Command Structure of the Australian Defence Force
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ABSTRACT

Transformation of the Higher Defence Organization from a grouping of a number of separate government departments and related elements into a single Department of Defence was undertaken during the 1970s. Parallel with this reorganization, instructions were given for the integration of the three armed Services into a single Australian Defence Force.

This latter reformation has progressed to the stage that there is a general need to understand the relationship of the Force to the Higher Defence Organization, some aspects of operational command by the Chief of the Defence Force, the changes that have been made in Force echelons, and the further steps that would seem desirable to complete the overall command structure.

Though there may at present be no significant threat to Australia's national security, there is always the possibility of a low-level threat arising at surprisingly short notice. In these circumstances, a command structure should be in place in peacetime, capable of meeting an emergency with a minimum of commotion. Even if part of it is in nucleus form only, it should be sufficiently defined so that it can be exercised at reasonable intervals, to ensure efficiency in a situation of rising tension.

This Paper outlines the Higher Defence Organization, seeks to illuminate the position of the Chief of the Defence Force and his headquarters within the Department, to explicate the aspect of command in operations, and describes the organization for command and communication at the several echelons of the Australian Defence Force. In doing so, it offers with diffidence some suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the command structure.
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In the period preceding the decision to establish the integrated Australian Defence Force he studied extensively the question of a command structure for such a force, and observed with growing interest the gradual development of that necessary structure.

In 1984-85 he produced three Working Papers for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre on related aspects of the subject; and was invited to prepare this Canberra Paper, embodying and enlarging on the working papers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I have quoted verbatim from a few sources only, but nevertheless wish to acknowledge the assistance gained from other documents too numerous to mention.

I wish also to record my thanks to Colonel Langtry for his careful reading of the text, his suggestions for additions, and his comment where clarity was not all it should be.

F W Speed.
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Background

Australia has been cautious, and hence unhurried, in devising a modern structure for national defence.

In the 1940s, Australia put together and developed an organization, to a considerable extent ad hoc, to meet the urgencies of war. Initially, the Navy functioned more often as a part of the Royal Navy: the Army produced an expeditionary force, the 2nd AIF, that operated as an element of the British Army: the Air Force raised and contributed individual squadrons to the overall RAF effort. At the stage the continent was threatened with invasion, the organization underwent great expansion. A move was made gradually to bring units of the three Services to fight in the same operational areas. At all times, however, apart from a short period in New Guinea in the Pacific war, Australian formations and units were dependent on British or American sources for much operational support and maintenance.

Yet, throughout the war, the three Services themselves maintained their separate identities, and no lasting need was seen to bring their respective roles to an efficient congruence, of a single integrated armed force.
The process of demobilization which followed was interrupted by the requirement to contribute to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, and the duties allotted to the three Australian Service elements were such that co-operation was seldom necessary. In consequence, in Australia itself, the Navy, Army, and Air Force were re-constituted on a basis similar to that of the pre-war period, but with emphasis on full-time professional components.

Not long afterwards, thoughtful of a Russian bid for world domination, the permanent forces were again expanded: and shortly thereafter were engaged in the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency. Though the importance of a closer integration of army and air, also navy and air, had been clearly demonstrated in World War 2, though the term 'co-operation' had had considerable currency, nothing really was done in the immediate post-war period to bring about an homogeneous organization.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Australian defence policy itself was relatively simple - unabashed dependence on "great and powerful friends", with Australian contribution to the security relationship consisting of small forces serving under major allies. Decisions concerning the particulars of the forces, on the other hand, were
principally the responsibility of the Services and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air. Throughout the period, the policy role of the Department of Defence remained limited (Ball 1982, p 139).

The first significant step forward was the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of the wartime Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead to review the entire defence complex; but its findings were unacceptable, and its report suppressed. However, in a memorandum sent to the Minister for Defence in late 1958, the Prime Minister (R.G. Menzies) directed that the Department of Defence must be "more than a co-ordinator" of the Service departments, and that "the Minister and Department of Defence have an overall responsibility for the defence policy of the country". Despite this directive, it was not until 1968 that the Minister for Defence (then Allan Fairhall) announced a reorganization of the Defence Department's planning and staff arrangements which drastically reduced the power of the three service departments (Ball 1982, p 140).

Meanwhile, the Australian tri-service contribution to the war in Vietnam was such that integration of the three elements was not feasible. However, while cooperation between US air force and Australian army and navy units was good, events tended to show the desirability of a much
closer relationship of Australia's three Services. But it is pertinent here to repeat that, in all campaigns, Australian formations/independent units of the three armed services formed part of larger allied forces. No Australian units were entirely reliant for support on other Australians.

Then, in accordance with the Minister's direction, a detailed proposal for integration, prepared by the Secretary for Defence and following a change in government, was accepted by Cabinet (Tange 1973).

Over the ensuing three-four years, the Departments of Navy, Army, and Air, together with portion of the Department of Supply, and the three military headquarters closely associated with those departments, were merged with the Department of Defence. At the same time, the position of chief of defence force staff was established, on a statutory basis, with responsibility direct to the minister for the command of the navy, army, and air force (Ball 1979, pp 183-97).

Concurrently with that re-organization, instructions were given towards integration of the three armed services into one Defence Force.
From time to time thereafter, changes in the departmental organization were made. Two of significance were a variation in title of the chief of defence force staff to chief of defence force, and provision within the department of a headquarters, Australian Defence Force.

Present Structure

Here, a brief analysis of the higher defence structure that resulted becomes appropriate.

The Department of Defence

As a department of government, the Department of Defence is headed by the Minister for Defence, with a Minister Assisting complementing him.

Under the Minister, the Department is jointly headed by the Secretary, Department of Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).

The CDF, under the Defence Act, and a directive from the Minister for Defence,

.. is the principal military adviser to the Minister, and

.. commands the Defence Force.
The Secretary, under the Public Service Act and the Audit Act

.. is responsible for the general working of the department and for advising the Minister in all matters relating to the department, subject to the statutory powers of the CDF;

.. is responsible jointly with the CDF, for the administration of the Defence Force, except for matters within the definition of 'command', and any other matter specified by the Minister.

It is to be noted that there is a distinction between 'Defence Department' and 'Defence Force', particularly in relation to members of the Secretary's immediate staff and other public service members.

The Department is organized into

.. a Central Office (known as 'Defence Central') consisting of four Groups, one autonomous Division, and four, outrider, organizations;

.. three Offices – Navy, Army, and Air – each headed by a Chief of Staff, who commands his armed service;

.. Defence Regional Offices in the State Capitals.

Within Defence Central, the four Groups are each comprised of Divisions and other sub-organizations. Additionally, the Secretary and the CDF each has a staff directly supporting him.
It is to be observed that these four Groups are headed by public service officers, as also are the autonomous Division, and, with one exception, the Divisions within the Groups. Moreover, the Deputy Secretary who heads each of the Groups has been described as an 'alter ego' of the Secretary, not obstructing the direct line of communication between the Secretary and the First Assistant Secretaries of Divisions.

For ease of further reference an outline of this part of the Defence Higher Organization is at Annex A.

The Defence Force

While the Secretary and the CDF are jointly responsible for administration of the Defence Force, it is apparent that in practice the public service heads of divisions look to the Secretary as their real superintendent, and that they are really unable to serve two masters. In this respect, therefore, there has been a tendency on the part of some public servants to overlook the responsibilities and autonomy of the CDF.

In the Defence Force, as distinct from the Department, the dividing line between 'administration', which is the joint responsibility of the Secretary and the CDF, and
'command' which is the responsibility of the CDF alone, is not entirely clear.

It follows that, in the event of a major emergency necessitating a variation of the Department's organization, re-organization would be in relation to its function as a department of government; that apart from the overall control by the government, the department would not be able to exercise proper control of units in operations without extensive re-structuring - which would be unacceptable in the exigency, or indeed in the concept of parliamentary government.

**Defence Organization supra the Department**

Beyond the Department itself, there are in place three organizations of higher defence -

- the Council of Defence
- the Defence Committee
- the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Their composition and functions are set out in Annex B.

It should be noted, also, that there are other organizations, chiefly known as committees, within the Department of Defence and beyond, of which the CDF is a
member. While important, none of these is directly related to the CDF's strictly operational function. It is to be expected, however, that they will have a bearing on the proportion of time that the CDF will be able to devote to his operational command.

Superior to the forementioned groups, there are two existing Cabinet committees that need to be kept in view -

the Defence and External Relations Committee
the National and International Security Committee.

It is to be expected that, from time to time, the CDF would be called to advise these committees, and a War Cabinet that may in emergency be formed.

Parallel also with the defence organization, there is the Department of Foreign Affairs which has a very substantial influence on national security policy, and of course the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Further, there are the several intelligence agencies including the Office of National Assessment, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this examination to review the adequacy or otherwise of the existing series of committees etc, but it may be observed in passing that there appear to be problems of deficiency in the high-level organization for overall national security (Ball 1982 p 145). Also, the Defence Committee membership is confined to first division officers of the Prime Minister, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs, whereas many other departments of government should be involved to some extent.

Moreover, it also bears noting that, in some sectors of the Department, such as for example the element dealing with Force Structure, public service officers who have not had military experience, appear to have a disproportionate influence. This aspect merits separate, dispassionate study.

Meaning of 'Command'

An important aspect in the matter of 'command', which may have become clouded during the departmental design stage, lies in the definition of that term.

In a military (navy, army, and/or air force) operational sense, 'command' includes 'administration': and a 'commander' ordinarily functions through a
headquarters that has sections directly responsible to him dealing with intelligence, operations, and all aspects of administration, which latter includes logistics -- and also finance, where the assistance of a financial adviser is usually provided. Thus, in this respect, the term 'command' as used in the description of the present functions of the CDF and the Service Chiefs of Staff has a different implication than that relating to command in operations, whether sea, land, or air.

Further, it is to be noted that the term 'administration' used in reference to the joint responsibility of the Secretary and CDF, also has a different connotation from that concerning administration in operations, where a major element is logistics, and a significant feature is finance, a subject, at the departmental level, wholly within the responsibility of the Secretary, Department of Defence.

Another problem is that the phrase 'command and control' which appears in departmental and service writings, is not fully understood by all concerned. The terms 'command' and 'control' are closely related, but not synonymous. 'Command' is the authority that a commander exercises, by reason of his appointment, over the formations, units, and individuals immediately subordinate to him. In this respect, 'Command' is directly in line
with the Oxford English Dictionary definition (verb) "To order ... with authority ..."; and (noun) "The act of commanding ... the expression of an authoritative order ...". 'Control' is the authority, less than full command, that a commander exercises over part of the activities of subordinate, or other organizations. Again, this is in accordance with that Dictionary's definition (noun) "the fact of ... checking ... action; the function of ... directing and regulating...".

In the military sense, 'control' often follows delegation of 'command' to a subordinate, and applies to the process of ensuring that an order is being complied with. Moreover, 'control' does not imply a sharing of authority with another individual of equivalent status. For practical purposes, however, the distinction is to a degree semantic.

In the operational sense, command is indivisible: the higher commander has the ultimate responsibility for conduct of operations. He must of course be responsive to the directive of higher authority, but he must be able at short notice to require action in both operational and administrative spheres. He cannot share his responsibility with another of equal status, and perhaps of different personality and outlook.
To carry through his assignment, the operational commander must have an organization wholly responsive to him, of undivided loyalty. This organization must cover all aspects essential to the successful conduct of operations - to monitor progress, to provide the information and advice necessary to the formulation of the commander's plan, and with the machinery necessary for its implementation.

The operational commander will of course be in constant consultation with his staff and heads of services before reaching a decision, but in the ultimate the making of the decision cannot be divided with another: it is his and his alone.

It is as well to observe that another aspect of 'command and control' is in the situation of the defence organization higher than the CDF's part of the department. Here 'control' means the function of the parliamentary government in directing and regulating the policy and function of the defence force, whereas 'command' in the military sense has no place.

The CDF as a Commander

The situation of the CDF therefore needs elucidation. Although he commands the ADF, he shares the administrative element of 'command' with the Secretary.
Yet, in the operational sense, command is indivisible. The CDF is ultimately responsible for the conduct of operations, and he could not share this responsibility with the Secretary. He must of course comply with the directives of the Minister and Cabinet. It is vital, however, that he should be able at short notice to require action in both operational and administrative spheres, and he could not be dependent for such action on members of the Department who are responsible to the Secretary.

From this it can be argued that the CDF will be unable to exercise command in operations. There is further justification for this contention when it is recalled that the CDF is the principal military adviser to the Minister, to the Prime Minister if the Defence Minister is otherwise committed, and in certain circumstances to Cabinet direct.

On the other hand there may be circumstances of a sensitive nature in which the government may wish the CDF personally to command an operation direct: and there may be a situation in which the CDF considers it essential himself to assume operational command. In such circumstances, he would be doing so with the consent of the Minister, and a nominated deputy would, in case of need, be acting for him as principal military adviser.
If the CDF were thus commanding in operations, he would sometimes not have time to consult with the Secretary, or seek assistance from the Deputy Secretaries. Nor could he have control over a sub-organization that is part of a department of government, not directly responsible to him. In those circumstances therefore the CDF would need to act unilaterally, keeping the Secretary informed to the best of his ability.

Of course, this unilateral administrative action would not relate to the ADF as a whole, only to a part of the Force that is actually committed to operations. Nor is this even to imply that any large sphere of administration is involved. In the main, administration at the departmental level will remain a function of the department as a whole; and will also continue with the three single-service organizations.

It needs also to be understood that the Secretary, being jointly responsible for the administration of the ADF, has automatic authority to raise with the CDF any aspect of such unilateral action that he may feel obliged to examine, when an opportunity is appropriate.
Comparable Organizations

A similar situation exists in New Zealand but, as in Australia, it has not yet been tested in actual operations. Canada also has an integrated defence force, put into effect in one all-embracing legislative move. However, the far-reaching nature of this Canadian arrangement has been found counterproductive, leading to some confusion. It is not yet evident whether there is anything to be seen as of value to Australia.

The nearest existing equivalent, though not an exact parallel, is in the USA where there is a 'unified and specified' command structure, a feature of which is that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has a channel of command direct to the executing commander. In this, the chain of command can by-pass the individual Service Chiefs of Staff, and any theatre or other functional commander, going direct to the commander on the spot.

At the same time, it is useful to observe that, in the campaign involving the Falkland Islands, it was found necessary to raise an ad hoc headquarters located in England to prepare, as a matter of urgency, the force being sent to relieve the British territory, to issue the initial directive and necessary subsequent instructions to the Force Commander, and to provide the channel of
communication with the force. For this the Ministry of Defence itself was inappropriate, and was unable even to undertake the expeditious planning and execution of administration that the single-minded headquarters was able to achieve. But one example of this precision was the conversion of civil shipping to hospital ships, at the Gibraltar shipyard, in four days including a weekend.

Threats to Australia's Security

Government policy, as proposed in the report of the review undertaken by Mr Paul Dibb for the Minister for Defence, envisages 'no identifiable direct military threat - that there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion', and that 'it would take at least 10 years and massive external support for the development of a regional capacity to threaten (Australia) with substantial assault'. However, as the Review concedes, 'there are possibilities for lower levels of conflict - some of which could be very demanding - arising within shorter warning times' (Dibb 1986 p 19).

Some experts have expressed disagreement with this assessment, and it is useful, therefore, to consider the kind of threat that could emerge in the proximate future. Representative examples are:
Isolated attack against civil facilities such as offshore oil and gas installations.

Intrusion into a sparsely populated area of Australia or its territories to gain information on geography, communications, etc.

Harassment of shipping, fishery activity, etc.

Sporadic, unauthorized intrusion into Australian airspace by military aircraft.

Large scale, non-violent intrusions into Australia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to poach scarce resources.

In general, such threats might be aimed at achieving political rather than military goals.

Further, in those kinds of threat that involve overt military action, there is the possibility of more than one threat, or more than one kind of threat, occurring simultaneously. Intrusions of any nature are a particular example - several landings from the sea and/or air, and/or several suspicious aircraft movements. The purpose of such multiple actions would evidently be to fractionate and confuse the defence. While each would be low-level, together they would represent a more serious threat calling for greater defence reaction than would ordinarily be involved in a more normal 'low-level threat'.

Another 'threat' that seems to have been overlooked, or at least discounted, relates to the area of Australian 'interests'. Even the perception of what might constitute a threat to such 'interests' tends to vary markedly. Australia's economic existence depends significantly, for example, on the maintenance of its trade, for example, with Japan. Yet, present contingency planning does not appear to cover protection of Australian and friendly foreign merchant shipping or aircraft leaving Australian ports carrying vital resources to Japan, or other parts of East Asia.

Further again, it needs to be appreciated that, if a low-level threat or a small series of such threats, appears to the initiator to have been even moderately successful, there is a danger of quick escalation of the attacks and even of higher level threats short of open hostilities.

Three considerations relative to the command structure of the ADF arise from this listing.

The organization designed to deal with any one of these threats needs to be in place now. If the necessary structure is not extant, at least in nucleus form readily expandable on a threat emerging, there will be a natural reluctance on the part of government immediately to authorize its raising. Any action proposed that may be seen to be provocative, will be delayed while diplomatic initiatives are explored and political pressures eased;
when provision of the necessary structure is at last authorized, there will be little or no time for its raising and proper training. It may be thought, for example, that a headquarters set up to comprise trained staff officers itself need little training. The falsity of this notion has been clearly demonstrated in the conduct of joint exercises, of which the 'Kangaroo' series are useful instances. These exercises showed conclusively that it takes a significant time even to begin operating as a coherent headquarters - one considered estimate was six weeks - and that a further period of time would be essential for effective control of real operations.

On the other hand, a proper command structure in situ will have participated in planning for emergencies, will itself have been exercised in its role, and will be ready for early operational employment. Even if it is still in nucleus form, it will have had practice in augmentation for exercise purposes, and will be able quietly to fill out to its emergency status.

The act of providing and exercising a command structure to meet such low-level threats, will achieve an organization capable, in turn, of quiet expansion in the future, to meet threats of greater magnitude should they later arise.
The CDF's Headquarters

In the development of the present structure of the ADF, a headquarters (HQADF) has been provided as the instrument through which the Chief of the Defence Force carries out preparation for and, ultimately, conduct of military operations of the Force.

It is to be observed that the HQADF is an integral part of the Department: but the intention is partially to detach it, to the extent that it is to be set up on one floor of the principal building. Its organization is shown at Annex C. In order fully to understand the structure of the Department and the relationship in it of the HQADF, the organization at the top, as shown in Annex A, warrants re-study.

Lest it be thought that the whole problem of operational command at CDF level is assuming impossible proportions, it is noteworthy that, in the conduct of major exercises mounted, at intervals, in the existing peacetime circumstances, the CDF carries out a command function without difficulty; and the provision of the HQADF will facilitate the task in the event of hostilities.
CDF Threat Reaction

Reference has already been made to the CDF's dual position as a commander and as an adviser to government.1

It is at the stage of imminent or actual emergency that the CDF will need to begin exercising operational command through his Headquarters ADF. It should be appreciated therefore that, in all circumstances of threat, the degree of involvement of the CDF in his important role of military adviser to the government is likely to vary significantly. Hence the attention he can devote to the function of command in operations will also vary, possibly in inverse proportion.

Should an emergency arise other than of a minor nature, the CDF may wish immediately to assume operational command. As stated earlier, it is even possible that, in circumstances of a minor but sensitive character, the government will wish the CDF to take command operationally so as to concentrate control specifically in Canberra rather than at the functional or local level.

Also, the nature and extent of the emergency will determine the channel through which CDF control will be effected. In most circumstances his command will be exercised through an appropriate intermediate command or commands.

1. Page 5.
In some situations, a part of the ADF committed may be required to operate in a remote area or in circumstances where more than one part of the ADF is committed: in such a situation it may be necessary for the CDF to appoint a separate joint force commander, responsible to an intermediate command, or direct to the CDF himself.

Then, to avoid involvement in the minutiae of command, he may no doubt wish to delegate, as quickly as possible, by issue of a directive to an intermediate joint commander or even direct to a joint force commander. He will then control the course of events by receiving periodical reports that will enable him to keep the government informed, and to take whatever action may be necessary to support the joint command, or in case of need to vary his directive.

In all situations the CDF will be supported by a nominated deputy who will be maintaining the headquarters routine, and will be available in case of need to act for the CDF in accordance with his known policy. The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) would be one such nominee.

A further aspect of the CDF's threat reaction is in modern communication systems. Presumably, the HQADF will
have in place separate electronic means of rapid communication with the subordinate headquarters engaged in operations. Thus provided, and having in mind the ready availability of a deputy, there will be more opportunity for the CDF to exercise control, even personal operational command. The need personally to attend vital committee etc. meetings, or to wait upon the Minister, Prime Minister, or Cabinet will present little problem to the continued exercise of command. Moreover, so that the length of each absence can be kept to a minimum, it will be important for the CDF to have ready access to an aircraft equipped for command communication linked with the already existing normal system.

A Special CDF Problem

A problem of major importance is the authority of the CDF, or his deputy in the possible absence of the CDF, to make a vital decision that is of the very fabric of command.

An example might be the presence of a foreign warship within the Australian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without prior notice, acting very suspiciously, at a time of tension short of war. It may be that the Minister is not at the time in immediate contact with his Department, and both the Prime Minister and his Deputy are for some reason not available.
There is of course the code of conduct applicable to such a situation, known as the Rules of Engagement. As far as Australia is concerned, this code applies more particularly to the Navy: and it is almost entirely unspecific in its application.

An instance such as this is not likely to arise at present, but it would be very desirable that a directive should be in existence telling the CDF what he should do in such circumstances, even if it only enjoins him to do nothing but keep on trying to communicate with the Minister or the Prime Minister.

**Single-Service v Joint Operations**

Current doctrine envisages that operations may be:

. Single-service operations where one Service only is required - Navy, Army, or Air. Such operations will normally be commanded by the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned, or his deputy.

. Joint operations where elements of more that one Service are conjointly involved. Usually, the COS of the predominant Service will command the elements of his own
Service and, under an appropriate CDF directive, the assigned elements of the other Service(s).

Joint Force Operations where circumstances require the CDF to have direct access to the commander of a joint operation. The CDF will institute a joint force and appoint, under Defence Act Section 9, a joint force commander (JFC). Usually the CDF will direct that the JFC's headquarters will be appropriately augmented.

It is worth specially observing here that, in the case of a relatively small though sensitive incident, rather than set up a headquarters ad hoc, the CDF may prefer to nominate the local commander, such as an army military district commander, with his existing headquarters. In such a case the CDF may direct that the augmenting component be provided by local members of the other Service(s) committed. Thus all concerned will have the advantage of local knowledge, and be already on cooperative terms with the civil authorities becoming involved. Nevertheless this local commander would, if necessary, be given the authority of a JFC.

Concept of Operations

The ADF concept of operations has the following aspects that are of direct relevance to its command structure:
Low-level conflict may arise with little or no warning. Accordingly the force-in-being (as distinct from any joint headquarters) must be capable of responding effectively without expansion or increase in preparedness.

Higher level conflict is likely to be preceded by a period of warning, but of uncertain length.

The range of possibilities indicates that most ADF operations are likely to involve at least two Services.

Conduct of operations may require forces to be deployed at short notice, for sustained operations, at considerable distances from main bases.

Because of political sensitivity of low-level threats, command may usually be centralised under the CDF.

Even when command is centralised under the CDF, a threat may be capable of being dealt with by single-Service action, but is more likely to require joint force resolution. Such an event may well occur with little or no warning.

In such a circumstance, appointment of a joint force commander with an existing headquarters capable of ready augmentation would seem to be an effective answer. It would also be desirable that this joint force should be exercised, from time
to time, to test the suitability of its augmentation and its efficiency.

**Functional Joint Commands**

By definition, functional commands in the ADF are joint commands embracing two or the three armed services, established to perform specific functions, with assets assigned under appropriate delegations. In this sense, the CDF and his HQADF are a form of functional joint command. On the other hand, though a Chief of Staff (COS), commanding his single-Service may, upon occasion, be instructed to carry out a joint operation in which he is nominated as joint commander, he is ordinarily excluded from the definition of functional joint command.

Below the level of the CDF and his HQADF and beyond that of the CsOS, joint commands have been introduced as features of the integrated ADF organization. These have arisen from a perceived need to provide functional joint commands as permanent elements of the command structure. Because of the particular nature of the environments in which they are to function, each is different in character and therefore varied in organization.

Additional to these established commands, two other similar commands are possible. One is the joint force
command under a JFC, as earlier mentioned, which is set up specifically to meet the needs of a particular joint operation that is developing, or is imminent.2 The other would be a regional joint command to fulfil the requirements of a particular area, whether within Australia, in one of its territories, or elsewhere overseas. An example of this latter is the northern command suggested by Mr Dibb in his Review (Dibb pp 92-93).

This functional joint command concept is, to a large extent, the outcome of the series of parliamentary and departmental committee inquiries, each of which contributed in greater or lesser degree to the ultimate result. To that extent, the system has been accepted as the best of a number of options. Even at this stage, however, it is to be implemented in nucleus form only, and is on trial in each instance. In consequence, each joint command can be examined in detail and suggestions offered on possible directions in which the concept might progress. However, the essential feature is that each joint command has an integrated organization comprising a mix from two or the three Services, and each is under the command of the CDF and not of a COS.

The Maritime Command

A first step has been the establishment of a Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) in nucleus form, based on and co-located with the existing Fleet Headquarters. The Flag Officer Commanding the Fleet is also the Maritime Commander. In his role of fleet commander he continues responsible to the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), in that of maritime commander he communicates direct with the CDF.

Initially, the MHQ comprised RAN personnel only: subsequently a senior RAAF officer was added, first as chief of staff, and then as deputy commander. After a period in full time, it was decided that he would revert to part-time, and take another part-time appointment in Canberra.

Although the term 'maritime command' is not actually authorized, it is appropriate to use the word 'command' in reference to the functional joint command operating in the sea environment, which comprises the maritime commander and maritime headquarters.

The command has a diverse role: protection of Australia's sea communications, trade routes, inward supply lines, coastal routes, and the EEZ. There are also the subsidiary functions of oceanographic survey, and policing
of illegal, non-military intrusion into the EEZ. In practice, for many of these duties, the new headquarters will doubtless rely on the continued functioning of the fleet headquarters. Beyond all this is the primary task of watch for unauthorized intrusion and, as necessary, resistance to a hostile force.

The method of operation of MHQ has yet to be worked out. However, since the flag officer commanding the fleet is also the maritime commander, difficulty is unlikely to arise. In any emergency, control will remain with the fleet commander and the CNS until the CDF decides that for national security reasons he must intervene. Then HQADF will no doubt deal direct with MHQ, but since the maritime commander and the fleet commander are one and the same person, there should be little confusion. But it will be apparent that plans should provide for effortless augmentation of the MHQ.

An essential element in the functioning of this command is air support - reconnaissance, anti-submarine search, and strike capability. Accordingly, it is important that there should be, in the staff of MHQ, an RAAF component for advice regarding air matters, also on special logistic aspects of air units involved. Further, this air component will almost certainly be required for liaison duties in order to reduce the time delay at present
involved in consultation at the Navy Office - Air Office level, or MHQ - Air HQ level. In short, in a situation of emergency or of hostilities, the facilities for direct and rapid access to air support are essential.

Other questions remain to be solved: should there be within the maritime command an Australian Federal Police Force (APFP) component, or should there be an arrangement whereby Federal police or other law enforcers can be called in to individual fleet units as necessary, or is it sufficient for certain ships officers to have powers of detention. In any case, a direct communication link between MHQ and an appropriate police etc. office would seem desirable. The involvement of the APFP is at present primarily in the area of coastal surveillance in which the force has specific responsibilities in peacetime. In similar manner, as the full role of the command develops, the MHQ will probably need the addition of army personnel for liaison etc. duties.

One further matter also needs to be decided, that is, the extent to which MHQ becomes involved in contingency planning. It may be that MHQ might undertake the drafting of such plans, for consideration and issue by HQADFW.
The Land Force Command

A similar step has been the establishment of a Land Force Headquarters (LFHQ) in nucleus form, based on and co-located with the existing Headquarters, Field Force Command (HQ FFC). The General Officer Commanding Field Force Command is also the Land Force Commander. In his role of field force commander he continues responsible to the CGS, in that of land force commander he communicates direct with the CDF.

As with 'Maritime Command', although the term 'Land Force Command' is not actually authorised, it is appropriate to use the word 'command' in reference to the functional joint command operating in the ground environment, of which the new headquarters is a part.

The LFHQ comprises a cadre, headed by a chief of staff, reporting direct to the land force commander. Its organization, at present tentative and subject to testing, is shown at Annex D. The cadre is designed to be augmented as required, for exercises and for operations, by manpower drawn from the three services, including their Reserves.

The primary role of Land Force Command is the ground defence of the Australian continent including, of course,
Tasmania, and the small islands adjacent to the mainland. This embraces responsibility for the close air defence of ground forces and installations, and for the perimeter defence of air force establishments, the internal defence of which is an air force task.

The method of operation of LFHQ has yet to be worked out. However, since the commander field force command is also land force commander, few difficulties should arise. In any emergency, control will remain with the field force commander and the CGS until the CDF decides that for national security reasons he must intervene. Then HQADF will no doubt deal direct with LFHQ. Further, it will be apparent that plans should provide for effortless augmentation of the LFHQ.

There is one problem here that can be illustrated by taking as an example an unauthorized intrusion of a suspicious nature into a remote locality of Australian territory. The commander immediately concerned will be the Military District Commander, the representative of a single Service. In a peacetime situation, the emergence of even a minor threat of uncertain significance to national security, would be of vital concern to the Government: and would require the immediate attention of the CDF as the Government's principal military adviser, probably together with the Federal Police Commissioner.
The CDF's concern might well demand a call being made direct to the Military District concerned, with the CGS being kept informed. Alternatively the CDF might feel satisfied to seek information from the CGS, relying on his being aware of the position and either having the latest information or able to get it expeditiously.

If the situation, while sensitive, seems unlikely to escalate, the CDF may, rather than set up a special headquarters ad hoc, prefer to appoint a local commander to act, as suggested earlier. If at any time it then appears that a major emergency is developing rapidly, the CDF may then choose to appoint a joint force commander, one having a formed unit or units at his disposal, and at the same time direct that this joint force will come under direct command of LFHQ, or of the HQADF itself. The establishment of duplicate communications, supplementary to a direct radio link to LFHQ/HQADF, would be the responsibility of the Military District: movement of units or sub-units into the Military District would be that of Movement Control at the direction of the COS concerned.

There is of course the risk that uncertainty about the correct chain of communication may lead to confusion, but this can be minimised by HQADF reacting quickly, to keep all informed of the channel to be followed. It will also be recalled that the commander field force command and land

3. Page 26
force commander are one and the same officer: this too will tend to mitigate confusion.

Special Circumstances of the Air Force

The Air Force is in a singular position from the environment aspect. Whereas the Navy and Army function in their respective environments with little overlap -- the Navy has shore establishments which barely encroach on the Army's ground environment, and the Army has small craft that seldom come into operational contact with the Navy -- the Air Force operates in the air above the sea and ground environments. Certainly there is some overlap there. The Navy has helicopters, with RAN pilots, as part of the standard equipment of ships, and the Army has its aviation corps with fixed and rotary wing aircraft having specific ground-related tasks. The Air Force functions in surveillance, operational, and transport tasks primarily at atmospheric levels, and often at distances, not penetrated by the Navy or the Army.

Of course, the Air Force cannot be completely independent. It has an important role in support of the other Services: in many circumstances this is absolutely vital. Hence, there are situations in which co-operation with the Navy and Army must take precedence over Air Force single-Service tasks. Nevertheless the Air Force strongly
believe their contribution to an integrated defence force can best be made by keeping their assets under command of the CAS, or perhaps of the Air Officer Commanding Operational Command RAAF. While they recognize the superior command of the CDF, they take the view, inter alia, that the CDF would be ill-advised to deploy Air Force units to positions under command of the Navy or Army. When air support is required by the Navy or Army, whether in surveillance, operations, or transport, it is for the CDF to determine whether the support is to be allotted: and if it is, the advice of the CAS would ordinarily be sought as to the scale of it. When it is agreed, it would then be for the Air Officer Commanding to determine which units will be allotted. This matter will be referred to again under 'Allocation of Assets', below.

Further, the Air Force, even now resists the idea that the other two Services need their own fixed and rotary wing aircraft; and asserts that it has the flexibility efficiently to carry out 'battlefield' functions, on land and at sea. This, it is believed, is despite the decision for the transfer of ownership and control of battlefield helicopters to the army.
The Air Defence Command

A case can still be made against provision of such a command. This is that the capabilities for defence of Australia are either 'maritime', operating on, under, or over the sea; or 'continental', operating on or over the land. To state such a position does not imply a need for re-structuring the three armed services, merely that, from a high-level command aspect, there may be a requirement only for two functional organizations - maritime and land force.

However, that case tends to overlook several important considerations, for example, (a) a possible requirement for the conduct of long-range air strike operations beyond the ambit of the maritime or land force commands; (b) the need for the defence of the national capital, other areas of population, and major areas of defence-related industry, against air attack unconnected to land operations engaging the land force command; (c) the determination of priorities for and the control of air units to be committed to the defence enumerated in (b) above, and those supporting the maritime and continental commands.

In these circumstances, the need for an air defence headquarters of a distinctly functional joint nature,
becomes evident. Accordingly, a first step has been the establishment of an Air Headquarters (Air HQ), in nucleus form, based on and co-located with the existing Headquarters, Operational Command RAAF (HQ Op Comd). The Air Officer Commanding Operational Command is also the Air Commander. In his role of commanding the Operational Command he continues responsible to the CAS, in that of air commander he communicates direct with the CDF.

As with the other two commands, although the term 'Air Defence Command' is not actually authorized, it is appropriate to use the word 'command' in reference to the functional joint command operating in the air environment, of which the new headquarters is a part.

The composition of the nucleus Air HQ is still at present in the process of being drawn up; and the method of operation has yet to be worked out. There is of course already in existence a system under which a few RAAF officers are located within the fleet headquarters, and communication between Fleet HQ and HQ Op Comd is authorized. However, this is related primarily to long range maritime patrols that have been functioning for some considerable time. Moreover, HQ Op Comd being single-Service, is wholly responsible to the CAS. It has logistics, engineering, and administrative functions that are distinctively RAAF. Hence, because of the special
circumstances relating to the RAAF outlined above, it would appear necessary for the Air HQ to be effectively separated from HQ Op Comd as soon as practicable. When this is done, there would be a clear recognition that Air HQ is part of a functional joint command system, but having a character somewhat different from either the MHQ or the LFHQ.

Joint Force Command

The principles underlying the appointment of a Joint Force Command (JFC) have been outlined. By definition, a JFC is ordinarily appointed, under Defence Act Section 9, to meet the demand of an operational situation.

It is desirable here to elaborate particularly on the circumstances involved in a ground setting, where the situation has begun at, or has escalated to, a point that the CDF considers the task is beyond the capacity of the local commander to handle. A useful example might be in a situation where the insertion of a formation such as the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) - at present 3rd Infantry Brigade - is indicated.

The formation's headquarters, comprising army personnel, would be augmented by a number of air, and if
desirable, navy representatives under command. Again, most units involved would be army but some might be air components under operational command or control, and other units, air and navy, might be in support for a particular operation. Of necessity, such air and navy elements/units could not be withdrawn without prior consultation, or at least adequate notice. And of course, that command would be answerable directly to the CDF. Thus such a command would be notably different from a single-Service command as for example the existing Headquarters Field Force Command (Army). In these circumstances therefore, it follows that the commander would be appointed a JFC under Defence Act Section 9.

A position such as this could also eventuate in a sea environment, and involve employment of both navy and air elements. This might be specially so if the event were sufficiently sensitive for it to be necessary for the CDF to assume direct command of the force. However, because the use of air units is more likely to be in support of the navy rather than under command, the appointment of a naval officer as a JFC is less likely to be indicated.

It is desirable to reiterate here that, in most if not all circumstances, a JFC is appointed only in a situation of direct joint operations in progress or imminent.
Regional Joint Command

A regional joint command, distinct from either a functional joint command as already defined or a joint force command, may in certain circumstances be considered desirable. An example, again in the ground environment, is in the suggestion by Mr Paul Dibb of a separate organization for the defence of northern Australia, which carries with it the possibility of a truly integrated tri-service regional command (Dibb 1986 pp92-93). Even if for fiscal reasons this particular proposal is not proceeded with, there may still be a case for some form of joint command for the north, possibly under command of the Land Force Commander.

The essential difference between these two schemes is that the Dibb proposal is for a joint organization fully located in northern Australia, whereas the second might have the principal elements only there.

The command could be a peacetime arrangement structured to take in all forms of operation ranging in intensity from non-violent incursions into Australia's EEZ upwards to actual hostilities. The area of responsibility
of the command might extend from a selected point on the north-west coast, across northern Western Australia, over the whole of the Northern Territory, and traversing across northern Queensland to a point on the north-east coast, possibly just south of Townsville. The area of operational command might extend in a northerly direction to embrace the EEZ, and those portions of it to the west and east to be determined having well in view the responsibilities of Maritime Command to the north-east of the continent and also to the north-west.

To ensure efficient integrated control of defence installations in the designated area, the command should assume responsibility for Service assets in the area, and in consequence for their logistic function.

The question of command of ADF units located in the stated area would be more complex. Possibly Army units such as the North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE) should be 'under command' in the normal sense of that term, their administration remaining with the CGS functioning through representatives within the command headquarters. Ideally, naval units based in the area should be under command, but any necessity for them to operate outside the stated area might mean they should be 'in support' under clearly defined terms regarding their employment by the northern command, their reporting to that headquarters, and their
removal as might become necessary from their role of support. Their administration would remain with the CNS functioning through representatives within the command headquarters.

Ideally also, air units based in the area should be under command on the grounds that it would be most desirable that the commander northern command should know precisely the air force assets he has at his disposal. However, the probability of these units being required for operations beyond the stated area might necessitate that some, or perhaps all, should be in support only. Again, their employment would need to be clearly defined so that the commander northern command would know the extent of his operational authority over them, and the air force commander(s) would be fully aware of their responsibility for continuing reporting to the command headquarters. Moreover, the extent of the authority of the Commander Air/Operational Command RAAF to remove any unit from support, temporarily or permanently, should be clearly stated. Any objection to such a division of responsibility would be countered by reference to the fact that the northern command is a joint functional command.

Such a command could establish a strong framework for the defence of northern Australia, and could provide, for the first time, an effective system of intercommunication
with the established civil administration and infrastructure. The implications of this system are dealt with in full elsewhere (Langtry and Ball 1986). Thus there would be in place in peacetime, a viable organization able to meet any threat to Australia's entity that might develop in the proximate future. It would also, at no extra material cost, provide a firm base from which foreign policy could be supported, initiatives that may in time become essential.

It is for consideration also whether this northern command might be regarded strategically as a reserve for the defence of south-eastern and south-western regions, if threats should develop there, without there being a threat imminent from the north.

On the aspect of the Service from which the commander of the northern command should be drawn, consideration would need to be given to the relative operational importance within the command of the three Services' units, and the expertise of the commander himself. At first sight, it might appear the Air Force may have the superior claim, but on reflection it might be thought that the Army's role as the force behind the seaward screen may be vital.
As with the maritime, land force, and air commanders, the regional joint commander would almost certainly not be appointed a JFC under the Defence Act. Such an appointment is essentially for a situation of actual or imminent operations. Even then, the operations may appear to be confined to a relatively small part only of the regional command, and it may be advantageous to appoint a subordinate commander as a JFC, thus leaving the regional commander freed to exercise functional command over his whole area.

The aspect of manpower cover for the additional command organizations is referred to later.

A Rear Area Command

In the event of an emergency or hostilities moving towards war, the existing series of functional commands is likely to be closely involved in preparation for, and conduct of operations. The centres of population, industry, and essential commerce are mainly on or adjacent to the seaboard, and are therefore liable to attack. Moreover the prevailing climate of terrorism and even of internal subversion is liable to intrude dramatically even though a conventional hostile force may be small, or not immediately involved.
Thus it is necessary to provide protection for all such areas, including also static military depots and workshops. It is possible that this protection should be the responsibility of the functional commanders already mentioned, or even of the Land Force Commander alone. On the other hand, the latter may be deeply involved in the task of overall ground environment protection, and co-ordination of the protection of all areas may be necessary. In these circumstances, an organization dedicated to internal security would be a requirement.

Accordingly, provision of a Rear Area or Home Command is proposed. While this can be of lower priority than the three other functional commands: and, while it may not be needed even in nucleus form in peace, provision for it should clearly exist. While it would need to be tri-service in composition, its commander might well be a senior officer on an inactive reserve list, and the headquarters or unit itself might be a part of the Army Reserve in a not-raised category. It may be appropriate for the commander in peace to be located with the LFHQ where he could be kept informed of all circumstances and arrangements affecting him.

A question arises here whether, on activation, the Rear Area/Home Command will be responsible direct to the
CDF, or to the Land Force Commander. It may be that the Rear Headquarters should at that time become responsible direct to the CDF for three reasons:

. The Rear Headquarters will tend to become involved in questions of overall administration, including particularly logistics.

. It will, in some respects at least, be of equal status to the other functional commands.

. It may even become involved in an operational capacity if low-level threats, internal or even external, emerge in its own area of responsibility.

Supporting Commands

A component of the overall command structure is in the question of the organization needed to oversee the functioning of such training installations as are joint in their roles, also logistic and other administrative entities, and the like. Some organizations of a related nature already have a place in the single-Services' structure, perhaps the outstanding examples of which are the Army's Logistic Command, and the Air Force's Training Command.
As the rationalization of the defence Services proceeds, logistic questions are becoming difficult of logical solution. One answer might be conversion of the existing single-Service Logistic Command to a tri-service structure: or an alternative may lie in the single-manager concept that has been in operation for some time in some areas of the logistic function. Further, detailed examination is indicated.

In similar manner the tri-service training organization may need study. There already exists a joint services staff college training members of the armed services and the public service in joint service duties. Senior officers of the services have access to the Royal College of Defence Studies and to a less extent to the United States War College, but the availability of vacancies may need to be addressed. Further, the present arrangement whereby a single-service training organization provides vacancies for students from the other services might be tested to determine its adequacy. Prima facie, it would seem that it is.

In essence, it would seem desirable to determine whether there is a requirement for joint service commands of a support nature, or whether the task can be effectively performed by the single-Services as at present, supervised by Defence Central.
Additional Role of Functional Headquarters

A further matter for consideration is the extent to which functional headquarters are to be involved in their contingency planning, their capabilities, and the development of force structures appropriate to joint operations in the environment for which each headquarters is responsible. There is already some suggestion that these subjects are over-concentrated at Defence Central where the sections concerned may not be as closely in touch with environment factors as are the functional headquarters.

Devolution of contingency planning should not involve much difficulty. Subject of course to direction by the CDF, such planning could be carried out by the functional commander and staff, for presentation to the CDF for approval, or variation as may be necessary.

Formulation of the capabilities needed for the discharge of the allotted roles of each command is another function that might with advantage be delegated to those close to the problems involved. Conclusions reached would, of course, need to be subject to approval by the CDF.
Closely related would be proposals for refinement of force structures, on an advisory basis, emanating from a 'user level', which would evidently be advantageous.

A further matter, relating to the role of Maritime Command, is worthy of mention here. There is a marked reluctance of government to address the subject of a maritime policy for Australia. Few people seem to think that a small nation such as Australia might need such a concept. It should be appreciated that the country is an island entirely dependent on sea-lanes for its international trade and for defence support beyond its own capability.

A maritime policy is of course a matter for the Government to determine, a matter that in ordinary circumstances should initially be formulated by senior advisers, civil and military. The subject was approached in the Dibb Review but, largely in the dim light of current economic difficulties, was not covered in any depth.

In these circumstances, it might be appropriate that the role of Maritime Command should include the formulation of a draft maritime policy, for submission through the CDF.5

5. Page 32.
It would be important that such delegations should not involve any overall increase in manpower. It is possible that a small increase in the size of the nucleus functional headquarters might be required, but, should that be found necessary, a compensating decrease within the Department itself would be appropriate.

Exercising the Headquarters

It cannot be over-emphasized that an important consideration in the existence of the functional headquarters, from HQADF down, is the need to exercise each headquarters at quite regular intervals. If this is overlooked, the personnel thereof will become set in a regular peacetime routine that will militate against their efficient functioning in an emergency.

In the case of HQADF in particular this will present considerable difficulty, but it should not be beyond the ingenuity of the Exercise Planning Section to devise suitable exercises that will not involve undue disruption to the flow of normal functioning.

A further benefit from exercising this functional joint command system will be to clarify the channel of command and communication, in operations, between the CDF and the Maritime, Land Force, and Air Commanders. In
consequence, the relationship of HQADF to MHQ, LFHQ, and AHQ will also be elucidated.

At present, there is uncertainty in the minds of the CsOS and their staffs how they are to function in an occurrence short of emergency that may be politically sensitive. And this uncertainty extends to the functional commanders who are at once responsible to single-Service CsOS and to the CDF. In such exercises, and the 'post-mortems' that follow, an expertise will develop in the method of dealing with a situation not only of emergency short of hostilities, but also of incidents having implications of peacetime international relations.

Natural Disaster Relief

The disasters at Darwin (Cyclone Tracey) and the Solomon Islands in 1986 point to the desirability, from the aspect of effective use of Australian defence resources, of having an ability to provide at short notice a small headquarters similar to that of a joint force command. A difference lies in the fact that the Director General Natural Disasters Organization is in full control of a relief operation, and the part of the ADF engaged in the relief operation functions under his direction. Although the Director General is ordinarily a senior Service officer, he does not have a full command function in
relation to the part of the ADF involved; and, since the
disaster is not in the category of a joint, war-like
operation, neither he nor any other senior ADF officer is
appointed as a joint force commander under the Defence Act.

Nevertheless, as the ADF component will probably comprise
elements of the three Services, doubtless the CDF order
assembling the component would designate a senior officer
to command.

It would be desirable in these circumstances for that
commander to have a staff drawn from his existing
headquarters, through which he is accustomed to
functioning, and to which necessary staff officers from the
other Services are already attached or can be quickly
allotted.

Allocation of Assets/Resources

A problem that arises with the new functional
headquarters is the question of allocation of assets in
peacetime.

In war no great difficulty need arise. The CDF will
direct each COS to allot a given number of units, as may be
necessary, to each headquarters, either semi-permanently,
for a stated period, or for the duration of a particular
operation. And such allocation may be under command, or
in support.
In peacetime, however, it is a different matter. Unless the allocation is for a precise period only, and that quite short, the COS allotting a particular asset will be losing control of it, and may have difficulty in recovering the asset when he needs it for some other purpose. The problem has been addressed in the aspect of reconnaissance aircraft for Maritime Command, and a solution appears to have been found at least for the present. Whether this will be permanent, and can be applied elsewhere, remains to be decided.

There are few, if any, assets of Navy and Army on which the other two services have more than infrequent call. On the other hand, most of Air's assets are of value to both Navy and Army, as well, of course, as to Air itself. Against this, the Air Force policy of concentration of force, results in Air wishing to retain control until a specific requirement arises for Navy or Army use. However, it must be realised that most operations call for joint planning and execution: and accordingly the Air Force has to concede that its participation is vital, leading in many instances to an allocation of assets to one or both of the other Services, on an as-required basis.
In these circumstances, therefore, the three functional joint commands need to develop a cordial relationship the one with the others, working closely together at all times. If this is done properly, there may be circumstances in which Air is able to make a special, almost permanent allocation of a particular asset. Then, the air unit/s might still remain in their present location, with their personnel fully administered, and their aircraft and related equipment fully maintained by the RAAF, except, that is, for any item or service already available in the host Service. In that instance, the air unit might be described as 'under command for operations', or 'under operational control' to distinguish it from those units, ordinarily of the same Service as the greater part of the joint headquarters, that are fully 'under command'.

**Manpower**

A vital factor in the establishment of joint, functional commands is manpower. In some areas there is already criticism that the superstructure of the ADF is over-large. However, for reasons already stated, a force-in-being requires an effective command structure also in being. In these circumstances, the necessary manpower cover must be found, albeit as economically as possible.
No doubt manpower considerations will inhibit raising the three joint headquarters in full in peace, but at least a suitable nucleus of each organization should be maintained, of such composition as will enable quick, unpublicized expansion in emergency to full planned establishment.

Here, in setting up each nucleus, consideration might be given to some of the appointments being filled by reserve commissioned officers, warrant officers, etc. These would need to be available for periodical training in duties relevant to their possible emergency employment, and of course for urgent call-up when required. It may further be possible for a considerable proportion of the emergency part of the establishment to be filled, in case of need, by similar reserve personnel. If it would be possible for these personnel to be 'earmarked' in peace, this would be very desirable.

Should a need arise further to save manpower at a high level, consideration might be given to any section of Defence Central that was set up at the time of the initial integration of the Service departments for aspects of organization which, once established, may no longer be necessary at least in their original form.
Relationship of the Chiefs of Staff

The defence system has not yet come fully to grips with the situation of the three Service CsOS and their relationship to the CDF.

At first sight, the position is clear - since the CDF commands the ADF, the CsOS are under command of, and responsible to, the CDF. Further each COS commands his armed service. Incidentally, each has right of access to the Minister: separately they are also members of the various defence committees.

As each is a commander of a single-Service component of the ADF, in the early stages of an emergency his Service may become engaged in a conflict operational in character. This applies perhaps particularly to the Maritime Commander.

A problem may arise when a COS's units or personnel are allocated away from him to a joint, or joint force, entity. A joint force commander (if and when appointed) and units under his command do not continue under command of the related COS. Also, formations and units placed under joint command cease to be under command of the COS not nominated. However, the COS dispossessed retains a responsibility for administration including many personnel
aspects and most logistic functions, of those formations and units, and of the joint force commanders as individuals.

Whereas the CDF is, in effect, a joint commander with the full powers implied, each COS is clearly a single-Service commander. Only in exceptional circumstances therefore will any one COS exercise a joint operational command function, and then only for a limited period. It is here that the measured pace of defence integration has given rise to the idea that the status of the CsOS is being lowered - when, as a fact of history, they have never had a major operational role. It is true that the CDF has been given an operational command status the Chairman Chiefs of Staff did not have. But because that is recognized to have been a wise step, is not to say that the CsOS should be similarly endowed, or that they are being downgraded if they are not so favoured. Also the fact that the CDF has a headquarters designed for operational command, should not be thought to mean that each COS should have such a headquarters.

Notwithstanding this, the CsOS are an intrinsic part of the higher defence organization, and they have a wide-ranging responsibility for, inter alia, the training and much of the administration of their respective armed services. Moreover, they retain a responsibility for the
administration of their personnel and maintenance of the equipment allocated to joint and joint force commands. Admittedly the matter is further complicated by the possibility that an individual COS may be given an operational task involving units of his own single-Service supported by units or personnel allocated by the CDF from another Service. In that case, as already noted, the subject COS becomes a joint operational commander, if only for a limited period.\textsuperscript{6}

Thus, during a growing emergency, the CsOS are likely to be heavily committed in the establishment, raising, training, equipping, and preparation for movement of forces for operations, also for much of the administrative support of deployed forces. Hence the CsOS will be heavily committed in functions they alone can discharge, and their employment on operational tasks will be feasible only in exceptional circumstances.

Another problem, previously mentioned, that has not yet been fully addressed, is in the power of the CDF to issue orders, directives, or instructions to the CsOS.\textsuperscript{7} In peacetime, such orders etc. are usually issued under the rubric of the Department, but in an emergency precedent to hostilities it will be appropriate for them to be issued through HQADF. There is no question that the CsOS as servicemen are thoroughly aware of the CDF's capacity in

\textsuperscript{6} Page 25. \textsuperscript{7} Page 14.
this regard, but there may be others who will doubt the legality of an order particularly when a financial element is involved. This needs clarification and promulgation.

Communications

An important factor in the success of the functional command system is provision for communications to and from the three headquarters, and extending from the Department of Defence on the one hand to formations and units on the other.

There is an impression at present within the defence establishment that plans for technology-based communications within the ADF have not quite reached the stage that command and control facilities are assured of adequacy. This is notwithstanding the developing Defence Integrated Secure Communications Network (DISCON). A basis for consideration of what is required might be the US Defense Communications System, suitably scaled down. In this system it is quite possible for the Commander-in-Chief wherever he is placed to listen-in to the operations of individual units in the field, in the air, and at sea. Though this might be thought extreme, in the fast moving events likely to be a part of any violation of Australian territory, it would be advisable for the CDF to be aware constantly of what is going on in the forward areas of each
environment. Moreover, recent experience (for example during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War) has shown that it is important the CDF and the Government should be aware in detail of current incidents well in advance of media despatches reaching Canberra and the state capitals.

**Logistics**

For logistics, the HQADF has a Command Support Systems Directorate (CSSD): and it is recognized that for exercise purposes and in emergency, the CDF has a call on officers, military and civil, in other divisions of Defence Central.

Operational plans cannot be developed efficiently without necessary logistics input. True, the three CsOS are individually responsible for logistic aspects of administration, but there is a question whether the HQADF staff can efficiently communicate with logistic sections of the three Service Offices either direct or through the logistic division of Defence Central. Moreover, actual operations cannot proceed effectively without proper logistic co-ordination, and it seems unlikely that CSSD as at present constituted can effectively achieve this co-ordination. Some change appears necessary.
Conclusion

An effective command structure is a fundamental component of the Australian Defence Force. Even though it may be held that Australia faces no identifiable direct military threat, there are possibilities of lower levels of conflict arising at surprisingly short notice.

Substantial progress has been achieved in the establishment of such a command structure for the ADF. Moreover, the measured pace at which progress has been made has avoided the mistakes encountered in over-bold change. A notable feature has been in the provision of headquarters in nucleus form capable of rapid but unobtrusive expansion in emergency, and pre-trained for efficient operation at short notice.

Nonetheless, a number of avenues remain in which further progress can with advantage be effected. These include

- Devolution of some aspects of planning, to the newly set up joint headquarters, which are closer to the action than is Defence Central.

- The need, or otherwise, for a regional command, a rear area command, and/or joint supporting commands.
. Enhancement of the existing and projected communications system.

. Elucidation of difficulties in the logistics area.

. Resolution of the problem of the requirement for a balanced joint-service system while retaining the desirable features of the single-Service organizations. In particular, there is the need for a proper attitude to achieving integration of the three armed Services.
DEFENCE HIGHER ORGANISATION

The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary have joint responsibility for the administration of the Australian Defence Force. The CDF is the principal military adviser to the Minister and the Secretary is the principal civilian adviser. Divisions under the control of the Secretary have the responsibility to advise and inform the CDF as appropriate and as required.

Notes
(a) Responsible to both the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force
(b) Under the supervision of Dep Sec B
(c) Also responsible for providing assistance to Service Commanders
(d) The Joint Force Headquarters will be activated by CDF directive as required for specific operations or exercises.
COUNCIL OF DEFENCE

1. **Composition**
The Minister for Defence (Chairman)
The Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence
(presently Aviation)
Secretary, Department of Defence
Chief of Defence Force
Chief of Naval Staff
Chief of the General Staff
Chief of the Air Staff

2. **Function**
To consider and discuss matters relating to the control and administration of the Defence Force and of the respective Arms of the Defence Force, referred to the Council by the Minister.
DEFENCE COMMITTEE

1. **Composition**
  
   **Chairman:** Secretary Department of Defence

   **Members:**
   - Chief of the Defence Force
   - Chief of Naval Staff
   - Chief of the General Staff
   - Chief of the Air Staff
   - Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
   - Secretary to the Treasury
   - Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

   **Invited Members:** Members may be invited from other Departments and Agencies

2. **Functions**

   To advise the Minister on:

   a. the defence policy as a whole;
   b. the coordination of military, strategic, economic, financial and external affairs aspects of the defence policy;
   c. matters of policy or principle and important questions having a joint Service or inter-departmental defence aspect; and
   d. such other matters having a defence aspect as are referred to the Committee by or on behalf of the Minister;

   and carry out such investigations as it thinks fit for the purpose of advising the Minister on those matters.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

1. Composition
Chairman: Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)
Members: Chief of Naval Staff
         Chief of the General Staff
         Chief of the Air Staff
Invited Members: The Chiefs of Staff Committee may request persons, who can assist in its deliberations, to attend its meetings.

2. Functions
The Chiefs of Staff Committee is responsible to the Minister for Defence, through the Chief of the Defence Force, and its functions are:
   a. to provide collective professional advice on military operations and on the military implications of defence policy and activities;
   b. to endorse military plans for approval by the CDF;
   c. to provide collective advice concerning the control and administration of special forces of a multi-national nature, the responsibility for which is assigned to the Australian Government, subject to such control conforming to the principles and procedures of the established machinery of Government and administration;
   d. to recommend the allocation of resources to designated commanders engaged in joint operations; and
   e. to endorse the military aspects of policies concerning joint Service units and installations.
LAND FORCE HEADQUARTERS
(Tentative Peace Establishment)

Land Force Commander

Chief of ADC

Force Staff

Liaison Finance Office
1 Navy Services
1 Army S02
1 Air S02

Registry Word Processor S02

Joint Ops Branch

Plans Mov Int Elec Comms PR
Control S01 Wfare S01
3 S02  3 S03 S03
2 2 S03

Joint Admin Branch

Log Service Joint LFHQ Tpt Med QM MP
Advisers Pers Support
4 S02  3 S02 5 S02
SO2 EMR  S02 Tpt  1 Pro
S03  S03 Tpt  1 Capt
S03 Sup  2 S03
1 Chap

Note
a. Officers only listed.
b. Army, unless otherwise stated.
c. One army offr for duty at Maritime Comd,
   one for duty at Air Comd.
d. Not included above, one naval offr comes from
   Maritime Comd, one air offr from Air Comd.

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This is the only academic body in Australia which specialises in these studies. Centre members give frequent lectures and seminars for other departments within the ANU and other universities. Regular seminars and conferences on topics of current importance to the Centre's research are held, and the major defence training institutions, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Navy, Army and RAAF Staff Colleges, are heavily dependent upon SDSC assistance with the strategic studies sections of their courses.

Since its inception in 1966, the Centre has supported a number of Visiting and Research Fellows, who have undertaken a wide variety of investigations. Recently the emphasis of the Centre's work has been on problems posed for the peace and stability of Australia's neighbourhood; the defence of Australia; arms proliferation and arms control; decision making processes of the higher levels of the Australian Defence Department; management studies and the role of the Minister in Australia's defence policy making; and the strategic implications of developments in South-east Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific Area.

The Centre contributes to the work of the Department of International Relations through its graduate studies programme; and the Department reciprocates by assisting the Centre in its research. A comprehensive collection of reference materials on strategic issues, particularly from the press, learned journals and government publications, is maintained by the Centre.

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