In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption has been a sensitive one to democracy. Although conflicts of interest have not always resulted in corruption, they do constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour. The Portuguese attempt at regulating conflicts of interest in parliament has been paradigmatic: eight legislative interventions to the first Statute of MPs in less than two decades and parliament was still unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent financial impropriety deriving from the accumulation of the representative mandate with other outside jobs and activities. The incremental nature of adjustments, the peculiar “tailor made” nature of legislation and the importation of regulatory models “in place” abroad, raise important aspects in regard both to the scope and efficacy of the instruments adopted as well as the legislators’ intentions and willingness to move on with the necessary reforms. This paper attempts to assess the regulatory performance and reform efforts of the Portuguese Assembleia da República in addressing MPs’ conflicts of interest through the analysis of the control framework adopted, namely, rules of disclosure and legal constraints to accumulation.