

“If Washington is effective in linking its Asia-Pacific and global security postures, it can maintain its status as a preeminent power in the region. If it fails, it may find itself involved in a dangerous and unstable multipolar rivalry. . . .”

America's Asia-Pacific Strategy Is Out of Kilter

WILLIAM T. TOW

It would be understandable in a post-9-11 world if American policy makers, at the expense of other regions, became fixated on international terrorism and related Middle East challenges. Such an approach to security policy, however, would be misguided and ill-fated. Ultimately, the United States' geopolitical destiny is likely to be shaped by pursuing the same goals on which US foreign policy has been focused since the founding of the republic: preventing hegemonic powers from controlling American global strategy; ensuring US access to key international markets; and promoting liberal democratic values abroad. Much of this agenda, albeit not all, is conducted at the traditional “state-centric” level of international relations, the rise of non-state actors notwithstanding.

In this context, the Asia-Pacific region is shaping up as the most important in the world for the United States' evolving strategic interests and force postures. The US-China relationship has developed into the world's most critical bilateral relationship. Taiwan and North Korea remain volatile flashpoints capable of involving the United States in conflicts that could be far more lethal than Iraq. And Asian economies, generating around 34 percent of the world's total gross national product, are among the most dynamic and fastest-growing in the world.

As Americans prepare to elect a new president next year, their country is approaching a historic juncture in its strategic relations with the expansive “region” encompassing a vast area that stretches from the eastern Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia to littoral East Asia to Oceania and the South Pacific. If Washington is effective in linking its Asia-Pacific and global security postures, it can

maintain its status as a preeminent power in the region. If it fails, it may find itself involved in a dangerous and unstable multipolar rivalry with China, Russia, and other major powers that would consume America's energy and sap its resources for decades to come.

US POWER CHALLENGED

The specter of China growing strong—whether through a “peaceful rise,” as Beijing insists is occurring, or as a hegemonic threat to US global primacy, as many of China's critics see it—is for US policy planners the most substantial Asia-Pacific challenge today. Resolving the Taiwan question is directly related to the future course of Sino-American relations; permanently defusing the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula also depends increasingly on the ability of China and the United States to manage that process.

There is no shortage, however, of other regional security challenges that could test Washington's future ability to help underwrite regional stability. These include sustained historical tensions between China and Japan, the United States' most important Asia-Pacific ally; tensions between China and India as the region's two most rapidly growing economic and strategic powers; and protracted religious and territorial disputes between India and Pakistan that could potentially spill over to affect stability throughout much of Central and Southeast Asia. Russia looms just over the horizon with continued territorial grievances against Japan and nationalist-based apprehensions about China. Observers concerned with the issue of good governance question the legitimacy of various Southeast Asian governments (Burma, Thailand, and the Indochinese states) and worry that nascent democracies (such as Indonesia and the Philippines) remain vulnerable to protracted ethnic,

WILLIAM T. TOW, a professor at the Australian National University, is author of *Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

religious, or ideological pressures. Finally, an array of so-called “transregional security” and “human security” challenges have recently emerged in the Asia-Pacific region that have obvious global ramifications. These include nuclear nonproliferation, climate change (with China and India projected to become the world’s largest energy consumers within a decade or so), energy security, pandemics, and food and water security.

The United States, as a global trading and maritime power that depends greatly on continued access to the region’s markets and sea-lanes of communication, has a major interest in promoting conflict avoidance. It wants Asia-Pacific rivalries and vulnerabilities not to escalate into open confrontation, and wants to prevent the development of an extremist, anti-Western bloc in the region. Neither does it wish an intensification of nuclear or conventional arms races in the region.

Asia-Pacific security challenges that affect US interests in the region and in the wider world also include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of terrorism, and the intensification of trade protectionism. The administration of George W. Bush has insisted, in national security strategy documents, that a key objective is to sustain US regional engagement by preserving robust security partnerships with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia that support a credible American forward defense posture.

Yet it is critical in this context to strike an appropriate balance between cooperative and competitive American security behavior in the region. Unfortunately, current US strategy puts excessive emphasis on competition. The US Department of Defense 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review represented US engagement strategy as a policy instrument to hedge against the ascendancy of China as a military competitor to the United States, demarcating US regional allies as deterrence assets. In April 2006, US National Security Adviser Steven Hadley described the following items as the three pillars of US Asia-Pacific strategy: promoting democracy and freedom with allied support; building networks of cooperative regional security with those allies and other regional states; and finding the right combination of engagement and balancing to project toward an increasingly powerful China. What appeared to be missing from Hadley’s list was an acknowledgement that all three processes would require investment of considerable time and effort, that they would have to be adjusted according to the region’s political and cultural sensitivities, and

that regional actors must claim joint ownership of future regional security architectures.

RIVALRY WITH CHINA

How successful Washington’s strategy will be rests largely on the future of Sino-American relations. China’s gross domestic product is now larger than that of Britain and France; if its current rate of growth is sustained, China is projected to become the world’s biggest economy by 2030. The economies of China and the United States are increasingly interdependent, with two-way trade increasing from \$33 billion in 1992 to \$263 billion in 2006. At the same time, China’s authoritarian political system and human rights practices clash with an American tendency to export democratic values as universal commodities. Sino-American military and diplomatic competition is also increasing. Many US analysts, for example, view the recent intensification of China’s multilateral security diplomacy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as nothing more than a divide-and-rule strategy designed to marginalize US strategic influence in the region.

American diplomacy, too, has been criticized as polarizing the region. Washington’s recent efforts to strengthen alliance relations in the Asia-Pacific, including so-called alliance transformation initiatives with Japan and the formalization of the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, are illustrative. Chinese leaders perceive such efforts as an American-led containment strategy directed against their own country. Beijing and Washington both fear the other will pursue “zero-sum” policies at its own expense. This tendency must eventually be tempered if greater stability is to be realized in the Asia-Pacific region.

War avoidance in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula constitutes the most immediate benchmark for how successfully these fears will be overcome. Crisis intensity varies in both regional flashpoints as China and the United States intermittently vie with each other to demonstrate their continuing loyalty to old Cold War allies, or collaborate to curtail steps toward independence by Taiwan and the policy excesses of the North Korean regime.

Beijing’s leadership insists it has the right to assimilate Taiwan by force if the current or a future Taiwanese government crosses the “red line” established in China’s March 2005 anti-secession law and declares independence from China. Any Chinese use of force against Taiwan would violate the Taiwan Relations Act that suggests the United

States might intervene on that island polity's behalf if such a contingency were to transpire. In Beijing and Washington, memories of the two countries' near-clash in 1996 are still raw. At that time, when the People's Liberation Army carried out military exercises and missile tests adjacent to Taiwan's shores in an effort to influence Taiwan's presidential election, China underestimated US resolve to intervene against hard-line Chinese actions.

The United States successfully faced down the Chinese leadership to end that crisis, but thereafter the Clinton and Bush administrations showed little inclination to confront China on the Taiwan issue. They instead adopted a harder line against Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's often-strident independence tendencies. To be sure, Beijing still complains about US "interference in internal affairs" concerning Taiwan. China is also tailoring its military buildup to help it prevail in any future confrontation with the United States over Taiwan. Its deployment of hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles in Fujian province, which is adjacent to the Taiwan Strait, and its recent antisatellite test, presumably carried out with US command and control networks in mind, exemplify this trend. Such Chinese efforts, however, have hardly overshadowed an inclination by both China and the United States since 1996 to avoid direct confrontation over Taiwan.

TROUBLES WITH ALLIES

Although it is not necessarily linked to the United States' harder line toward Taiwanese independence, China has recently adopted a tough position against its longstanding communist ally, North Korea. The Chinese, with Washington's blessing, have assumed a pivotal role in multilateral talks, pressuring North Korea's "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il to take tangible steps toward nuclear disarmament in return for US economic and diplomatic concessions. Of course, China is concerned about what might happen if the communist regime were suddenly to implode. The ramifications for China's own border security, the probable influx of North Korean refugees into Jilin and Liaoning provinces, and the removal of an ideological bedfellow (albeit an eccentric and often cantankerous one) adjacent to its own territory would be less than acceptable for China's leadership.

Achieving balance depends on the United States transforming itself from a hierarchical player in the Asia-Pacific region into one more comfortable with sharing power and negotiating compromises.

Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, however, is critical to Chinese security, if for no other reason than that it gives China and the United States, as "nuclear have" powers under the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a better chance to stem the tide of state-centric nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and beyond. For China it would be a geopolitical nightmare to face a Japan that had developed a nuclear force in response to unbridled North Korean development of nuclear weapons capabilities. With this in mind, China has been relentless in pressuring the North Koreans to participate in successive formal rounds of six-party talks and to join numerous working groups to prepare for the more formal negotiating sessions. It has also threatened the North Koreans with extensive sanctions in the export of food and fuel if Pyongyang becomes too recalcitrant. (China provides 80 to 90 percent of North Korea's

fuel supplies and about one-third of its food supplies.)

China and the United States have demonstrated a willingness and capacity to work with each other

to restrict the ability of minor regional powers to disrupt the Asia-Pacific region's central strategic balance. But this does not mean they are necessarily becoming more compatible in managing the broader Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape. Serious and potentially divisive differences persist in their strategic objectives and diplomatic style. The United States is feeling increasingly comfortable, for example, with Japan's resurgence as a "normal power." This may prove a barrier to sustaining any implicit Sino-American strategic bargain on comanaging the Taiwanese and North Korean flashpoints.

Strengthening the US-Japan alliance is a core feature of Washington's emerging grand strategy to encourage the rise of "friendly powers" such as Japan, Australia, and India to contain Chinese ambitions and capabilities and to preserve its own position of decisive strategic influence. Key officials in the Bush administration also see the US-Japan alliance as a burgeoning instrument of international security politics that could be applied to the global war on terror, preventing nuclear proliferation, and safeguarding vital sea-lanes of communication.

Japanese political leaders are increasingly considering revisions to their country's postwar "peace

constitution.” And US-Japan collaboration in such defense technology areas as theater missile defense is now ingrained within the alliance. Japanese weapons procurement designed to integrate such technologies into its military infrastructure is resulting in Japan’s deploying what is de facto an increasingly offense-oriented defense force. All of these trends only intensify China’s threat perceptions of the US-Japan alliance as a challenge to its core geopolitical interests.

Another source of tension relates to China’s ambitions for regional dominance. Beijing promotes variations of a “New Security Concept” as the most appropriate road to achieving greater regional stability. China has become an enthusiastic supporter of ASEAN’s “comprehensive security” formula for confidence-building measures and for collective security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region. It has directly contrasted this approach to the US insistence on maintaining its “hierarchical” or “hegemonic” bilateral security alliances in the region. American critics of China’s diplomatic behavior insist that Beijing is using multilateralism in a way its traditional advocates never intended—to drive a wedge between the United States and its regional allies by forcing them to choose between emerging regional security organizations (with the idea that this will increasingly lead them to accept Chinese dominance).

FORWARD, BUT FLEXIBLE

America’s military preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a widespread perception that US military power is declining as the “long war” against international terrorism intensifies. An April 2007 Congressional Budget Office report, for example, noted that only between three and eleven US Army brigades would be available if a crisis in another part of the world were to require American military intervention. US plans to defend South Korea have previously envisioned deploying up to 20 or 21 brigades. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of defense transformation, in which forward basing would be reduced, seems irrelevant at a time when the United States is increasingly dependent on coalition partners to help carry out critical military missions.

For China it would be a geopolitical nightmare to face a Japan that had developed a nuclear force in response to unbridled North Korean development of nuclear weapons capabilities.

A steady, qualitative improvement in China’s defense industries, supplemented by a thriving Russian-Chinese arms sales relationship, promises to bring China into equality with the United States in areas of military technology where equality was until recently unimaginable. China’s increased ability to disrupt US information networks, its development of special operations forces to strike at US regional basing operations, and its broadening of ballistic, cruise, and other missile systems threaten to neutralize traditional US strategic superiority in the Asia-Pacific maritime theater of operations. North Korea’s military capabilities also remain formidable, in the event a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula. And there is no guarantee that a strategically resurgent Russia would stay neutral in any future East Asian conflict if it believed its security interests were directly threatened by the United States. Russia maintains a significant security relationship

with China via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and still honors a low-key defense accord with Pyongyang.

To contend with these realities, recent US doctrinal planning

has focused on increasing the flexibility of American forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. The numerical strength of ground forces will shrink in South Korea (a 2004 agreement calls for the reduction of US forces from 37,500 to 25,000 by next year) and in Okinawa (where 8,000 Marines will be transferred to the US territory of Guam), as domestic politics in both South Korea and Japan now favors national security strategies less dependent on a permanent US force presence. Both countries, however, have agreed to continue hosting major operating bases from which US forces could maneuver in future regional contingencies. The US-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative and the US-South Korea Future of the Alliance Talks have mapped out a de facto triangle of US force positioning affording Washington maximum flexibility to apply its military power. Guam is particularly important in this equation, as the home for substantial levels of US air and naval forward strike capabilities. This strategy at least partially compensates for the present lack of mass in US force structure.

Both South Korean and Japanese forces are planning to achieve greater interoperability with US units even as they mature toward assuming more

responsibility for their own national defense. The US-South Korea Combined Forces Command will soon give way to the South Korean government's assumption of control over its own country's forces during wartime. Japan will increasingly develop missile defense technology, provide training for Southeast Asian antipiracy and related maritime capabilities, and act as an important coalition partner in US-initiated global security operations such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and international counterterrorism efforts.

Achieving the United States' strategic interests in Southeast Asia requires that US policy makers think about this region in wide strategic terms, and not merely as a theater for counterterrorism. Although a very substantial terrorist threat, the suppression of which is crucial to the United States' regional and global security objectives, has emerged in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other parts of the subregion, the Asian financial crisis illustrated that Southeast Asian leaders fundamentally believe that economics is security. This largely explains China's growing geopolitical appeal among the ASEAN states, notwithstanding their lingering suspicions about China's ultimate strategic intentions. It also highlights a perception held by many Southeast Asians that the United States is increasingly indifferent to their area of the world, except for counterterrorism.

A BROADER SECURITY PARADIGM

During the Bush administration's second term in office, the United States has attempted to respond to ASEAN's embrace of a broader security paradigm. In November 2005, the United States signed the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership agreement, which was intended to increase collaboration on security, economic, and cultural issues by treating these categories as interdependent. The same month, Washington lifted its longstanding ban on arms exports to Indonesia, having realized that the burgeoning Indonesian democracy's efforts to promote security could never entirely satisfy the US Congress's unbending expectation that Indonesia adhere to US-style human rights standards and behavior. The December 2004 tsunami underscored the relevance of disaster relief as a key nonmilitary component in ASEAN's security agenda. The SARS pandemic's physical and psychological impact on the populations of Singapore and Vietnam drove home the point that Washington's contemporary security approaches to Southeast Asia need to be innovative and multifaceted.

Even the military dimensions of Southeast Asian geopolitics are changing rapidly. Traditional cold

war alliances emphasizing containment and deterrence have given way to relationships defined by how an external power can assist smaller states in preserving domestic political stability. The United States has designated both the Philippines and Thailand as major non-NATO allies, yet both countries are mired in conflicts with domestic insurgency groups, including jihadists, and both have recently confronted extra-constitutional challenges to their fragile democratic institutions.

Unlike their Northeast Asian counterparts and Australia, therefore, the Philippines and Thailand, along with most other ASEAN states, have been unable to devote the resources needed to modernize their military infrastructures so that they can be integrated easily into US strategic operations. Thailand—though it continues to host the annual Cobra Gold military exercise for the United States, Singapore, and allied nations—has declined several recent requests by Washington for permission to pre-position US military supplies for use in the Persian Gulf. The extent to which Thailand is now contributing viably to a US regional “footprint” is in doubt. The Philippines withdrew its small contingent of military personnel from Iraq in July 2004 in response to a civilian Filipino truck driver being taken hostage and threatened with beheading. Given this behavior by the United States' Southeast Asian treaty allies, cynical observers of US policy can feel justified in treating the phrase “coalition of the willing” with at least some derision.

US defense officials respond to such skepticism by noting that Thailand, the Philippines, and other ASEAN countries can contribute to regional security by pursuing the niche areas of defense most relevant to their own regional security environments. Examples would include countries' procuring precision-guided munitions and advanced combat aircraft to defend their 200-mile exclusive economic zones and maritime approaches from external state-centric predators or from sub-state threats such as piracy. However, a more conventional ASEAN multilateral defense—especially one in which the United States plays a key supporting role—appears to be only a distant prospect. Indonesia and Malaysia's rejection in mid-2004 of a proposal floated by the United States Pacific Command for a Regional Security Maritime Initiative illustrates the difficulty facing the United States in reversing Southeast Asian governments' historical preference for the “ASEAN Way,” with its emphasis on noninterference in internal affairs and its general aversion to great-power domination. ASEAN will balance and hedge against

both American and Chinese power as long as neither becomes dominant.

MAKING AND KEEPING FRIENDS

The Bush administration has enjoyed more tangible success in its efforts to upgrade strategic relations with India. Official policy statements have designated India as a rising democratic power ready to undertake global security responsibilities in partnership with the United States. Recent signs of closer strategic collaboration support this view: the issuing of a joint statement on strategic partnership by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh; the Indian Navy escorting US freighters through the Malacca Straits in April 2004 to support the US war effort in Afghanistan; the acceleration of joint naval exercises between 2005 and 2007; and, in March 2006, the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.

The latter development was significant in bringing India at least partially into the NPT regime. Although criticism of the Bush administration for recognizing a non-NPT state as a “legitimate nuclear power” has persisted in the US Congress, that body in December 2006 passed legislation supporting US-India civilian nuclear cooperation. The overall momentum for deepening US-India ties is unmistakably strong. In early 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney proposed that India join Australia, Japan, and the United States in forming a quadrilateral mechanism for security consultation and collaboration (an informal coalition of democratic states, rather than a formal alliance) to pursue mutual security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is unlikely India will abandon its traditional stance of neutrality to such an extent. But it is clear that New Delhi is pursuing balancing strategies of its own, positioning itself as a significant power whose views and interests must be taken into greater account by Washington, Beijing, and other regional security actors. These efforts are likely to succeed if China persists in building its military power to levels that increase American apprehensions about Beijing’s intentions and drive Washington to expand its defense relations with other regional powers. India’s status in America’s eyes as a potential strategic counterweight will also be enhanced if Pakistan—India’s nuclear rival and another US “major non-NATO ally”—contin-

ues to lose stability internally to the point that its utility as a partner in counterterrorist operations becomes questionable.

If Japan has remained the United States’ most important Asia-Pacific ally, Australia has continued as Washington’s most steadfast regional security partner. In the past decade Australia, under John Howard’s conservative government, has joined the United States and Britain as a key contributor to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a guarantor of stability in the arc of instability stretching from eastern Indonesia and East Timor into the wider South Pacific, and as a peripheral but increasingly polished interlocutor in multilateral regional security politics. The extent of Australia’s intelligence collaboration with (and access to) US counterparts is remarkable for a middle power. Washington places a high value on Australia’s propensity to cooperate with the United States in missile defense research and development, and to contribute unique defense capabilities in niche

areas of asymmetrical warfare.

How strongly Australian-American security collaboration persists beyond the Howard years—the Australian prime minister faces a

strong electoral challenge from Mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd before the end of 2007—will invariably be affected by future developments in Sino-American relations. China has recently moved past Japan to become Australia’s largest trading partner. For Australia, the prospect of having to choose between supporting the United States in a Taiwan conflict and remaining neutral, with all the risks that would entail for Canberra’s security relationship with Washington, constitutes a policy nightmare.

RESHAPING STRATEGY

How can the United States most effectively relate its security interests in the Asia-Pacific region to its ongoing global strategic posture in the post-9-11 era? Three broad approaches might be considered: treating the Asia-Pacific region as a critical element within an increasingly interrelated international security environment; integrating Asia-Pacific policy makers’ concerns about nontraditional security problems more fully into future US strategic planning; and assigning greater priority to regional multilateral security initiatives.

American critics insist that China is using multilateralism to drive a wedge between the United States and its regional allies.

Successive post-cold war US administrations have chosen, as their primary strategies for realizing US global interests, the promotion of American-style democracy and the linking of international security with trading policies and practices. This policy orientation, while appealing to the American public, has often been viewed by Asian policy makers as excessively unilateral and hegemonic, and has precipitated a defense of “Asian values” to neutralize what many Asians see as excessive American intrusion on their own cultural identities. Future US policy will need to focus on long-term US interests that Asia-Pacific and other international actors can understand and negotiate without fearing that they will only gain US support by adopting what the Americans would regard as good governance. Over time, globalization and capitalism will provide far more incentives for liberalization in developing societies than will any quest for social engineering emanating from Washington.

At the same time, it is justifiable and urgent for the United States to pursue interregional geopolitical alignments that are beneficial for all parties involved. Such a pursuit must entail the establishment and perpetuation of stable Asia-Pacific and global power balances, the preservation of sufficient US military and economic assets for Washington to strongly influence how those power equilibriums will be shaped, and the incorporation of Asia-Pacific partners in regional security initiatives. Such initiatives should address minimizing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, neutralizing terrorism, and securing access to markets and energy by guaranteeing the safety of maritime commerce and the sustained development and distribution of global energy supplies.

The December 2004 Asian tsunami was seminal in sensitizing US policy makers and the American public to the intersection of traditional and non-traditional security dynamics. The policy management of future pandemics, global warming, food and water resources, and forced people movements—all important issues in many Asia-Pacific citizens’ daily existence—needs to be integrated into future US strategic planning for the region. To its immense credit, the US Pacific Command has already demonstrated a keen awareness of this imperative, spearheading joint training and development programs with regional counterparts for responding to future human security contingencies. The challenge inherent in such programs, however, is how to win the hearts and minds of the programs’ intended beneficiaries without simul-

taneously appearing to establish dominance over their cultural and sociopolitical identities and values. This problem becomes all the more difficult for strategic thinkers in a world where asymmetrical conflicts and resource deprivation are increasingly common. Striking a judicious and acceptable balance between intervention and the politics of assistance is a key requirement for successfully integrating regional and global security politics.

Ultimately achieving this balance depends on the United States transforming itself from a hierarchical player in the Asia-Pacific region and within global institutions into one more comfortable with sharing power and negotiating compromises. The days of hub-and-spoke alliances in America’s network of Asian bilateral security relationships are clearly numbered, yet no alternative form of regional security governance has emerged to take their place.

A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE?

American neoconservatives have recently envisioned the creation of new institutional entities organized around common democratic values or, more crudely, a China containment rationale. China, Russia, and others critical of this approach point to an expanded NATO (which now embraces consultations with “Pacific partners” such as Japan and Australia) as a destabilizing force in southeastern Europe and Central Asia. They have created new mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to neutralize what they regard as NATO’s unwarranted evolution into a global alliance. This trend correlates with China’s application of its New Security Concept to Asian institution-building. It illustrates the difficulties facing the United States in achieving strategic consensus among both its traditional rivals and its prospective security partners, a consensus that must be achieved if the region is to avoid slipping into a highly dangerous condition of multipolarity.

Avoiding this outcome fundamentally depends on finding a common basis for translating the interests and concerns of both the United States and Asia-Pacific countries into a new, more effective regional security architecture. The United States, although it remains a truly global strategic actor, has yet to demonstrate the will and capacity to interact with Asia-Pacific states in ways that allow it to be widely viewed as a valued and engaged security partner in an institutional context. Overcoming America’s image as indifferent is mandatory if the United States is to play an integral role in shaping future Asia-Pacific security politics and simultaneously to achieve its global security objectives. ■