Strategic partnerships are more flexible and potentially less destabilizing for Asian security than formal alliances. Yet, as David Envall and Ian Hall ask, does such flexibility come with a cost?
Kate Stevenson and David Envall, ‘The “Quad” and Disaster Management: An Australian Perspective’, in Yuki Tatsumi and Jason Li, eds, International Disaster Response: Rebuilding the Quad? W
H. D. P. Envall, ‘Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally’, in Michael Wesley, ed., Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Canberra: ANU Press, 2017, pp. 15-30.
Since becoming Japanese prime minister for a second time in 2012, Shinzō Abe has sought to remake Japan’s national security posture so that the country can play a more active role in international affairs. Abe’s reforms clearly constitute a transformational project, aimed at remoulding the fundamentals of Japanese strategic thinking. However, do Abe’s efforts constitute a coherent set of foreign and security policy principles or an “Abe Doctrine”? As Japan’s “chief diplomat,” Abe remains an ambiguous figure.
Nick Bisley and H. D. P. Envall, ‘The Morning After: Australia, Japan, and the Submarine Deal that Wasn’t’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, 346, 7 June 2016: 1-2.
