s politics work. The sketch provides perspective for Lawson’s and Fry’s academic work which we looked at in the context of democratic constitutions thriving in the region. Broadly, Fry’s and Lawson’s research suggests Vanuatu has some potential for political and constitutional turbulence at the time of the 1991 general election which will not necessarily develop into full-blown crisis.

To restate what Fry saw as important when the region's various constitutions were being devised, we see:

- the absence of parties in South Pacific countries eliminating the usual approach to the choice of a government, namely that the party which gains a majority of seats in parliament after a general election becomes the government, and its leader the prime minister. (Instead the appointment and dismissal of governments, including the appointment of a prime minister, is solely in the hands of parliament.)

- no active or discretionary power for the head of state to be involved in questions of succession of government. (In most constitutions there is neither an active nor any discretionary power and in those where a limited role is specified no discretionary power is granted to the Head of State.)

- the compulsory removal of a prime minister after a no-confidence motion has been passed by parliament being encoded in the constitutions.

When he wrote in 1982 Fry reflected that while there had been general acceptance of the mechanisms, looking ahead he considered "we are really asking why force has not been used to seize power in the South Pacific states and why incumbent governments have not sought to entrench their own position and cripple that of their opponents by changing the rules or ignoring the existing procedures concerned with succession of government".3

In answering his own question, Fry emphasised the small size of most of the states involved; the general absence of nationalist parties; the non-existence of armed forces outside Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu; and the lack of ethnically "bi-polar" states except in Fiji and possibly Vanuatu. Only in Fiji and Vanuatu did he see conditions existing that could prompt the development of a permanent out-group which felt fully excluded from the possibility of gaining power. Fry mentioned that although Vanuatu had a large number of traditional ethnic groups it was the Anglophone/Francophone overlay which provided the most important division of politics.4 He concluded the most likely

3. Fry, "Succession...", p.56.
4. ibid.
threat undermining constitutional succession would be if political out-groups based on ethnic or regional allegiance developed. Fiji and Vanuatu were nominated as the most likely places for that to happen.

Seen against Fry's criteria Vanuatu stands apart in a way which would increase the possibility of constitutional fragility. The most apparent aspect is the Vanua'aku Pati's dominance since before independence as the country's nationalist party. By itself that aspect is not sufficient to question the VP's commitment to democratic politics and on the rest of Fry's key succession mechanisms Vanuatu is no different from the others in his study. He appears correct in contending that the Francophones are an out-group, or in the words Lawson uses, a permanent minority.

The more detailed model which Lawson used for Fiji needs now to be considered in the context of Vanuatu. Uppermost is the consideration that since the November 1979 general election the UMP has shown a limited willingness to accept the rules of the constitutional game. In 1988 party leaders were publicly admitting that they were willing to go beyond the constitution to help Sope remove the Lini government.

The Opposition have played an often disruptive approach to Parliament, having throughout the eighties resorted to boycotting proceedings. In doing so they have been in effect unwilling to accept the limitations Apter saw for them if they were to be responsible, namely to oppose the government but not to obstruct. In that light the UMP has performed poorly and at this time appears to lack credibility as a potential alternative government. On taking office it would have no-one with previous ministerial experience and few with parliamentary experience. Nor is it likely to have ministers experienced in business or government administration, prerequisites for a new government having any serious prospect of leading the country when the new opposition could be expected to oppose them vigorously. Until the election we can only ponder how ill-fitting the UMP would find the mantle of government which seemingly sits so naturally on the VP.

A major factor will be how important the Anglophone/Francophone divide is at the time of the election. It can only be reassessed in light of new developments. Another factor will be how united the UMP is for the election, and whether its French connection is highlighted yet again. Alleged connections with French officialdom which have become public in the past have already been detailed. When travelling overseas UMP leaders most frequently pass through Paris and Noumea and are rarely seen elsewhere in the South Pacific, Wellington or Australia.

Parliamentary accountability by the Vanuatu government is potentially weak. In important respects the Opposition has failed and parliament meets for a few weeks only each year. Nevertheless there are substantial checks on the government.

Richard Sklar, writing about the norm of accountability, suggests that it appears to be the most widely practised of democratic principles. Rather than freedom of association to compete for government office, or popular participation in authoritative decision making, or the right to dissent from official policies without fear of retaliation, it is this which explains why a Vanuatu dominated by the VP may surprise many observers by being more democratically resilient than had been reckoned. It also probably lies behind Payne’s comment that the Lini government has shown itself to be a firm supporter of the principles of parliamentary democracy. Sklar contends that accountability within the group constrains the actions of power-holders and obliges them to respect the rights and wishes of their constituents.

When observers, such as Henningham, suggest that Vanuatu since July 1988 has in effect become a one-party state they have taken too narrow a perspective of the country’s dynamic. Unquestionably there is trouble in the parliamentary scene when the main opposition has initiated its own absence and

then called "foul". But in the cut and thrust of Vanuatu’s politics there are still important and proven constraints on the government. These forces may be constitutionally informal but they have nevertheless been effective and will most likely continue. The importance of the churches, the custom chiefs and the wider membership of the VP, each of which has established and well-worn avenues to make known their concerns, should not be underestimated. Frustrated foreign observers are at a loss to read what is really happening and can fall back on projecting what they would expect to happen from their experience elsewhere. A notable instance of this phenomenon was the Australian media coverage of the Presidential coup in December 1988 which, for the most part, assumed that the President had the constitutional right to do what he did and saw the Prime Minister refusing to accept his decision to sack him as wrong.10

Yet observers are right to emphasise the importance of parliamentary politics. Lawson’s emphasis on the need for constitutional opposition has considerable bearing here as it did in Fiji, her immediate concern.

Conclusion

With nearly two years to go a great deal can happen which might alter the story told here and thus invalidate the assessment offered now.

As of April 1990 the indications point to the Vanua’aku Pati retaining power in the November 1991 general election. It is most likely they will hold power on their own but they could do so with the support of independent MPs or a minor party. A major factor in their win would be their continuing credibility with most ni-Vanuatu but the failure of the main opposing faction, the Union of Moderate Parties, to put together a credible alternative team of candidates with nation-wide appeal would boost their chances

considerably. Barak Sope may win a seat but his Melanesian Progressive Party is likely to get one other seat at most.11

The campaign period has some potential for political turbulence.12 There are groups unhappy with the prospect of the VP staying in power. They are likely to act at some time but not then, quite possibly sooner.

If the Lini government loses then the political scene will have a high volatility and be much more unpredictable.

Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Walter Lini, said in the immediate aftermath of his country's most recent major political turbulence - the December 1988 Presidential coup - that his government had confidence in the constitution, in the Parliament, and in the police, but that if some external force had come (as Sope had sought then) then his government would not have been confident in coping alone. Vanuatu could only have done so with the help of its neighbours. He acknowledged the importance for his government of the show of support Vanuatu had had from the countries of the region. He said then:

if the neighbours in the region were uncertain then our view was it would have put in question the future of all democratically elected governments in the region. We were very pleased to have had the support of the governments in the region at the right time.13

11. In mid-April 1990, while in Fiji en route to the United States, the former President, Ati George Sokomanu, was reported in the media as saying that the MPP is "sure of winning a majority in the parliament with the coalition (the UMP/MPP) and our trip is part of preparations to form the next government". See *The Fiji Times*, 19 April 1990.
12. Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, spent Easter 1990 holidaying in Vanuatu before starting an official visit to Vila and Santo. In the course of his visit Evans was reported as saying "there is, of course, a continuing high level of political drama likely to be apparent again in the run-up to the elections and a lot of fireworks expected, but that's just the rough-and-tumble of the democratic process, rather than alarming". *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 April 1990.
ANNEX

VANUATU: 1979 -1989

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS

Abbreviations of Party Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Fren Melanesian Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Federal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Frum</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapiel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Leba Pati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matui Tano</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Moderate Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPP</td>
<td>Melanesian Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Namaki Aute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat</td>
<td>Natatok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Na Griamel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>New People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab</td>
<td>Tabwemasana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>Tan Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCNH</td>
<td>Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union of Moderates Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIAP</td>
<td>Vanuatu Independents Alliance Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vanua’aku Pati</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Banks and Torres:** 2 seats

### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,275</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
<th>2,008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Worek (VP)</td>
<td>866*</td>
<td>Norman Roslyn (VP)</td>
<td>769*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre Laloyer (ind)</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>Luke Dini (ind)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,029</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Godden (VP)</td>
<td>789*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Roslyn (VP)</td>
<td>742*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mol Roy Jim (UMP)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Welegtabit (UMP)</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Worek (VIAP)</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Lagon (VIAP)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1987 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,764</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
<th>2,311</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Godden (VP)</td>
<td>793*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luke Dini (UMP)</td>
<td>703*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derek Lulum (VP)</td>
<td>551</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Roslyn (ind)</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### December 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,764</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
<th>1,660</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Baet (VP)</td>
<td>1,342*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Din (TU)</td>
<td>318</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### November 1989 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,764</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
<th>1,792</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cecil Sinker (VP)</td>
<td>1,487*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorgon Ben (TU)</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
**Prospects for Crisis Prediction**

### Aoba & Maewo: 3 seats

#### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>4,390</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>3,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onneyn Tahi (VP)</td>
<td>1,184*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Tungu (MP)</td>
<td>815*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judah Vira (VP)</td>
<td>683*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Wilson (VP)</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson Bihu (ind)</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1987 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>3,901</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onneyn Tahi (VP)</td>
<td>1,107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Natu (VP)</td>
<td>631*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Spooner (ind)</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Ngwerorongo (VP)</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jairus Mui (UMP)</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeon Revo (ind)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Wilson (ind)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Tarivolo (VIAP)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japhet Garaetaligu (NG)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>3,797</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onneyn Tahi (VP)</td>
<td>815*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Bangabiti (UMP)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Ngwerorongo (VP)</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jairus Mui (UMP)</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeon Revo (ind)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Wilson (ind)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Tarivolo (VIAP)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japhet Garaetaligu (NG)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1987 general election:

- the Aoba (Ambae) and Maewo was split into:

#### Ambae: 3 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>4,279</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>3,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onneyn Tahi (VP)</td>
<td>884*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samson Bue (UMP)</td>
<td>772*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Qualao (VP)</td>
<td>766*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Bangabiti (UMP)</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Morris (NG)</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Mera (VP)</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Horo (NPP)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Maewo: 1 seat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boe Roger Jerry (VP)</td>
<td>539*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Sigo (UMP)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezechiel Toa (ind)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Boe (ind)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### December 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>1,596</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarisevuti Wilson (VP)</td>
<td>1,368*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremiah Vira (TU)</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
**Santo, Malo and Aore:** 5 seats

### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Maliu (MP)</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>5,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Karaeru (MP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Nalan (MP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Seru Reuben (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jole Antas (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sela Molisa (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moli Tacetamata (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Ravou Pan (MP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sela Molisa (VP)</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Vohor (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Luc (FMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jole Antas (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Karaeru (NG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manasseh Vocor (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Tangis (NG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Dick (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Reuben Seru (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valui Molisingi (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Melelivo (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1987 general election: 6 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sela Molisa (VP)</td>
<td>7,193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Vohor (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Karaeru (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Luc (FMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Vurobaravu (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavcor Wass (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Sarki (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Reuben Seru (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valui Molisingi (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Melelivo (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### December 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sela Molisa (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Vohor (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Karaeru (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Luc (FMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Vurobaravu (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavcor Wass (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Sarki (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Reuben Seru (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valui Molisingi (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Melelivo (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### November 1989 by-election

Louis Vatu (TU) was elected unopposed.

* * * * *
**Luganville Town:** 2 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1979 general election</strong></td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td><strong>1983 general election</strong></td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georges Cronsteadt (MP)</td>
<td>886*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Andrew Welwel (VP)</td>
<td>471*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmer Vocor (Matui Tano)</td>
<td>799*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alfred Maseng (UMP)</td>
<td>284*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestine Tamata (VP)</td>
<td>541</td>
<td></td>
<td>Celestine Tamata (VP)</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Varou (Tab)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
<td>Michel Noel (UMP)</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalmer Vocor (VIAP)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Devis Vuti (ind)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1987 general election</strong></td>
<td>3,522</td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td><strong>August 1982 by-election</strong></td>
<td>1,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Maseng (UMP)</td>
<td>1,063*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sela Molisa (VP) (UMP)</td>
<td>913*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Edgell (VP)</td>
<td>542*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Arusiro (VP)</td>
<td>386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joel Cyrus (VIAP)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel Takau (NPP)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Reynolds (LP)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 1988 by-election</strong></td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>891</td>
<td><strong>November 1989 by-election</strong></td>
<td>3,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalo Nial (VP)</td>
<td>647*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russell Seth (VP)</td>
<td>545*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Vatu (TU)</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tamos Petro (TU)</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Roslyn (ind)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
**Malekula:** 5 seats

### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Simeon (VP)</td>
<td>1,359*</td>
<td>7,597</td>
<td>6,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisen Obed (VP)</td>
<td>1,170*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sethy Regenvanu (VP)</td>
<td>1,110*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard Leymang (NA)</td>
<td>1,044*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aime Malere (NA)</td>
<td>941*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileh Rantes (VP)</td>
<td>803</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Arnhambat (VP)</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadrack Shem (ind)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Barthelemy (ind)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sethy Regenvanu (VP)</td>
<td>1,526*</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisen Obed (NA)</td>
<td>1,159*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisen Obed (VP)</td>
<td>1,089*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileh Rantes (VP)</td>
<td>748*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucien Litoung (UMP)</td>
<td>649*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Arnhambat (VP)</td>
<td>489</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Dolly (NA)</td>
<td>329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Simeon (ind)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Harrison (ind)</td>
<td>209</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenery Williams (ind)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alick Kaloris (VIAP)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Apia (VIAP)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1987 general election: 6 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anatole Lingtamat (VP)</td>
<td>1,229*</td>
<td>9,854</td>
<td>8,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sethy Regenvanu (VP)</td>
<td>1,072*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrien Malere (UMP)</td>
<td>926*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Telukluk (UMP)</td>
<td>890*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileh Rantes (VP)</td>
<td>881*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeon Ennis (VP)</td>
<td>822*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aime Malere (UMP)</td>
<td>685</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willy Willion (VP)</td>
<td>599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidel Fabian (UMP)</td>
<td>488</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Edson (NDP)</td>
<td>331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Narcisse (FMP)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Donabit (NPP)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollingson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issachar (NDP)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Malsekan (ind)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### December 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Nato (VP)</td>
<td>2,414*</td>
<td>9,854</td>
<td>3,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Wesley Tawi (VP)</td>
<td>1,191*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignace Liatlatmal (TU)</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willy Willion (VP)</td>
<td>599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidel Fabian (UMP)</td>
<td>488</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Edson (NDP)</td>
<td>331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Narcisse (FMP)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Donabit (NPP)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollingson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issachar (NDP)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Malsekan (ind)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### November 1989 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waniel Emil (VP)</td>
<td>2,985*</td>
<td>9,854</td>
<td>3,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignace Liatlatmal (TU)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
### Epi: one seat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1979 general election</th>
<th>1983 general election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters:</td>
<td>1,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>1,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Taritonga (VP)</td>
<td>840*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Louis (MP)</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Ambrym: 2 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1979 general election</th>
<th>1983 general election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters:</td>
<td>2,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Adeng (FP)</td>
<td>1,163*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Hopa (VP)</td>
<td>951*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Patterson (VP)</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1987 general election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Adeang (UMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Hopa (VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Welwel (VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Jonathon (NPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>December 1988 by-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Welwel (VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talsil Olsen Kai (TU)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* * * * *
### 1987 general election

**Registered voters:**
- Valid votes: 1,438

**Candidate Votes:**
- Jimmy Simon (VP) 790*
- Kalala Waiwo (UMP) 442
- Reggie Robert (NPP) 206

---

### November 1989 by-election

Tangat Yapet (VP) was elected unopposed.

### Pentecost: 3 seats

#### 1979 general election

**Registered voters:**
- Valid votes: 4,532

**Candidate Votes:**
- Walter Lini (VP) 1,393*
- Vincent Boulekone (ind) 1,042*
- Samuel Bule (VP) 646*
- John Melten (VP) 539
- Fabiano Buleuru (FMP) 462

#### 1983 general election

**Registered voters:**
- Valid votes: 4,340

**Candidate Votes:**
- Walter Lini (VP) 1,351*
- Boulekone (UMP) 1,128*
- Ezekiel Bule (VP) 658*
- Wilson Wayback (VP) 570
- Gaetano Bulewak (UMP) 529
- Johnson Tabisang (NG) 104

#### 1987 general election

**Registered voters:**
- Valid votes: 4,769

**Candidate Votes:**
- Walter Lini (VP) 1,392*
- Luke Fargo (VP) 572
- Vincent Boulekone (UMP) 1,094*
- Job Tabi (ind) 159
- Gaetano Bulewak (UMP) 849*
- Fraser Sine (NPP) 83
- Basile Tabi (VP) 620*

* * * * *
### Paama

**1 seat**

#### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>1,126</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edward Harris (VP)</th>
<th>687*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Isso (FP)</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Collins (ind)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Edward Harris (VP) | 542*  |
| Harry Collins (UMP)| 384   |
| Avock Sam (VIAP)   | 18    |

#### 1987 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>1,077</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| William Mahit (VP) | 553*  |
| Hael William (UMP) | 524   |

* * * * *

### Tongoa and Shepherds

**2 seats**

#### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>1,993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Kenneth Tariliu (VP) | 853* |
| Fred Timakata (VP)   | 659* |
| Willie Haruel Roy (ind) | 213 |

#### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>1,420</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Kenneth Tariliu (VP) | 583* |
| Fred Timakata (VP)   | 372* |
| Toara Lui (VIAP)     | 205  |
| Willie Haruel Roy (UMP) | 145 |
| Dick Harrison (UMP)  | 115  |

#### 1987 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,472</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| David Karie (VP)   | 531*  |
| Fred Timakata (VP) | 419*  |
| Raymond Clay (UMP) | 376   |
| Jimmy Tasso (NPP)  | 293   |
| Api Toara (NDP)    | 161   |

* * * * *

#### November 1989 by-election:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>2,459</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid votes:</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Etchin Shem (VP)   | 731*  |
| Pakoa Ezekiel (TU) | 33   |
### Efate Rural: 3 seats

#### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald Kalpokas (VP)</td>
<td>1,362*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Kalkoa (VP)</td>
<td>1,256*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Nanua (VP)</td>
<td>672*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morrison Tangarasi (ind)</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Kalsakau (Nat)</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Kalotiti (Nat)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Laoto (Nat)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barak Sope (VP)</td>
<td>1,076*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Kalpokas (VP)</td>
<td>1,069*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joel Mansale (UMP)</td>
<td>891*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tele Taun (VP)</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morrison Tangarasi (VIAP)</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakoa Andrew (ind)</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Feandre (ind)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1987 general election: 4 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andes Carlot (UMP)</td>
<td>1,086*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joel Mansale (UMP)</td>
<td>1,074*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Kalpokas (VP)</td>
<td>934*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Meto (VP)</td>
<td>920*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tele Taun (VP)</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Satungia (Leba)</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edith Matautotau (NDP)</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### August 1982 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dick Poilapa (VP)</td>
<td>1,989*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UMP)</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ind)</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kalotiti (Nat)</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Feandre (ind)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### December 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Valid votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tele Taun (VP)</td>
<td>771*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Tanarango (VP)</td>
<td>474*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andes Carlot (UMP)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* * * * *
126 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

**Port Vila**: 4 seats

**1979 general election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalpokor Kalsakau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,277</td>
<td>4,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Prevot (UCNH)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,344*</td>
<td>1,293*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Sande (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,113*</td>
<td>1,025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxime Carlot (ind)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>714*</td>
<td>644*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Wawasse (ind)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Tulangi (Nat)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1983 general election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalpokor Kalsakau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>3,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Sande (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,025*</td>
<td>850*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxime Carlot (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>768*</td>
<td>644*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Jimmy (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Joseph (VIAP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Ngwele (ind)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1987 general election**: 5 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maxime Carlot (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,071</td>
<td>4,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Jimmy (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>945*</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Crowby (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>671*</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilda Lini (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>602*</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barak Sope (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>524*</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**August 1982 by-election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barak Sope (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,984</td>
<td>1,349*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Jimmy (UMP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**December 1988 by-election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalkot Mata Kelekele (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,094</td>
<td>941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalanga Sawia (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobe Joseph (TU)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Faratia (VP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>757*</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert Haul (TU)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * * *
### Tanna: 5 seats

#### 1979 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexis Iolu (John Frum)</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>5,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Korisa (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charley Nako (Kapiel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Louhman (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Nampas (VP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Napraper (Custom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal Saba (Kapiel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1983 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willie Korisa (VP)</td>
<td>5,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Louhman (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Leye (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Kapum (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawai Thompson (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Kapalu (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Moffet (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Iaukow (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Kasso (ind)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Moses (ind)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Napa (VIAP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1987 general election: 6 seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Iouiou (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iaris Naunun (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iolu Abbil (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keasipai Song (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Iameaham (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawai Thompson (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charley Nango (UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### August 1982 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Leye(UMP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Iatika (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### November 1988 by-election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gideon Kota (VP), Jack Iauko (VP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy (TU)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

**Other Southern Islands:** 1 seat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1979 general election</strong></td>
<td>982</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Naupa (VP)</td>
<td>515*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Leye (FP)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Mete (ind)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1983 general election</strong></td>
<td>854</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Nipake Natapèi (VP)</td>
<td>441*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Nentu (UMP)</td>
<td>267</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Naupa (ind)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered voters:</th>
<th>Valid votes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1987 general election</strong></td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Nipake Natapèi (VP)</td>
<td>606*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christophe Leye (UMP)</td>
<td>461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Naupa (NDP)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Intelligence Assessments

Books and Monographs


Majorie W. Cline (ed.), *Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s: A Survey of College and University Courses on The Subject of Intelligence* (National Intelligence Study Center, Washington, 1986).


Journal Articles


Stuart Farson, "Schools of Thought: National Perceptions of Intelligence", *Conflict Quarterly* vol.9, no.2, Spring 1989, pp.52-104.


Robert Jervis, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol.1, no.1, Spring 1986, pp.28-41.


Kevin N. Lewis, "Dealing with the Unexpected", *Orbis*, vol.26, no.4, pp.839-847.


Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, "Intelligence: Seizing the Opportunity", *Foreign Policy*, no.22, Spring 1976, pp.182-205, (See also George A. Carver, Jr’s critique of the Szanton and Allison, pp.206-211, same issue of *Foreign Policy.*)
134 Prospects for Crisis Prediction


Ralph K. White, "Empathy as an Intelligence Tool", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol.1, no.1, Spring 1986, pp.57-75.


**Military In Politics**

**Books**


Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale New Haven, 1968)


SOUTH PACIFIC

Vanuatu

Books and Monographs


136 Prospects for Crisis Prediction


**Chapters in Books**


Yash Ghai, "Vanuatu", in Peter Larmour and Ropate Qalo (eds.), *Decentralisation in the South Pacific* (Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, 1985), pp.42-73.


Robert Tonkinson, "Vanuatu Values: a Changing Symbiosis", in Ron May and Hank Nelson (eds.), Melanesia Beyond Diversity (Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982), pp.73-90.

**Journal Articles**


138 Prospects for Crisis Prediction


Books and Monographs


Edie Dean and Stan Ritova, *Rabuka-No Other Way* (Doubleday Moorebank, 1988).


Radio and Television transcripts


Television New Zealand *Frontline* interview with Timoci Bavadra, 7 May 1989.

Australian Broadcasting Commission *Four Corners* program, "Fiji Arms: an investigation into the illegal shipment of arms to Fiji which was seized in Sydney in May 1988", 21 August 1989.

Australian Broadcasting Commission *Four Corners* program, "Fiji Coup", 17 May 1987.

Journal Articles

Rod Alley, "Fiji's recent election: Stalemate or Watershed?", *New Zealand International Review*, July/August 1977, pp.10-12.

Rod Alley, "The Military Coup in Fiji", *The Round Table*, no.304, October 1987, pp. 489-496.


Yaw Saffu, "Worst Scenarios often the real thing", Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1989, pp.16-17.


**General**

Coral Bell (ed.), Crises and Policy-Makers (Canberra Studies in World Affairs no.10, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982).


Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific (Fifth ed., Institute of South Pacific Studies, Suva, 1989).

Helen Fraser, New Caledonia: Anti-colonialism in a Pacific Territory (Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988).


David Hegarty, Libya and the South Pacific (Working Paper no.127, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, October 1987).


**Journal Articles**


The aim of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, which was set up in the Research School of Pacific Studies in The Australian National University, is to advance the study of strategic problems, particularly those relating to the general region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and South-east Asia. Participation in the Centre's activities is not limited to members of the University, but includes other interested professional and Parliamentary groups. Research includes not only military, but political, economic, scientific and technological aspects. Strategy, for the purpose of the Centre, is defined in the broadest sense of embracing not only the control and application of military force, but also the peaceful settlement of disputes which could cause violence.

This is the only academic body in Australia which specialises in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the Centre's research are held, and the major defence training institutions, the Joint Services Staff College and the Navy, Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses.

Since its inception in 1966, the Centre has supported a number of Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the Centre's work has been on problems posed for the peace and stability of Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; decision making processes of the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; management studies and the role of the Minister in Australia's defence policy making; and the strategic implications of developments in South-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific Area.

The Centre contributes to the work of the Department of International Relations through its graduate studies programme;
and the Department reciprocates by assisting the Centre in its research. A comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues, particularly from the press, learned journals and government publications, is maintained by the Centre.

The Centre also conducts seminars and conferences which have led to several volumes of published proceedings.
CANBERRA PAPERS ON STRATEGY AND DEFENCE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>$AUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP31</td>
<td>Japanese Defence Policy Since 1976: Latest Trends by K.V. Kesavan</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP32</td>
<td>Limited World War? by Neville Brown</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP33</td>
<td>The Strategic Implications for Australia of the New Law of the Sea by D.B. Nichols</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP34</td>
<td>Low Level Conflict Contingencies and Australian Defence Policy by Tony Godfrey-Smith</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP35</td>
<td>The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy: An Australian Perspective by Andrew Selth</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP36</td>
<td>Problems in Australian Defence Planning by Ray Sunderland</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP37</td>
<td>Nuclear Pre-emption and Crisis Stability 1985-1990 by Robert D. Glasser</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP38</td>
<td>The Regional Concentration of Defence Spending: Issues, Implications and Policies Concerning Defence Infrastructure Development in Australia by Michael Ward</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP39</td>
<td>The Role of Japan in United States Strategic Policy for Northeast Asia by Russell Solomon</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP40</td>
<td>Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War by D.M. Horner</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP41</td>
<td>Command Structure of the Australian Defence Force by F.W. Speed</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP42</td>
<td>The Afghanistan Conflict: Gorbachev’s Options</td>
<td>Amin Saikal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP43</td>
<td>Australia’s Secret Space Programs</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP44</td>
<td>High Personnel Turnover: The ADF is not a Limited Liability Company</td>
<td>Cathy Downes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP45</td>
<td>Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands?</td>
<td>Ross Babbage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP46</td>
<td>US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications</td>
<td>Desmond Ball (ed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP47</td>
<td>Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP48</td>
<td>The Vietnam People’s Army: Regularization of Command 1975-1988</td>
<td>D.M. FitzGerald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP49</td>
<td>Australia and the Global Strategic Balance</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP50</td>
<td>Organising an Army: the Australian Experience 1957-1965</td>
<td>J.C. Blaxland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP51</td>
<td>The Evolving World Economy: Some Alternative Security Question for Australia</td>
<td>Richard A. Higgott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP52</td>
<td>Defending the Northern Gateway</td>
<td>Peter Donovan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP53</td>
<td>Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intercepting Satellite Communications</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP54</td>
<td>Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security Policy for Australia</td>
<td>Gary Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP55</td>
<td>Senior Officer Professional Development in the Australian Defence Force: Constant Study to Prepare</td>
<td>Cathy Downes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP56</td>
<td>Code 777: Australia and the US Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP57</td>
<td>China’s Crisis: The International Implications</td>
<td>Gary Klintworth (ed.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Publications

CP58  Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence
      by Gary Brown  15.00
CP59  Controlling Civil Maritime Activities in a Defence Contingency
      by W.A.G. Dovers  12.00
CP60  The Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Vol.I, Views from the Region
      by David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds)  10.00
CP61  The Strategic Significance of Torres Strait
      by Ross Babbage  25.00
CP62  The Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia’s Unique Environment
      by P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert  17.50
CP63  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia:
      Geography, History, Economy, Infrastructure, and Defence Presence
      by Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds)  19.50
CP64  Vietnam’s Withdrawal From Cambodia: Regional Issues and Realignments
      by Gary Klintworth (ed.)  12.00
CP65  Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study
      by Ken Ross  15.00

Plus packaging and postage

WORKING PAPERS:

Price: All at the one price of $3.00 plus packaging and postage, except WP57.
Some earlier numbers available on request.

NO.  TITLE
WP50  The Urumqui Military Region: Defence and Security in China’s West
      by Donald H. McMillen
WP51  China’s Political Battlefront: Deng Xiaoping and the Military
      by Donald H. McMillen
WP52  Technological Forecasting in the Australian Military Environment
      by Desmond O’Connor
WP53  Options and Constraints for US Far Eastern Policy: Five Issue Areas
      by Ean Higgins
WP54  The Development of Moscow-Hanoi Relations Since the Vietnam War:
      The View from Singapore
      by Bilveer Singh
WP55  Kenya’s Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict
      by Samuel Makinda
WP56  Australia, the US, and the Strategic Balance
      by H.G. Gelber
WP57  A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy?
150 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

by Gary Brown and Derek Woolner
($5.00 plus packaging and postage.)

WP58 Issues in Strategic Nuclear Targeting: Target Selection and Rates of Fire
by Desmond Ball

WP59 The Need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability
by Alan Robertson

WP60 The State of the Western Alliance
by T.B. Millar

WP61 Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
by T.B. Millar

WP62 Managing Nuclear Polarity
by John J. Weltman

WP63 Aspects of Leadership in a Modern Army
by J.O. Langtry

WP64 Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace or Power Play?
by Iqbal Singh

WP65 World Political and Strategic Trends over the Next 20 Years -
Their Relevance to Australia
by Paul Dibb

WP66 The Concept of Force Multipliers and the Development of
the Australian Defence Force
by J.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball

WP67 Indochina and Insurgency in the ASEAN States, 1975-1981
by Tim Huxley

WP68 Problems and Prospects in Managing Servicemen's Careers: A Review
by Warwick J. Graco

WP69 Performance-Based Training: An Explanation and Reappraisal
by Warwick J. Graco

WP70 The Civil Infrastructure in the Defence of Australia: A Regional Approach
by J.O. Langtry

WP71 Civil-Military Relations in Australia: The Case of Officer Education, 1965-1980
by V.J. Kronenberg and Hugh Smith

WP72 China in Asian International Relations
by Donald H. McMillen

WP73 The Resolution of Conflict and the Study of Peace
by T.B. Millar

WP74 The Australian Army of Today and Tomorrow
by Major General K.J. Taylor

WP75 A Nuclear-free Zone for the Southwest Pacific: Prospects and Significance
by Greg Fry
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Publications

WP76  War and Conflict Studies in Malaysia: The State of the Art
by Zakaria Haji Ahmad

WP77  Funding Australia's Defence
by Derek Woolner

WP78  Australia's Changing Threat Perceptions
by Ray Sunderland

WP79  Human Resources and Australia's Defence
by I.F. Andrew

WP80  Australia's Emerging Regional Defence Strategy
by Ray Sunderland

WP81  The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power
by Paul Dibb

WP82  Soviet Policy in the Red Sea Region
by Samuel M. Makinda

WP83  The Political Economy of Global Decline: America in the 1980s
by Andrew Mack

WP84  Australia and the Republic of Korea: Still Allies or Just Good Friends?
by Andrew Selth

WP85  Command in Operations of the Australian Defence Force
by F.W. Speed

WP86  Australian Defence Force Functional Commands
by F.W. Speed

WP87  Mr Reagan's 'Star Wars': Towards a New Strategic Era?
by Harry Gelber

WP88  The ASEAN States' Defence Policies, 1975-81: Military Responses to Indochina?
by Tim Huxley

WP89  The Civil Defence of the USSR: This Everybody Must Know and Understand. A Handbook for the Population
translated by Geoffrey Jukes

WP90  Soviet Strategy Towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania
by Paul Dibb

WP91  Terrorist Studies and the Threat to Diplomacy
by Andrew Selth

WP92  Australia and the Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy
by Andrew Selth

WP93  Civilian Defence: A Useful Component of Australia's Defence Structure?
by Peter J. Murphy

WP94  Australia's Defence Forces - Ready or Not?
by Ray Sunderland
Prospects for Crisis Prediction

WP95 Selecting Long-Term Force Structure Objectives
by Ray Sunderland

WP96 Aspects of Defence: Why Defence?
by W.H. Talberg

WP97 Operational Command by the Chief of the Defence Force
by F.W. Speed

WP98 Deterrence, Strategic Defence and Arms Control
by Ron Huiskens

WP99 Strategic Defenses: Concepts and Programs
by Desmond Ball

WP100 Local Development of Defence Hardware in Australia
by Stanley S. Schaetzel

WP101 Air Operations in Northern Australia
by Air Marshal S.D. Evans, AC, DSO, AFC

WP102 International Terrorism and Australian Foreign Policy: A Survey
by Andrew Selth

WP103 Internal Aspects of Security in Asia and the Pacific: an Australian Perspective
by Andrew MacIntyre

WP104 Rethinking Deterrence and Arms Control
by B.C. Brett

by J.A.C. Mackie

WP106 Japan's Role in United States Strategy in the Pacific
by Paul Keal

WP107 Detection of Nuclear Weapons and the US Non-disclosure Policy
by Gary Brown

WP108 Managing Australia's Contingency Spectrum for Defence Planning
by Ross Babbage

WP109 Australia's Approach to the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
by Ross Babbage

WP110 Looking Beyond the Dibb Report
by Ross Babbage

WP111 Mr Gorbachev's China Diplomacy
by Gary Klintworth

WP112 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Verification Problems
by Samina Yasmeen.

WP113 The Future of the Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship
by Ross Babbage

WP114 Kim Il Sung's North Korea: at the crossroads
by Gary Klintworth
WP115 The Australian Defence Force in Industrial Action Situations: Joint Service Plan 'CABRIOLE' 
by Gary Brown

WP116 Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: The Australian Approach 
by Hugh Smith

WP117 Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia, 
by Gary Klintworth

WP118 Nuclear Arms Control After Reykjavik 
by Harry G. Gelber

WP119 A Programme for the Development of Senior Officers of the Australian Defence Force 
by Harry G. Gelber

WP120 The Northern Territory Economy: Growth and Structure 1965-1985 
by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh

WP121 Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War 
by Robert A. Hall

WP122 The ASEAN States' Internal Security Expenditure, 
by Tim Huxley

WP123 The Status of Australian Mobilization Planning in 1987 
by J.O. Langtry

WP124 China's India War: A Question of Confidence 
by Gary Klintworth

WP125 India and Pakistan: Why the Latest Exercise in Brinkmanship? 
by Samina Yasmeen

WP126 Small State Security in the South Pacific 
by David Hegarty

WP127 Libya and the South Pacific 
by David Hegarty

WP128 The Dilemmas of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Contingencies in Australian Defence Planning 
by Ross Babbage

WP129 Christmas and the Cocos Islands: Defence Liabilities or Assets? 
by Ross Babbage

WP130 The Gulf War and 'Irangate': American Dilemmas 
by Amitav Acharya

WP131 The Defence Para-military Manpower Dilemma: Militia or Constabulary? 
by J.O. Langtry

WP132 'Garrisoning' the Northern Territory: The Army's Role 
by J.O. Langtry
WP133  The Case for a Joint Force Regional Command Headquarters in Darwin
by J.O. Langtry

WP134  The Use of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection
by Desmond Ball

WP135  Army Manoeuvre and Exercise Areas in the Top End
by Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry

WP136  Legal Aspects of Defence Operations on Aboriginal Land in the Northern Territory
by Graeme Neate

WP137  The ANZUS Alliance - The Case Against
by Gary Brown

WP138  Controlling Theater Nuclear War
by Desmond Ball

WP139  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Geostrategic Imperatives
by J.O. Langtry

WP140  The Ambient Environment of the Northern Territory: Implications for the Conduct of Military Operations
by J.O. Langtry

WP141  Is the Non-aligned Movement Really Non-aligned?
by Samina Yasmeen

WP142  The Australian Submarine Project: An Introduction to Some General Issues
by A.D. Garrison

WP143  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Naval Considerations
by Commander Stephen Youll RANEM

WP144  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: A Potential Adversary's Perceptions
by J.O. Langtry

WP145  The INF Treaty and Soviet Arms Control
by Samuel Makinda

WP146  Infrastructure Development in the North: Civil-Military Interaction
by J.O. Langtry

WP147  South Pacific Security Issues: An Australian Perspective
by David Hegarty

WP148  The Potential Role of Net Assessment in Australian Defence Planning
by Brice Pacey

WP149  Political Reform and the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China
by Ian Wilson

WP150  Australia's Defence Revolution
by Andrew Mack
WP151  The Intelligence Analyst's Notebook  
by R.H. Mathams

WP152  Assessing the 1987 Australian Defence White Paper in the Light of Domestic  
Political and Allied Influences on the Objective of Defence Self-reliance  
by Thomas-Durrell Young

WP153  The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): The North Pacific Dimension  
by Clive Williams

WP154  Australia's Maritime Activities and Vulnerabilities  
by W.A.G. Dovers

WP155  Coastal Surveillance and Protection:  
Current Problems and Options for the Future  
by Ross Babbage

WP156  Military Competence: An Individual Perspective  
by Warwick J. Graco

WP157  Defence Forces and Capabilities in the Northern Territory  
by Desmond Ball

WP158  The Future of United States Maritime Strategy in the Pacific  
by Ross Babbage

WP159  Inadvertent Nuclear War: The US Maritime Strategy  
and the 'Cult of the Offensive'  
by David Hodgkinson

WP160  Could the Military Govern the Philippines?  
by Viberto Selochan

WP161  Defence in Papua New Guinea: Introductory Issues  
by Tas Maketu

WP162  The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia:  
Settlement History, Administration and Infrastructure  
by Deborah Wade-Marshall

WP163  The Diplomatic and Security Implications of ANZUS Naval  
Relations, 1951-1985  
by Thomas-Durrell Young

WP164  How Valid was the Criticism of Paul Dibb's 'Review of  
Australia's Defence Capabilities'?  
by Matthew Gubb

WP165  ASEAN: Security Issues of the 1990s  
by Leszek Buszynski

WP166  Brunei's Defence Policy and Military Expenditure  
by Tim Huxley
156 Prospects for Crisis Prediction

WP167 Manpower Considerations in Mobilizing the Australian Army for Operational Service
by Warwick J. Graco

WP168 The Geographic Context for Defence of the Northern Territory
by John Chappell

WP169 Social, Economic and Political Influences Upon the Australian Army of the 1990s
by Cathy Downes

WP170 Activities of the Soviet Fishing Fleet: Implications for Australia
by Robert Ayson

WP171 The Australian Military Response to the Fiji Coup: an Assessment
by Matthew Gubb

WP172 Gorbachev and the Soviet Military
by Malcolm Mackintosh

WP173 Gorbachev's First Three Years
by Malcolm Mackintosh

WP174 South Pacific Culture and Politics: Notes on Current Issues
by Jim Sanday

WP175 Why Australia Should Not Ratify the New Law of War
by Brigadier P.J. Greville (RL)

WP176 The Northern Territory and the Defence of Australia: Historical Overview
by Peter Donovan

WP177 Papua New Guinea: At the Political Crossroads?
by David Hegarty

WP178 China's Indochina Policy
by Gary Klintworth

WP179 Peacekeeping in Cambodia: An Australian Role?
by Gary Klintworth and Ross Babbage

WP180 Towards 2010: Security in the Asia-Pacific, An Australian Regional Strategy
by David W. Beveridge

WP181 The Vietnamese Achievement in Kampuchea
by Gary Klintworth

WP182 The Concept of Political Regulation in Soviet Foreign Policy:
The Case of the Kampuchean Issue
by Leszek Buszynski

WP183 Major Power Influences on the Southeast Asian Region: An Australian View
by A.C. Kevin

WP184 The ANZAC Ships
by Denis McLean and Desmond Ball
WP185  Stability and Turbulence in South Pacific Politics  
by David Hegarty

WP186  Nuclear War Termination: Concepts, Controversies and Conclusions  
by Stephen J. Cimbala

WP187  Exercise Golden Fleece and the New Zealand Military: Lessons and Limitations  
by Peter Jennings

WP188  Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Listening to ASEAN  
by Desmond Ball

WP189  ANZUS: Requiescat in Pace?  
by Thomas-Durrell Young

WP190  China’s New Economic and Strategic Uncertainties; and the Security Prospects  
by Harry G. Gelber

WP191  Defending the Torres Strait: The Likely Reactions of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia to Australia’s Initiatives  
by David Hegarty and Martin O’Hare

WP192  Maritime Lessons from the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War  
by Commodore H.J. Donohue RAN

WP193  The Changing Maritime Equation in the Northwest Pacific  
by Ross Babbage

WP194  More Troops for our Taxes? Examining Defence Personnel Options for Australia  
by Ross Babbage

WP195  Leadership Politics in the Chinese Party-Army State: The Fall of Zhao Ziyang  
by You Ji and Ian Wilson

WP196  The Neither Confirming Nor Denying Controversy  
by Jan Prawitz

WP197  The Death of an Aircraft: The A-10 Debacle  
by Stanley S. Schaetzel

WP198  Fourteen Steps to Decision - or, the Operations of the Defence Department  
by Stanley S. Schaetzel

WP199  The Coastal Exposure of Australia  
by Stanley S. Schaetzel

WP200  The Space Age and Australia  
by Stanley S. Schaetzel

WP201  The Military in Fiji: Historical Development and Future Role  
by Jim Sanday
**Prospects for Crisis Prediction**

WP202 The Prospects for a Third Military Coup in Fiji  
by Stephanie Lawson

WP203 Strategic Cooperation and Competition in the Pacific Islands:  
An American Assessment  
by John C. Dorrance

WP204 The Australian-American Alliance Today: An American Assessment of the Strategic/Security, Political and Economic Dimensions  
by John C. Dorrance

WP205 Naval Shipbuilding: Some Australian Experience  
by John C. Jeremy

WP206 Australia and the Concept of National Security  
by Alan Dupont

WP207 The Soviet Union and the Pacific Islands:  
An American Assessment and Proposed Western Strategy  
by John C. Dorrance

WP208 Security Perceptions in the South Pacific: Questionnaire Results  
by Stephen Bates

---

**OTHER MONOGRAPHS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>$AUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Controlling Australia's Threat Environment: A methodology for planning Australian defence force development, by J.O. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Arms for the Poor: President Carter's Policies on Arms Transfers to the Third World, by Graham Kearns</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>Options for an Australian Defence Technology Strategy, by S.N. Gower</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>Oil and Australia's Security: The Future Fuel Requirements of the Australian Defence Force, by I.M. Speedy</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M7</td>
<td>Survival Water in Australia's Arid Lands, by B.L. Kavanagh</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plus packaging and postage
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>$AUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MS1</td>
<td>Defence Resources of South East Asia and the South West Pacific: A Compendium of Data by Ron Huiskens</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS3</td>
<td>Testimony by W.K. Hancock</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS4</td>
<td>The A-NZ-US Triangle by Alan Burnett</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plus packaging and postage
This monograph considers the ability of intelligence assessments to predict important developments, particularly political crises. It surveys the published literature and draws on the author's decade as an analyst specialising on the South Pacific. Intelligence analysis is explained and the considerable limitations on predicting crises are highlighted with the intent to establish more realistically what policy-makers and the public can expect of intelligence organisations. The importance of top-calibre analysts is emphasised as a most important element in obtaining the best possible assessments.

Most South Pacific countries change their Prime Ministers and governments within a peaceful constitutional succession convention. Fiji has been the only exception. Vanuatu, where the Lini government has been in power since 1979, is regarded by some observers as the next most probable exception. A general election is due in late 1991 and it is thought there could be political turmoil regardless of who wins because of discontent with the result.

This general election is developed as a case study to illustrate how an intelligence analyst might prepare assessments endeavouring to determine the likelihood of a crisis occurring then. The tentativeness of the assessment is stressed but the value of its being done hinges on the assertion that ministers and senior officials, as policy-makers, will be more alert and better briefed to face the eventual outcome, whether it lives up to the prediction or not.