While some ethnic groups engage in a high level of ethnic voting, many others do not. We argue that where class and ethnic differences overlap, ethnic voting should be elevated. More specifically, we theorize that between-ethnic group inequality (BGI) increases ethnic voting, but that its effect is conditional on the level of within-ethnic group inequality (WGI); when WGI is low the effect of BGI on ethnic voting is strengthened; when WGI is elevated, the effect of BGI is reduced.
Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism – the economic insecurity perspective–emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. Alternatively, the cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a reaction against cultural changes that threaten the worldview of once-predominant sectors of the population.
India’s independence leaders were well aware of the threat India’s colonial-style army posed for the new democracy. This talk explores the strategies Nehru and others adopted to control the military and safeguard India’s democracy, and how and why they have succeeded. The talk draws comparisons with Pakistan and other former colonies, and also examines current stresses and strains in India’s civil-military relations.