How to soften resistance to state-building efforts by local powerholders? This paper highlights a strategy of compensation, where elites receive government offices in exchange for relinquishing their vested interests. We explore this strategy in the context of the Northern Wei Dynasty of China (386-534 AD) which terminated an era of state weakness during which aristocrats exercised local autonomy through strongholds.
Exploiting a comprehensive state-building reform in the late 5th century, we find that aristocrats from previously autonomous localities were disproportionately recruited into the bureaucracy as compensation for accepting a stronger state presence. Three mechanisms of bureaucratic compensation facilitated state-building. Offices received by those aristocrats: (1) carried direct benefits; (2) realigned their interests toward the ruler; and (3) mitigated credible commitment problems.
Our findings shed light on the causes of the “First Great Divergence,” where similar “barbarian” invasions at similar times led to fragmentation in Europe but further state consolidation in China.
About the speaker
Erik H. Wang is a lecturer in the Department of Political and Social Change. He received his PhD from Princeton University. His research interests centre on historical political economy, politics of state-building, and bureaucracy. His work has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Politics, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Research and Politics, among others.